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The first chapter of this thesis presents a review of the li terature on the 
meaning of truth in the aftermath of violence. There, I argue that, historically, 
scholars have tried to justify the quest for truth in such circumstances (1) by 
reference to the benefits it brings, which is a type of instrumental justification; and 
(2) for its own sake, a type of intrinsic justification. Following my description and 
analysis of these two ideal typical accounts,  I present my own alternative 
approach to  truth in the aftermath of violence, which is a middle point between the 
two ideal types. This alternative approach provides a synthesis between knowing 
facts and telling testimonies; showing how the instrumental and intrinsic 
justifications of truth are actually closer than they appeared to be at first glance. 
The second chapter explores how this alternative approach could be materialized 
through a particular truth seeking mechanism such as a truth commission. The 
third chapter presents a methodological matrix, which systematizes my own vision 
of a bona fide truth commission. The matrix is made up of a series of 
consideratoions that are illustrated by analyzing two international experiences: the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) of South Africa and Sierra Leone. 
The fourth and last chapter seeks to demonstrate the utility of the proposed matrix 
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Beginning in the early 1980s, many Latin American countries underwent a change 
from authoritarian to democratic regimes. This change was far from peaceful. In 
some instances, it was a decades long, bloody contest, with many casualties, and 
it would take a peace agreement to bring an end to the hostilities between the state 
and various insurgent groups (e.g. Argentina, Chile, Peru, among others) (Teitel, 
2003, p. 75). In these transition processes, the question of impunity constantly 
cropped up among parties seeking to strike an unattainable balance between the 
former oppressors’ desire for everything to be forgotten and the victims’ quest for 
justice (Joinet & Rights, 1996). At the time, it was discussed whether disclosing a 
violent past in divided societies emerging from violent conflict would inflame 
passions, instill resentment, and provide grievances to be exploited (Mendeloff, 
2004, p. 355). There was the thesis that forgiving perpetrators and forgetting the 
past were the most effective ways of minimizing immediate threats to peace and 
further human rights abuses.  
 
Currently, there is no longer room for this sort of proposition. The right of the 
victims to know the truth has achieved the status of a customary international law 
norm as it is recognized as a key aspect of a robust doctrine to put an end to 
impunity (Cassel 2001: 409). Likewise, truth commissions have become de rigueur 
state-institutional tools for countries that emerge from long periods of oppression 
(Grunebaum, 2011, p. 3). These commissions have proliferated worldwide 
(Nauenberg, 2015) becoming a standard component of the transitional justice 
repertoire  (Heine & Turcotte, 2015). In the post-soviet world, the quest for truth 
has become so fashionable “that one can readily recognize what might be called a 
truth cascade”(Daly, 2008, p. 24). Currently, truth seeking is considered a central 
component in the strategy to respond to past atrocities (Hayner, 2011, p. 14).  
 
The literature on this topic has been dominated by a discussion about which 
truth seeking mechanisms are the most effective in order to address mass 
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atrocities: ad hoc international criminal courts (such as former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda), national criminal courts (Argentina), hybrid criminal trials (East Timor, 
Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Darfur and North Uganda) or truth commissions (South 
Africa, Peru, El Salvador). The various  authorities of these topics agree with the 
necessity to create proper conditions for a full exploration of the truth especially in 
areas where denial reigns and where violent facts are deliberately hidden 
(Mendez,2007: 198). However, they disagree with the process by which 
information should be disclosed and the purpose behind the disclosure.  Non-
prosecutorial mechanisms (truth commissions) focus more on restorative goals 
such as healing for victims, reconciliation across social divisions and so on. For 
instance, Martha Minow declares that responding to mass atrocities with legal 
prosecutions is simply embracing the rule of law, and that truth commissions are 
the preferred form because they offer more extensive therapeutic assistance and 
relief than prosecutions (Minow, 1999, p. 63). By the same token, Priscilla Hayner 
asserts that in criminal trials, victims are invited to testify only advance specific 
claims, and, during this process, are aggressively challenged by defense attorneys. 
In contrast, truth commissions “effectively give victims a public voice and bring their 
suffering to the awareness of the broader public”(Hayner, 2011, p. 22).  
 
On the contrary, prosecutorial mechanisms (criminal courts) focus more on 
goals such as promoting respect for human rights, preventing future violations, and 
punishing perpetrators. In that sense, Mark Osiel argues that criminal law is the 
most effective means to address the problems that new democratic rulers face in 
reconstructing some measure of trust, social solidarity, and collective memory. 
Trials present moments of transformative opportunity by highlighting official 
brutality and public complicity, and “often make people willing to reassess their 
foundational belief and constitutive commitments, as few events in political life can 
do”(Osiel, 1997, p. 2). Likewise, Raquel Aldana-Pindell asserts that victims prefer 
the truth to be revealed through a criminal process because alternative forums, 
such as truth commissions, compromise justice. The importance of this justice is 
that the state prosecutes and punishes “the perpetrators in a manner 
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commensurate with the grave nature of the violations” (Aldana-Pindell, 2002, p. 
1437).  
 
Recent times have seen a move away from the traditional 'either/or' 
approach to the establishment of these bodies (Bisset, 2012, p. 8). The United 
Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academics alike have 
affirmed the theoretical compatibility and complementary nature of these 
mechanisms1. 
  
 Although academics, the international community and civil society have 
broadly addressed different truth-seeking mechanisms, the nature of the truth that 
is being sought and its justification has scarcely been discussed. The concept of 
truth seems to be implicit and assumed within the discussion between those who 
defend the importance of truth commission as being closely related to a form of 
social constructivism and those who defend the possibility of satisfying the right to 
truth, through criminal courts, arguing a realism approach to the notion of truth. 
Social constructivists defend the thesis that all facts are description-dependent, 
that is, we construct a fact by accepting a way of talking or thinking that describes it 
(Boghossian, 2007). Therefore, the truth is dependent on the historical context: the 
possibility of truth and falsehood is conditioned by styles of reasoning (Rabinow, 
1986). Hence, there are multiple and contending truths (Payne, 2008), all of which 
are malleable and contradictory (Milton, 2007). Following this epistemology, 
Hayner, who argues in favor of truth commissions, equates the truth with the type 
of abuses selected and documented through a consensus among the 
commissioners. In this sense, the personalities of the commissioners, the 
methodology used and the questions asked in collecting and analyzing information 
                                                 
1
 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (eds.), Transition al Justice in the  Twenty-First 
Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Charles Villa-Vicencio, 
'Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and 
Truth Commissions Meet' (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal 205; Charles Villa-Vicencio, 'The Reek of 
Cruelty and the Quest for Healing: Where Retributive and Restorative Justice Meet' (1999-2000) 14 
Journal of Law and Religion 165; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23 
August 2004; Amnesty International, Truth , Justice and Reparation: Establishing an Effective Truth 
Commission, 11 June 2007. 
4 
 
define the very nature of the truth that truth commissions will collect (Hayner, 
2011). By the same token, other authors define the facts that victims seek to know 
as socially constructed and equate the truth to the “victims’ story” (Van den 
Wyngaert, 2006). In other words, the true value of the facts related by the victims 
does not depend on whether they describe the crimes as they really happened in 
the past, rather “faith is given to their testimony by their words breaking the silence 
and asserting their right to speak out against the genocide they survived”(Sanford, 
2009, p. 47). The multiplicity, subjectivity and mutual incompatibility that are 
intrinsic to the constructivism concept of truth, render the goal of truth commissions 
to establish a single official record (Daly, 2008, p. 25). 
 
On the contrary, realism recognizes the social relativity of descriptions and 
refuses the idea that a description can be dependent of the facts (Boghossian, 
2007). The schemes we adopt to describe the world depend on which ones we find 
useful, and they therefore depend on our contingent needs and interests as social 
beings. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the facts are description-dependent, or 
that we construct a fact by accepting a way of talking or thinking that describes it 
(Boghossian, 2007). Facts are mind-independent. In this sense, the truth is 
objective because what matters is the way the world is and not what we believe 
about the world (Lynch, 2005). What makes our beliefs true is always their 
relationship to real physical objects. Following this epistemology, legal documents 
that support the right to the truth assert that victims and their next of kin are entitled 
to know the reality about certain facts, the reality of what has happened (Rights, 
2000). Thus, the nature of the truth that victims are interested in knowing refers to 
what really happened. 
 
My dissertation seeks to offer a new theoretical approach to discuss the 
importance of one truth seeking mechanism in particular (truth commissions). 
Rather than discussing the strengths and weaknesses of establishing this 
mechanism and its merits over others, I suggest to discuss the very concept of 
truth that this mechanism is seeking to find.  In that sense, the first chapter 
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provides a review of the literature on the meaning of truth in the aftermath of 
violence and how it has been justified. There, I argue that historically, scholars 
have tried to justify the idea that truth matters in the aftermath of violence (1) by the 
benefits it brings, which is a type of instrumental justification; and (2) by its own 
sake, a type of intrinsic justification.  This chapter explains how these approach to 
truth have emerged in particular historical contexts and have been materialized into 
different symbols. To end this chapter I present my own approach to truth in the 
aftermath of violence (i.e. military dictatorship, authoritarian rule, ethnic, religious or 
civil conflicts, etc).  
 
The second chapter explores how this alternative approach to truth could be 
materialized through a particular truth seeking mechanism such as a truth 
commission. My approach to truth moves beyond the typical way of justifying the 
importance of truth commissions: the approach to truth I propose denies that the 
victim should be the protagonist of an isolated account (victim-centered character), 
on the contrary, the testimonies of the suffering must create bridges 
between victims and audiences who are reluctant to acknowledge their 
suffering. At the same time, my approach to truth denies that these Commissions 
have the capacity to deter future atrocities. These commissions attempt to 
understand the past in order to project a possible future which is not exempt from 
the repetition of already suffered violence. 
 
The third chapter presents a methodological matrix, which systematizes my 
own approach to a truth commission. This matrix proposes the main themes to be 
documented by a nascent truth commission and suggests a list of objectives that 
can serve as criteria for learning from previous international experiences and / or 
for a dialogue with current local experiences. Both international experiences and 
local initiatives can provide relevant input for defining the mandate of a future truth 
commission. The matrix synthesizes the historically traced tension between telling 
and acknowledging between narrating experiences of suffering and acknowledging 
criminal facts (documented in Chapter 1). It seeks to demonstrate that, in fact, such 
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tension between telling and knowing do not exist,  telling testimonies and knowing 
facts are two sides of the remedy victims claim: victims' experiences of suffering 
must be counted and listed but their questions about the factual circumstances 
surrounding their suffering must also be answered. The design of a truth 
commission should attend to both of these claims without postponing one to 
privilege the other. The matrix is made up of variables and dimensions that are 
explained by analyzing two international experiences: the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRCs) of South Africa and Sierra Leone. 
 
The fourth and last chapter seeks to demonstrate the utility of the proposed 
matrix by applying it to a particular case: the nascent truth commission of 
Colombia. The "Final Agreement for the Ending of the Conflict and the Building of a 
Stable and Durable Peace" (2016) assigned to the future Commission for the 
Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition (CVCR) has three main 
goals; eleven functions and a mandate that includes 13 aspects to be clarified and 
recognized. This last section seeks to systematize these objectives, functions and 
mandate in light of the methodological matrix, in order to analyze what could be the 
pending damages to be diagnosed and the possible remedies that the CVCR 
should explore. 
 
This exercise seeks to contribute to the definition of a well-crafted mandate 
focused on addressing the country’s truth deficits, avoid duplicating objectives that 
have already been satisfied in other instances, and to take advantage of local 
expertise to achieve the remaining goals.  
 
In sum, my dissertation begins suggesting a particular approach and 
justification of truth in the aftermath of violence, after that it uses this approach to 
define what a truth commission is (Chapter 2) and what it should do (Chapter 3). 
The definition of truth emerges from a theoretical discussion between those who 
associated it with the victim´s possibility to give their testimonies and those who 
defend the victim´s right to know facts. The novelty of this theoretical framework is 
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make the implicit, epistemological tension between giving testimonies and knowing 
the facts explicit. My alternative notion of truth in the aftermath of violence seeks to 
overcome this tension  in a  methodological matrix. This matrix suggests three 
issues to document: the first two issues (Context and background; and Criminal 
acts and implicated actors) are focused on satisfying the victims’ right to know the 
facts, whereas the third one (Impacts) is focused on giving victims’ the opportunity 
to tell their testimonies. Each one implies different sorts of speech situations. 
 
The most immediate contribution of this dissertation will ideally be to support 
the definition of a well-crafted mandate for the Colombian Truth Commission. 
Having clear and concise objectives might ensure that all participants of this 
particular truth commission have realistic expectations about what impact their 
contributions could have (González, 2013, p. 5) and controlling such expectations 
might save future truth commissions from generating cycles of high hopes and 





Chapter 1.  Approaches to Truth in the Aftermath of 
Violence 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a literature review on ideas of 
truth, truth commissions and the right to know the truth, by answering the following 
question: How has the importance of truth been defined and justified in the 
aftermath of violence?  
 
To answer this question I use two ideal types, drawing inspiration from in 
Max Weber`s concept. According to Weber, “an ideal type is formed by the one-
sided accentuation of one or more points of view” according to which “concrete 
individual phenomena … are arranged into a unified analytical construct” (Weber, 
1904). In this chapter, I suggest  two ideal types which accentuate two different 
approaches to truth in the aftermath of violence: (i) truth as telling testimonies and 
(ii)  truth as knowing testimonies. These approaches are not clearly separated in 
reality – indeed, none of them can be found empirically in reality. However, as ideal 
types, they contribute to  making explicit some epistemological tension I wish to 
overcome in a methodological matrix (chapter 3). My own approach consists of a 
middle point between the two ideal types. 
 
Table 1. How has the importance of truth been defined and justified in the 
aftermath of violence? 
 
 Instrumental justification Intrinsic justification 
Approach to  truth  Telling testimonies Knowing facts 
Context Exaltation of extra-judicial 
truth-finding mechanisms 
Impossibility of finding 




and justice  
Settled at the national level International and 
mandatory standards 
Genesis South Africa TRC Fight against impunity 
(Latin America) 
Initial symbol Public hearings Right to know 
Power attributed 
to truth 
Promoting healing for 
victims  






If the justification for processes such as truth-telling commissions is 
instrumental, the nature or the very definition of truth is irrelevant. What is 
important is the practical benefits of providing victims the opportunity of telling their 
own experiences of suffering and their testimonies; what matters “is not so much 
what is told, but rather that telling occurs” (Sanders, 2000, p. 18). Testimonies 
recounted by victims, and to which empathic audiences listen, are accepted in 
some sense, not because they exactly correspond to the way events happened in 
the past, but because the process of recounting what is said to be a fact serves 
many present and ongoing interests, e.g., promoting healing for individual victims, 
promoting reconciliation across divisions created by the collective violence, 
restoring dignity to victims, etc. For this approach, the very notion of truth is 
irrelevant but that doesn’t mean truth doesn’t exist; in that sense, it is possible to 
associate this sort of justification with a particular approach to truth, which I call 
truth as telling testimonies.  The public hearings of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) are a symbol of this approach to truth, where it 
was assumed that truth-telling was a healing and cathartic experience for victims 
and public hearings materialized these therapeutic powers of telling (See Table 1). 
 
Ruti Teitel suggests three phases to determine the genealogy of transitional 
justice2:  phase I emphasises international judicial mechanisms (the Allied-run 
Nuremberg Trials, 1945); phase II is related with national extrajudicial mechanisms 
and the third phase is characterized by the international trend to standardize the 
synthesis between judicial, extrajudicial and social transitional mechanisms. The 
genesis of truth as telling testimonies and its justification can be located in Phase 
II, which is characterized by the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
led to concurrent transitions throughout much of the world. During this phase, the 
tension between punishment and amnesty were settled at the national level taking 
                                                 
2
 Teitel defines transitional justice as a conception of justice associated with periods of political 
change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes (Teitel, 2003, p. 69).  
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into account the political and social contingencies, including the requirements of 
the predecessor regime. In that sense, South African TRC was the political 
compromise reached between the former elites and their desire to gain amnesties 
and the sectors that wanted to bring them to trial (Hazan & Stadelhofen, 2010, p. 
33). This local agreement was supported by a discourse which hailed the benefits 
of extra-judicial truth-finding mechanisms and condemned the judicial truth as 
fragmentary and contrary to reconciliation aims (Uprimny & Saffón, 2006, p. 15).  
 
Yet another viewpoint has claimed the importance of truth as intrinsically 
justified—that truth is worth caring about for its own sake, independent of whatever 
therapeutic or other benefits the truth brings to people. The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights assert that victims and 
their next of kin have the right to “know the truth regarding the violations to the 
fullest extent practicable” (OAS, 1987). These tribunals likewise assert that  “every 
society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events in order to 
prevent repetition of such acts in the future”(OAS, 1987). Truth is the ideal 
standard of satisfaction of the right to know. Statements made by victims, revealed 
by perpetrators, or discovered by judges or commissioners are accepted as true 
insofar as they correspond to and describe the way events actually happened in 
the past. I call this approach truth as knowing facts.  
 
I relate the genesis of the approach to  truth as knowing facts with the “fight 
against impunity” undergone in Latin America, which sought to overcome the 
obstacle of uncovering the truth through judicial mechanisms3. Following Teitel’s 
way of thinking, the genesis of truth as telling testimonies and its justification can 
be located in Phase III. Amnesty laws addressed exclusively at the national level, 
were replaced by international and mandatory standards. As a result, the new 
international status of victims’ legal rights made amnesty laws globally illegal and 
                                                 
3
 Surely this notion of truth has played roles in many judicial settings for millennia, however, 
because I am talking specifically about truth in the aftermath of violence and truth as response to 




the right to truth a safeguard against its illegality. This right materialized the 
approach to truth as knowing facts and the power attributed to this truth was the 
possibility to offer a remedy to victims of human rights violations (see Table 1). The 
notion of remedy is inspired by the universally recognized “right to an effective 
remedy” which holds that harm  must be remedied partially or integrally. There is a 
broad consensus between primary international human rights tribunals (Inter-
American and European) in considering truth, in itself, as an effective remedy in 
the wake of gross human rights abuses (Antkowiak, 2001). The rationale of this 
right would appear to lie in the right of victims or of their families to be informed 
about the events in question in order to offer a sense of closure, enable their 
dignity to be restored and provide a remedy and reparation for violations of their 
rights and/or the loss suffered (Naqvi, 2006, p. 249). The notion of remedy will be 
explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 Literature reviewed on the instrumental and intrinsic justifications of truth 
with their respective approach to truth (historic approaches) are introduced in the 
first part of this chapter and  the second part illustrates the risk that implies both 
historical approaches of truth. The last part of the chapter suggests how an 
alternative notion of truth can overcome these risks.  My own approach is a middle 
point between the two ideal types.  It provides a synthesis between knowing facts 
and telling testimonies; showing how the instrumental and intrinsic justifications of 
truth are actually closer than they appeared to be at first glance.  
 
1. Historical Approaches and Justifications of of Truth in the 
Aftermath of Violence 
1.1 Truth as Telling Testimonies  
The genesis of this notion of truth might be located in the creation of the 
South African TRC.  After more than twenty years of increasing ethnic exclusion 
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and abuses, an official racial segregation policy —the Apartheid4— was 
established in South Africa.   Most of the organized protests and active oppositions 
of curtailed groups were silenced with violence and abuse. At the end of the Cold 
War, between 1990 and 1993, and after some international sanctions, a series of 
negotiations started between the government party and the African National 
Congress (ANC). Democratic elections were held in 1994 and an interim 
constitution was passed. The dichotomy between truth and justice was settled on 
the national level. The former elite was determined to gain amnesty and the ANC 
initially sought to go to trial; however, the ANC did not want some of its own 
powerful militants to be judged.  The TRC was formed in 1995 to investigate 34 
years of conflict5 and it fulfilled the political compromise reached between these 
two conflicting demands (Hazan & Stadelhofen, 2010, p. 33).  
 
The TRC accomplished its mandate through three committees: The 
Amnesty Committee; the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee; and the 
Human Rights Violations Committee. The Amnesty Committee considered and 
revised the applications for amnesty. Conditional amnesty in exchange for 
confession did not seek to foreclose truth-seeking, but rather to promote it as 
amnesties motivated perpetrators to reveal themselves and opened cycles of 
betrayal. This sort of dynamic secured the statements and explanations of violent 
acts otherwise unavailable, especially because outgoing authorities destroyed 
records and closed ranks (Minow, 1999, p. 56). Indeed, families of the victims 
obtained information and confessions from hundreds of state agents that could 
never have been obtained through a trial (Hazan & Stadelhofen, 2010, p. 34).  
 
The Human Rights Violations Committee investigated human rights abuses 
that took place between 1960 and 1994, based on statements made to the TRC   
and once victims of gross human rights violations were identified they were 
                                                 
4
 Apartheid is a word in Afrikaans, an official language spoken mostly by Dutch descendants in 
South Africa. The word means something like «aparthood», i.e., the characterization of something 
which is kept away (Clarkson and Worger 2013).  
5
 The final report was officially published on 1998 but was unable to finish all of its work; thus, it was 
given until 2003 to finish its investigations and publish a codicil that included its final results.  
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referred to the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee. The Human Rights 
Violations Committee organized public hearings where victims and witnesses were 
invited to give testimony in their home language. The hearings were non-
adversarial and supportive forums, which were not accorded with the rules of 
evidence such as those required in criminal proceedings. The commission took 
testimony from over 21,000 victims and witnesses, 2,000 of whom also appeared 
in public hearings (Hayner, 2011, p. 146). 
 
The South African message was, in essence, that restorative justice is more 
effective and more morally correct than criminal justice (Hazan & Stadelhofen, 
2010, p. 34). The TRC's final report states that "even if criminal prosecution has 
been politically feasible ... strengthening the restorative dimension of justice" 
helped to build a bridge between "the past of a deeply divided society 
characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice and a future founded 
on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful coexistence and 
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of color, race, class, 
belief or sex." (Hazan & Stadelhofen, 2010, p. 34).  
 
 Instead of defining crime in terms of breaking the law and focusing on the 
abstract violations, the restorative justice6 approach defines it in terms of the harm 
done by one person to another and focuses on the problems of the persons directly 
involved: victim and offender (Trenczek, 2015). In its conventional understanding, 
restorative justice is concerned with responding to a particular (violent) incident on 
the micro-level, however, it is possible to understand this kind of justice in the 
context of large-scale conflicts. The process contributes to relational aspects 
between members of the opposing collectives due to its communicative process 
and the development of a consensual agreement (Rohne, Arsovska, & Aersten, 
                                                 
6
 Johnstone, G., & Van, N. D. W. (2007). Handbook of restorative justice. Cullompton: Willan; 
Sullivan, D., & Tifft, L. (2006). Handbook of restorative justice: A global perspective. London: 
Routledge; Monterosso, S., & Curtin University of Technology. (2007).  Restorative justice: A new 
paradigm?. Perth, W.A: School of Business Law, Curtin Business School, Curtin University of 
Technology. Johnstone, G. (2003). A restorative justice reader: Texts, sources, context. 




2008, p. 15). Its major challenge in the context of large-scale conflict is “the fact 
that the incident at the micro-level cannot be isolated from its more general – 
historical, political and social – context” (Rohne et al., 2008, p. 19). 
 
Although victims are popularly viewed as vindictive , seeking retribution 
above all else, research now indicates that many victims place considerable – in 
some cases predominant weight on other values, including information, 
participation, material reparation, and symbolism (Nancy Amoury Combs, 2007, p. 
137). In that regard, victims participating in restorative-justice programs are more 
likely to feel that their needs and views have been taken into account (Nancy 
Amoury Combs, 2007, p. 137). 
 
Indeed, the South African victim´s experience of testifying before people 
who seemed to understand and believe their pain was a new experience, sharply 
contrasted with many instances in which victims were treated as a source of 
annoyance or inconvenience:    
 
“On being asked by the TRC chairman to sit down before 
and during a testimony, a woman remarked that in all the years 
that she had dealt with officialdom around issues of her 
victimization, she had never been asked to sit down. It made a lot 
of difference to her and to her sense of dignity”. (Rotberg & 
Thompson 2000, 161) 
 
Additionally, echoing the assumptions of psychotherapy and religious 
confessions, the slogan of the TRC was “revealing is healing”. Some authors have 
asserted that the action of telling could be considered a therapeutic instrument 
(Cienfuegos & Monelli, 1983, p. 43)  by allowing for  1) testimonial acts that 
restored affective ties; 2) the orientation of aggression in a constructive manner; 
and 3) the integration of fragmented experiences. This experience of testimony has 
been found to be effective in providing symptomatic relief for certain patients, as it  
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facilitates the integration of the traumatic experience and restoration of self-esteem 
(Cienfuegos & Monelli, 1983, p. 43). 
 
In the South African TRC, the therapeutic process was explained through 
the metaphor of the injured body whose festering wounds can heal only by being 
painfully re-opened and cleansed through (Shaw, 2009, p. 6). Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, Chair of the TRC, set forth these ideas in the Commission’s final 
report: 
 
“There were others who urged that the past should be forgotten—glibly 
declaring that we should ‘let bygones be bygones’. This option was rightly 
rejected because such amnesia would have resulted in further victimisation of 
victims by denying their awful experiences… The other reason amnesia 
simply will not do is that the past refuses to lie down quietly. It has an 
uncanny habit of returning to haunt one. ‘Those who forget the past are 
doomed to repeat it’ are the words emblazoned at the entrance to the 
museum in the former concentration camp of Dachau. They are words we 
would do well to keep ever in mind. However painful the experience is, the 
wounds of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. 
They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they can heal. 
This is not to be obsessed with the past. It is to take care that the past is 
properly dealt with for the sake of the future” (Shaw, 2009, p. 8). 
 
1.1.1 The Instrumental Importance of Truth:  Building Narratives of the Past. 
 
As it was seen in the TRC case, telling testimonies was justified by its power 
to heal and overcome the peripheral status of victims. However, recent 
ethnographic and psychological studies have challenged the claim that truth telling 
is healing, arguing that the experience of testifying can be traumatic, rather than 
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healing or cathartic7. Testimony in therapy often is seen as an important ritual for 
individual healing (Agger & Jensen, 1990; Skaar, Gloppen & Suhrke, 2005 in 
Brounéus, 2008). Nonetheless, the long-term ability of a once-off statement or 
public testimony to address the full psychological impact of the past is questionable  
(Hamber, 2003a, p. 160): “In South Africa the revealing of the truth and the 
reopening of wounds have been extremely painful. Some survivors and families of 
victims only began to experience a range of psychological problems months after 
their testimony” (Hamber, 2003a, p. 160). Broneus points out similar effects for 
women in Rwanda who testified in the Gacaca, village tribunals created to enhance 
reconciliation after the 1994 genocide, as traumatization, ill-health, isolation, and 
insecurity dominated the lives of these women (Brounéus, 2008, p. 57).  
 
 Likewise, a 2009 psychological study which analyzed fifteen trials8, 
concluded that single sessions of psychological “debriefing” are insufficient in 
reducing psychological distress and preventing the development of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) after traumatic events. The study asserts that despite 
debriefing being used as a grassroots type of intervention that has face value and 
popular support amongst many health and allied practitioners… “the practice of 
                                                 
7
 Bernard Rimé et al., “The Social Sharing of Emotions in Interpersonal and in Collective Situations: 
Common Psychosocial Consequences,” in Emotion Regulation and Well-Being, ed. Ivan Nyklíček, 
Ad Vingerhoets, and Marcel Zeelenberg (Springer New York, 2011), 147–63; Catherine C. Byrne, 
“Benefit or Burden: Victims’ Reflections on TRC Participation,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace 
Psychology 10, no. 3 (2004): 237–56; James C. Ballenger et al., “Consensus Statement Update on 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder from the International Consensus Group on Depression and Anxiety,” 
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 65 (2004): 55–62; Brandon Hamber, “Does the Truth Heal? A 
Psychological Perspective on Political Strategies for Dealing wi th the Legacy of Political Violence,” 
in Burying the Past: Mak ing Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict , ed. Nigel Biggar 
(Washington, USA.: George Town University Press, 2003), 155–177; Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray, 
“Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?,” Signs 18, no. 2 (1993): 260–90; Brandon 
Hamber, Dineo Nageng, and Gabriel O’Malley, “Telling It like It Is Survivors’ Perceptions of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Psychology in Society 26 (2000): 18–42; Allan Marietjie, 
“The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as a Therapeutic Tool,” Behavioral Sciences & the Law 18, no. 4 
(2000): 459–77; Trudy De Ridder, “The Trauma of Testifying : Deponents’ Difficult Healing 
Process,” Track Two 6, no. 3&4. 
8
 Most trials involved those admitted to hospital following trauma , or attending trauma clinics 
(Sijbrandij 2002; Campfield 2001) ) or  recruited subjects via the local police and medical services. 
One study (Litz 2004) involved soldiers deployed on a peacekeeping mission.   
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compulsory debriefing should cease pending further evidence”(Rose, Bisson, 
Churchill, & Wessely, 2002, p. 42). 
 
I completely agree with Hamber in that telling testimonies might be only one 
component of the victim’s typically lengthy and painful healing process, that in itself 
is insufficient to meet an individual’s myriad of psychological needs (Hamber, 
2003a, p. 160). In my opinion, it is naïve to believe that one session of 
remembering and telling affords that individual with the ability to come to terms with 
the pain and trauma of the past and resume the course of the victim’s life. 
Testimony can be a part of the therapeutic process, but the idea of process implies 
something broader and more comprehensive than what could be achieved in one 
single session. For instance, during the 1970s, the use of testimony as a 
therapeutic tool was developed in Chile in the underground work carried out to help 
victims of the military dictatorship. However, the method employed for such therapy 
usually had a duration of 12-20 weekly sessions, depending on the client's 
situation (Cienfuegos & Monelli, 1983, p. 119). 
 
Besides the discussion about the healing power of telling, there are authors 
who have explored alternative benefits: the opportunity to tell multiplies equally 
valid versions of the past, raises consciousness of a more tolerant and democratic 
society (Laplante, 2007, p. 441) and embodies “a tool for the empowerment of the 
hitherto powerless”(Rappaport, 1990, p. 18). 
 
Cynthia Milton, exploring alternative truth narratives to official initiatives, and 
Leigh A. Payne, analyzing perpetrators’ confessions, come to the same conclusion 
as Erin Daly that  “a new regime that is truly democratic and open, must tolerate 
continued efforts to challenge the dominant view of history” (Daly, 2008, p. 29). 
Milton´s concept of a “fractured past” recalls that history remains contested and 
unresolved in the present, far from any kind of consensus or single version (Bilbija, 
Fair, Milton, & Payne, 2005, pp. 3, 5). Art, music, film, humor, performance, and 
memory try to push the frontiers of the discussion about the past and help to 
18 
 
achieve a fuller expression and better understanding of a difficult and contested 
past. Official truths rely on the alluring fiction that carefully managed processes can 
yield an objective consensus. They forge a shared understanding of the past to 
move forward quickly and to put the nation's difficult past behind it. Yet, unofficial 
accounts, reflecting the messy subjectivity of lived experiences, have staying 
power. A traumatized society, comprising so many stories, does not put the past 
quickly behind it (Bilbija et al., 2005, pp. 3, 5).(Payne, 2008) 
 
For Payne, consensus, harmony, and equality are unlikely outcomes. 
Nevertheless, contentious coexistence offers a more realistic understanding of 
dialogical practices in democracies, as well as a better alternative to reconciliation 
processes that suppress political talk. Contentious coexistence emphasizes the 
reality and importance of competition over ideas, and conflict over values and 
goals (Payne, 2008, p. 3). 
 
From this approach, there is no “superior framework” to judge or evaluate 
between different understandings of the past.  That does not matter. What matters 
is the freedom of expressing different (and even contradictory) testimonies. For 
McAdams this process not only preserves democratic institutions and the rule of 
law, but also, nurtures and educates active citizen participation (McAdams 1997).  
 
The democratic impact of the telling process is also related with “the 
possibility of empowering where the formerly silenced become protagonists” 
(Sanders, 2000, p. 20). Kirk Simpson argues that the history of political “terror has 
exacerbated the isolation of victims, quarantining their narratives of experience and 
grief, and silencing and alienating them from the societal mainstream” (Simpson, 
2007, p. 335). The legacy of violence has “seal[ed] victims off from mainstream 
public and political participation” (Humphrey, 2003, p. 173). Silence can make a 
human rights violation all the more degrading since it implies that the person does 
not even deserve to complain, making them less human than the rest (Rappaport, 
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1990, p. 18). Silence denies victims their humanness, their status as a speaking 
subject.    
 
Thanks to telling initiatives, what was unthinkable during the authoritarian 
regime became possible (Laplante, 2007, p. 448): victims emerge as citizens from 
behind the wall of silence imposed by violent conflict (Simpson, 2007: 339). So the 
audience validated the individual subjective experiences of people who had 
previously been silenced. Finally, marginalized individuals were respected and 
taken seriously in public and empathic spaces. 
 
1.2. Truth as Knowing Facts  
 
Truth as knowing testimonies might be related with the fight against impunity 
undergone in Latin America between 1990s and 2000s9 . While in South Africa 
conditional amnesty promoted truth seeking, in Latin America granted amnesties 
foreclosed truth-finding processes. Before leaving power, in fear of being held 
accountable for their crimes, the dictatorships granted themselves immunity from 
prosecution. These sorts of amnesties laws were addressed exclusively at the 
national level, taking into account the local and political conditions.  Prior to this, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the international community agenda was interested in the 
significant socio-economic difficulties of developing countries and not in impunity or 
disclosure of the truth (Dykmann, 2007, p. 60). Liberal Western policymakers and 
political scientists did not speak of “transitions to democracy,” but rather of 
socioeconomic modernization as a precondition of an evolutionary process of 
political development (Arthur, 2009, p. 338). 
 
                                                 
9
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that Peruvian amnesty laws did not apply (Barrios 
Altos v. Peru) because international conventions required prosecution in such human rights crimes. 
Former Chilean president Augusto Pinochet was detained in London (1998) using the principles of 
universal jurisdiction. The Argentine Supreme Court struck down the country’s amnesty laws which 
blocked the prosecutions of crimes committed under the country’s military dictatorship.  
20 
 
Nevertheless, during the second half of the 1980s, United Nations and the 
Inter-American Human Rights System completely changed the approach to past 
abuses and gave a new mandatory status to the victims’ legal rights. Both 
authorities developed a broad energetic doctrine to put an end to impunity (Cassel, 
2001, p. 409) and set up the right to the truth as a safeguard against it.   
 
Victims and organizations fighting against impunity resorted to international 
law to support their case. Since the end of World War II, even though no clear 
prohibition had been formulated against amnesties or pardons, law and the 
international community showed a clear tendency to prevent the impunity of certain 
crimes considered morally repudiable. Given that this trend required elaboration 
and systematization, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, consistent 
with previous pronouncements against the self-amnesty laws issued by the 
dictatorships of Chile, Argentina and Brazil, challenged The Law on 
the Expiration of the Punitive Claims of the State (Uruguay) and the laws of the 
Final Point and Due Obedience (Argentina), finding these laws to be incompatible 
with the American Convention on Human Rights (Méndez, 1997). 
 
 For its part, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is the 
interpretative body of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ruled 
the laws contrary to the right of victims to justice and to knowledge of the truth 
(Méndez, 1997). The United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of principles 
for the protection and promotion of human rights through actions to combat 
impunity. Following this recommendation, Mr. Louis Joinet prepared a set of 
principles (1996) for this purpose.10 He justified these principles in reference to 
victims' legal rights: (a) the victims' right to know; (b) the victims' right to justice; 
and (c) the victims' right to reparations. In his report, the UN (1996) indicated that 
                                                 
10
 Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take 
appropriate measures in respect to the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring 
that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished; to provide 
victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to 
ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to 
prevent a recurrence of violations (UN, 2005, Principle 1). 
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the truth of the events should be known in order to find those who are responsible 
and punish them for their atrocities. Since then, the right to truth has become 
increasingly visible in international human rights legal discourse, as it has been 
progressively recognized as a binding legal obligation. 
 
Both the Inter-American Human Rights System and The United Nations 
have defined the right to know the truth in two dimensions. In its individual 
dimension, it asserts that victims and victims’ next of kin have the right to “know the 
truth regarding the violations to the fullest extent practicable, in particular the 
identity of the perpetrators, the causes and the circumstances under which they 
occurred.”(OAS, 2009). In its collective dimension, this right establishes that “every 
society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events . . . in order to 
prevent repetition of such acts in the future.”(OAS, 1987). In both cases, the right 
to truth implies “the same – or a very similar – consideration: to know the reality 
about certain facts.” (Rights, 2000)  
 
Additionally, the victims’ right to know the truth has been considered one of 
several remedies suggested for victims of human rights violations: “knowing the 
truth about the circumstances and the treatment or death of the victims is 
considered part of any remedy accorded to victims or their families” (Pasqualucci, 
1994, p. 332) The notion of remedy emphasizes the universally recognized «right 
to an effective remedy» which holds that human rights violations produced 
damages that must be remedied (Rights, 2000, p. 42). 
 
 The origin of the right to truth explains quite well why knowing facts is 
considered a remedy. This origin may be traced to the right under international 
humanitarian law of families to know the fate of their relatives, as well as the 
obligations incumbent on parties to armed conflicts to search for persons who have 
been reported missing, as recognized by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. To 
properly mourn their losses, loved ones need to confirm their death, how they died, 
why they disappeared, where their remains are buried, etc. (Aldana-Pindell, 2002, 
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p. 1428). In absence of these answers, the uncertainty of what happened is more 
painful than the truth itself. Knowing the fate or whereabouts of a missing victim 
offers a sense of closure  to the next of kin (Aldana-Pindell, 2002, p. 1440). 
 
1.2.1. The Intrinsic Importance of Truth: Knowing Criminal Acts  
 
For instrumental justification (telling testimonies) the nature or definition of 
truth is irrelevant; it focuses on the practical benefits of processes that provide 
victims with the opportunity to tell their own narratives of suffering (their own 
“truth”). Conversely, for knowing facts, truth is worth caring about for its own sake 
(Lynch, 2005, p. 15). It focuses on the relevance to know the truth about criminal 
acts because it reduces the “power of the unknown”; the descriptive and evaluative 
dimension of the associated notion of truth seeks to describe criminal acts as they 
happened in the past to condemn them as morally wrong; and the materiality of 
past acts allows confronting ideological thinking with reality. 
 
For purposes of clarity, I define criminal acts as core factual matters that 
happened in the past and produced an ongoing illegal harm that should be 
remedied in different dimensions (legal, moral, financial and psychological, among 
others). This sort of damage has a dialogic structure, which refers to two opposite 
but related components: the damage committed by someone finds its other half in 
the damage suffered by someone else (Ricoeur, 1995, p. 259).  
 
A criminal act is mind-independent in the sense that it exists even if no one 
had asked about it (i.e. international community) or everyone had denied it (i.e. 
dictator). The clandestine nature of the act, closely linked with tyrannies or 
dictatorial regimes explains well the mind-independent character of criminal acts: 
the damage of this criminal act does not disappear because the criminal act is 
denied or ignored, on the contrary, the more unknown criminal acts are, the more 
harmful the power to damage becomes. The clandestine nature of torture and 
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abuse doubles the pain of those experiences with the disbelief of the community 
and even jeopardizes the victim's own memory and sanity (Minow, 1999, p. 67):   
 
  “When loved ones were missing, those left went first to the local 
police station and were treated in many instances as nuisances, and in 
many more as people who were of no consequence. When they went to 
state hospitals looking for sons and daughters and fathers and mothers, 
they received similar treatment. It was no better when they went to the 
mortuary in a final attempt to find a missing person.”(Rotberg &  Thompson 
2000, 154) 
Knowing the truth about criminal acts seeks to reduce the “power of the 
unknown”. To unveil what was hidden or denied is a remedy to the ongoing 
damage. To reveal what vanished without a trace and became invisible to the 
public reduces the power of the damage caused.  
 
Additionally, truth is worth caring about for its own sake because of its 
descriptive and evaluative dimension: describing criminal acts as they happened in 
the past implies at the same time a judgment that they are morally wrong. 
Statements such as “x killed y”, “a disappeared b”, “c raped d”, “massacre x 
happened”, etc.” implicitly contain both characterizing and appraising evaluation. 
The very factual description of these criminal acts asserts that they are an 
undesirable condition.   
 
In the same vein, the materiality of past acts is the criterion to distinguish 
between facts and fiction, between reality and ideologies. Arendt, searching for the 
nature of totalitarian government, explains how ideology implies an arrogant 
emancipation from reality and experience: “Insofar as ideological thinking is 
independent of existing reality, it looks upon all factuality as fabricated, and 
therefore no longer knows any reliable criterion for distinguishing truth from 




For Arendt, total domination requires that man be fit into the ideologically 
determined, factitious world of totalitarianism. A good example of that is Adolf 
Eichmann, one of the principal organisers of Holocaust. During his trial in 
Jerusalem, he never admitted that he did something wrong, his mind was filled with 
effective lies: “that the war was no war; it was started by destiny and not by 
Germany; and, third, that it was a matter of life and death for the Germans, who 
must annihilate their enemies or be annihilated”. German society, which at that 
time consisted of eighty million people, had been shielded against reality and 
factuality by these lies as the practice of self-deception had become commonplace 
(Arendt, 1994, p. 52).  
 
Likewise, dictatorships in Latin America justified their crimes as a “War 
Against Subversion”, thereby holding that armed forces had done nothing more 
than annihilate this subversion. Similarly, in South Africa, racism was a systematic 
ideological doctrine which created the ‘other’ as essentially different: “blacks... 
were essentially different from the more civilised, developed people of European 
origins” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South, 1998, pp. 5, 7, 83).  
 
The importance of truth-as-knowing-facts in the aftermath of violence is that 
it allows ideological thinking to be confronted with reality. For Arendt, the stability of 
the totalitarian regime depended on the isolation of the fictitiousness of the 
movement from the outside world. Thus, once the ideological thinking is confronted 
with reality, its stability is in danger: 
 
“The real danger is the fact that the factitious, topsy-turvy 
world of a totalitarian regime cannot survive for any length of 
time if the entire outside world does not adopt a similar system, 
allowing all of reality to become a consistent whole, threatened 
neither by the subjective unpredictability of man nor by the 
contingent quality of the human world which always leaves 




The ideas of a “War Against Subversion”, "the battle of destiny for the 
German people", and Apartheid as “a white counter-revolution”, were masks and 
lies which justified criminal acts and thereby exacerbated the brute facts of the 
victims’ affliction.   
 
2. Risks of Historical Approaches to Truth in the Aftermath of 
Violence 
 
In sum, truth in the aftermath of violence has been historically justified in two 
senses: (i) by the benefits it brings (instrumental justification) and (ii) by its own 
sake (intrinsic justification).  First, for instrumental justification the nature or very 
definition of truth is irrelevant; it focuses on the practical benefits of processes that 
provide victims with the opportunity to tell their own narratives of suffering. Facts 
recounted by victims and listened to by an empathic audience are accepted as 
true, not because they exactly correspond to the way the events happened in the 
past, but because the process of recounting facts serves many present and 
ongoing interests. There is no parameter to establish which narrative of the past is 
“right” or “wrong”. Even the very distinction of “right” or “wrong” is nonsensical in 
this context because all versions should be equally accepted. There are many 
versions of the past, however there is no reliable criterion that one can or should 
appeal to in order to judge or evaluate them. 
 
Second, for intrinsic justification, truth is worth caring about for its own sake.  
The very notion of truth is relevant because it allows for a description of criminal 
acts as they happened in the past, which also implies that they may be judged as 
morally wrong. The mind-independent character of the criminal act is the reliable 
criteria with which to judge and evaluate different versions of the past and 
determine which one is “right” and which one is “wrong”.  The descriptive and 
evaluative dimensions of the notion of truth allow one to confront ideological 




The differences between the instrumental and intrinsic importance of truth 
seem to suggest an irreconcilable opposition between past approaches to telling 
testimonies versus knowing criminal acts. It would then seem that the notion of 
truth must be defined and justified taking into account either the instrumental 
approach or the intrinsic approach, as they are mutually exclusive. For instance, 
Prisiclla Hayner doubts the importance of the perspective which focuses on 
specific facts, such as the names of perpetrators and victims as “this approach 
misses a greater reality: how were the violent acts experienced, and from what is it 
that people were trying to heal?” (Hayner, 2011, p. 81).  
 
From my own perspective, it is possible to offer an alternative notion of truth 
in the aftermath of violence which defeats this opposition and makes a synthesis 
between the benefits of telling testimonies AND knowing facts. For that purpose, it 
is necessary to be wary of the risk of each historical perspective.  I warn against 
the risk of focusing exclusively on the instrumental importance of truth in that this 
(1) could reproduce the victim´s isolation, which is precisely what the victim seeks 
to overcome and (2) does not resolve the ambiguity between narratives of the past 
that serve “good” purposes and those serving “bad” purposes. Likewise, I caution 
against the risk of focusing exclusively on the intrinsic importance of knowing facts 
as this can result in fact-finding impediments which impair the tribunals' ability to 
determine who did what to whom. This risk is exacerbated when high standards 
are set in order to recognize victims as legitimate sources of truth. This risk has 
been widely criticized from those who defend the superiority of truth commissions 





Table 2. Risks of Historical Notions of Truth  
 
Instrumental Justification Intrinsic Justification 
Victim´s isolation Past facts, ephemeral knowledge 
Truth as subordinated power (not 
as subversive power) 
Unbelievable victims, skeptical 
audience 
 
2.1 The Risky Side of the Instrumental Importance of Truth  
 
In my opinion, there are two potential risks that arise from focusing 
exclusively on the instrumental importance of truth and disregarding the notion of 
truth. I call the first risk “victim`s isolation”. If the very distinction of “right” or “wrong” 
makes no sense, and all the testimonies should be equally accepted, these 
testimonies become incommensurable and this incommensurability fails to leave 
room for channels of communication among different testimonies. When someone 
says "this is true for me," it is not "a matter of fact" but "a matter of experience". 
Likewise, when someone says "it is true for me but not for you" it is more often 
than not a roundabout way of saying: "I believe it, you don't, so let's talk about 
something else." These are conversation-stoppers which prevent us from having 
reasoned discussions about the issues that matter the most (Lynch, 2005, p. 35).  
 
Arendt´s concept of logicality refers to mere reasoning without regard to 
facts and experiences: “logicality is what appeals to isolated human beings, for 
man, in complete solitude, without any contact with his fellow men and therefore 
without any real possibility of experience, has nothing else he can fall back on but 
the most abstract rules of reasoning” (Arendt, 2011a, p. 358). Logicality is the risk 
of ideological thinking. The same risk also arises in the aftermath of violence if a 
victim’s testimonies are isolated reasonings that disregard facts and experiences; 
in this sense telling testimony becomes a new excuse for emancipation, for not 




Human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech, has the 
twofold character of equality and distinction: 
 
 “If men were not equal, they could neither understand each other 
and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the 
needs of those who will come after them. If men were not distinct, each 
human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, 
would need neither speech nor action to make themselves 
understood”(Arendt, 1998, p. 175).  
 
 The process of telling testimonies currently overestimates the importance of 
distinction and underestimates the importance of equality. I think the process of 
telling testimonies should shift the perspective to overestimating equality and 
underestimating diversity, in order to overcome the victim´s isolation by 
strengthening the human bond. The point is not to turn victims into protagonists of 
their own narrative, but to build bridges with empathic audiences who come before 
them to listen.  
 
The second risk, I call “truth as subordinated to power (not as subversive 
power)”. The instrumental importance of truth and disregarding the very notion of 
truth is related with the ambiguity between narratives of the past that serve “good” 
purposes and those serving “bad” purposes. The “good” practical interests that 
truth might serve are to overcome the peripheral status of victims and to recover 
civil and human dignity. Yet, there are some scholars who warn that truth might 
serve “bad” interests as well.  They warrant that the significance of the axiom that 
“history is written by the victors” has not been sufficiently explored in the context of 
the current mode of transitional justice: “The concept of victor’s truth often lies in 
the shadow of victor’s justice” (Daly, 2008, p. 7). From this approach the version of 
the past that is defined as true and official is the version which best fits to enhance 
the legitimacy of the current regime (Daly, 2008, p. 7). Likewise, other scholars 
support that truth seeking initiatives might be significantly influenced by external 
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factors such as international donors that tend to implement programs to insert poor 
countries emerging from conflicts into the world economy, promoting a pattern of 
development based on neo-liberal economic policies, instead of actually 
responding to the ravages of past human rights abuses (Lundy & MacGovern, 
2017, p. 276).  
 
These sort of arguments are shared in Foucault’s assertion that ‘‘truth’’ is 
nothing more than an expression of power through societal structures (Naqvi, 
2006, p. 23). Truth can be produced exclusively by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint: 
 
Each society has its regime of truth… that is, the types of 
discourse it accepts and makes function as true: the mechanisms 
and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements; the means by which each is sanctioned, the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true (Foucault, 1980, p. 207). 
 
The idea of a 'regime of truth' shows how truth is subordinated to power (Taylor, 
1991): “truth isn’t outside power or lacking in power, truth isn’t the reward of free 
spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have 
succeeded in liberating themselves” (Foucault, 1980, p. 207). For Foucault, power  
does both, represses and produces:  repression prohibits and restrains, setting 
limits to  what agents do and might desire, in that sense repression is negative; on 
the contrary, production is positive; power produces things, forms of knowledge, 
discourses,   etc (Lukes, 2005, p. 91). Mores specifically, power produces subjects, 
“makes up people” (Hackins, 1986.) The development of this idea falls into two 
phases of Foucault’s works: (i) his work on discipline and Volume I of the History of 
Sexuality, and (ii) the subsequent writings, from 1978 to his death in 1984, on what 
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he called “governmentality”; in most of his life, Foucault never ceased to affirm that 
power excludes both freedom and truth (Lukes, 2005, p. 91). 
 
 
I agree with authors who warn that the risk of Foucault’s notion of truth is 
that it implies exclusively a unidirectional account of power. He abandons the 
“emancipatory ideal of society in which individuals are free from negative effects of 
power, and the conventional view that power can be based on the rational consent 
of its subjects” (Hindees 1996: 149-58 in Lukes 92). For Foucault, “the relation of 
power is fixed in such a way that it is perpetually asymmetrical and the margin of 
liberty is extremely limited”.  There can be no liberation from power, either within a 
given context or across contexts (Lukes, 2005, p. 91). Within a given context, if 
truth is nothing more than an expression of power there is no room for criticism 
from the powerless. A belief passes for true, when those in power believe it (Lynch, 
2005, p. 40). If the powerless have a belief that is contrary to the beliefs of the 
powerful, they are simply deemed wrong (Lynch, 2005, p. 40).  Likewise, if the 
powerless move from one context to another this cannot be seen as a liberation 
because there is no common measure between the impositions of the one and 
those of the other.  They will be confined to a new model of control. There is no 
way of judging between ways of life, since each one imposes its own rules of 
judgment, and there are no other rules to go by, according to Foucault.  
 
In opposition of Foucault’s approach, and I completely agree with them, 
there are authors who assert that power does not make sense without the notion of 
liberation and the notion of truth (Taylor, 1991, p. 81). Lukes for instance, asserts 
that humans have a two-way power: one way is the ‘power over’ others, this is 
power as domination (Lukes, 2005, p. 95). The second way is ‘power to’, power as 
the capacity or the potential to resist, reject or make a change (Lukes, 2005, p. 95). 
He/She who has the power to dominate is imposing a restraint over others who 
cannot fulfil their desires/purposes. This imposition proceeds by foisting illusion on 
us, by disguising and masking, and by falsehood as well.  In certain situations, 
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certain impositions cannot simply be lifted, yet, in other circumstances, he/she who 
is dominated could resist the imposition, lift the mask and remove the restraint in 
order to fulfil their desires/purposes (Taylor, 1991, p. 91).  
 
From my own perspective, the “fight against impunity” shows how the 
powerless resisted imposition and moved on to a less oppressive regime. Although 
Argentina’s dictatorship officially denied any responsibility for the systematic 
practice of forced disappearance, the relatives of the disappeared for many years 
only demanded to know the truth about the fate of their loved ones11.   Ideological 
thinking (supported by dictatorship) asserted that “War Against Subversion” had 
done nothing but “annihilate subversion”, however, relatives of the disappeared 
had to lift their ideological masks and show how those masks sought to blind 
society from reality.  The subsequent transition from military dictatorship to 
democratic regimes that aspires to respect human rights might be thought of as a 
movement towards greater freedom. However, this sort of comparison is only 
possible because repressive and democratic regimes are considered 
commensurable and because human rights are a relevant criteria in comparing and 
tracking the path forward to a less oppressive regime.  
 
According to Foucault, this “movement towards a greater freedom” does not 
make sense. The transition only serves as a substitution for another system of 
power (Foucault, 1980, p. 207).  In other words, the human-rights pretension of 
universality is an illusion produced by Western hegemony, and the idea of 
comparability between authoritarian and democratic regimes is just a moral 
petulance disguise of ‘cultural imperialism’(Nickel, 2007, p. 57). 
  
                                                 
11
 In Argentina, over 5,000 reports were filed with the Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos 
Humanos (Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, or APDH) and thousands of complaints were 
submitted to the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR), the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Human Rights Division, 
Amnesty International and organizations of various religious denominations. These reports 
prompted country visits from Amnesty International and IACHR.   
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Consequently, I caution against placing too much emphasis on the 
instrumental importance of truth as this denies the victim the possibility to resist 
and remove the imposition, thereby allowing for a transition to a less oppressive 
context.  
 
2.2  The Risky Side of the Intrinsic Importance of Truth 
 
In my opinion, there are two potential risks that arise when one exclusively 
focuses on the intrinsic importance of truth: first, the difficulties in knowing the 
ephemeral facts that happened in the past and second, how these difficulties turn 
victims into subjects of doubt.  
 
Regarding the first risk, the right to know is based on the notion of “fact”. In 
her book, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720, Barbara Shapiro analyzes the 
processes by which fact became the most important feature of the English 
intellectual landscape in the early modern era, and how its method of fact-finding 
produced a well-accepted and widely admired epistemological framework (Shapiro, 
2003).  
 
 From the mid-16th to the early 18th century, English legal systems 
possessed an underlying epistemology, that is, a set of beliefs concerning the 
human ability to arrive to “true” and “just” decisions; then also found in other fact-
oriented genres and disciplines (Shapiro, 2003, p. 86). Although law deals with 
“transient things” of no "constant being" that had to be retrieved by memory 
(Shapiro, 2003, p. 30 y 208), this legal system was pervaded by the belief that 
ephemeral facts of human action could be established with a high degree of 
certitude. It required faith in the possibility of reaching adequate and reasonable 
beliefs about such events and a mode of thinking about what is knowable, about 
whom can achieve such knowledge, and under what conditions it is knowable, as 
well as the institutional arrangements and processes for knowing.  Historians, like 
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lawyers, assumed it was possible to know something about events that had taken 
place in the past (Shapiro, 2003). 
 
Proponents of the right to know the truth share this belief about the human 
ability to arrive to “true” and “just” decisions. Yet, there is a shadow of doubt 
regarding the feasibility of this epistemology: serious fact-finding impediments 
impair a tribunal’s ability to determine who did what to whom.  I call this risk “past 
facts, ephemeral knowledge” 
 
After reviewing thousands of pages of transcripts from various international 
criminal tribunals, Nancy Amoury Combs concludes that international criminal 
tribunals purport a fact-finding competence that they do not possess and, as a 
consequence, base their judgments on a less precise, more amorphous method of 
fact-finding than they publicly acknowledge (Nancy A. Combs, 2010). 
 
These tribunals do not regularly receive forensic evidence relevant to the 
charges in the indictments. In the aftermath of violence, some of the times, forensic 
experts are not able to perform autopsies and exhumations. Equally, the architects 
of more recent atrocities have left few written records, which often are not made 
available to prosecutors. Consequently, the vast bulk of evidence presented to the 
current international tribunals comes in the form of witness testimonies, which are 
frequently inaccurate. 
 
Tribunals have not always recognized the negative impact of stress on 
memory and perception. According to (Nancy A. Combs, 2010, p. 15),  conducted 
studies have proven that those who witness (or are victims of) violent events have 
a higher tendency to misperceive these events than witnesses of nonviolent events 
because their ability to perceive what is real diminishes when they experience 
stress. A substantial proportion of witnesses testify inconsistently with their written 
statements or with their in-court testimony in previous cases (Nancy A. Combs, 




Judicial mechanisms to overcome these limitations of eyewitness 
testimonies, such as the standards of proof and evidence, imply obstacles for 
victims to be recognized as legitimate sources of truth, a matter that has been 
widely criticized by those who defend the superiority of truth commissions over 
criminal trials (Du Toit, 2000, p. 136). I call this second risk “unbelievable victims, 
sceptical audience”. The most distinctive element of truth commissions, in 
comparison with a trial, is the tone of caregiving and sense of safety, which allow 
victims to tell a broad array of experiences of suffering. Trials focus on consulting 
victims only to illustrate the fact or scope of the defendants' guilt. Judges and 
lawyers  interrupt and challenge victims´ testimonies with cross examination and 
listen to them with scepticism tied to the presumption of the defendants' innocence 
(Minow, 2000, p. 238). Trials are also usually only designed to cover a very narrow 
set of events that constitute the crime for which the defendants are being charged. 
(Hayner, 2011, p. 22). On the contrary, a truth commission creates a welcoming 
setting and offers a friendly listening environment (Minow, 2000, p. 246).  
 
Despite the criticisms, I recognize the importance for victims´ testimonies to 
be subject to cross-examination and to the minimum rules of evidence, in some 
scenarios; this cross-examination is an alternative to dealing with the difficulties 
that a trial might present in knowing the truth about the elusive criminal acts that 
happened in the past. To illustrate my point, I would like to introduce the case of 
the Mapiripán Massacre before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 
1.2.1 The Mapiripán Massacre 
 
The massacre took place in July 1997 in the small town of Meta, located in 
central Colombia. An notoriously armed paramilitary group called the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC in Spanish) in collaboration with the Colombian 
military deprived, tortured and deprived civilians of their liberty, others were 




The Mapiripán case involved various domestic judicial actions and 
proceedings in Colombia. Despite these actions and proceedings, the Inter-
American Commission first noted that widespread impunity remained intact, 
“insofar as the truth of all the facts had not been established and not all the 
masterminds and direct perpetrators of those facts had been identified” (I/A & H.R, 
2005, p. 236). For that reason, on September 5, 2003, the Commission petitioned 
the Court to declare the case admissible. On September 15, 2005, the Court held 
Colombia responsible for having violated several of its obligations under the 
American Convention on Human Rights ( I/A & H.R, 2005).  
 
At the time of the Judgment, more than eight years had passed since the 
massacre and the remains of some of the victims had yet to be identified or even 
located, therefore the Court ordered the State to take the necessary actions to 
search and individually identify the victims and their next of kin and to also keep a 
record of the next of kin as they were identified (ICHR, 2205: paragraph 305). 
Despite these difficulties, the Court set the following amounts for pecuniary 
damages for the following identified victims12 (ICHR, 2205: paragraph 278): 
 
Antonio María Barrera Calle US $ 350.000 
Jaime Riaño Colorado US $ 35.000 
Enrique Pinzón López  US $ 80.000 
Jorge Pinzón López US $ 80.000 
Luis Eduardo Pinzón López US $ 90.000 
José Alberto Pinzón López US $ 90.000 
Gustavo Caicedo Rodríguez US $ 60.000 
Diego Armando Martínez 
Contreras  
US $ 100.000 
Hugo Fernando Martínez 
Contreras 
US $ 100.000 
 
                                                 
12
 According to the information supplied by the State in its brief with final pleadings and in an April 6, 
2005 document signed by the Attorney General’s Office, those persons were individually identified 
in the criminal proceeding as victims of the events in Mapiripán. 
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The following chart represents compensation for non-pecuniary damages for 





Six years after the Inter-American Judgment, in November 2011, the Justice 
Sinaí Blanco Santamaría US $80,000 
Nory Giraldo de Jaramillo (spouse)  US $50,000 
Carmen Johanna Jaramillo Giraldo (stepdaughter) US $55,000 
Álvaro Tovar Muñoz  US $80.000 
José Rolan Valencia  US $80.000 
Gustavo Caicedo Rodríguez US $80,000 
Diego Armando Martínez Contreras US $90,000 
Hugo Fernando Martínez Contreras US $90,000 
Mariela Contreras Cruz (spouse) US 
$150,000 
Yur Mary Herrera Contreras (stepdaughter and sister) US $67,000 
Zuli  Herrera Contreras (stepdaughter and sister) US $67,000 
Maryuri Caicedo Contreras (stepdaughter and sister) US $72,000 
Gustavo Caicedo Contreras (stepdaughter and sister) US $72,000 
Rusbel Asdrúbal Martínez Contreras (stepdaughter and 
sister) 
US $72,000 
Enrique Pinzón López  US $80,000 
Jorge Pinzón López US $80,000 
Luis Eduardo Pinzón López US $80,000 
José Alberto Pinzón López US $80,000 
Teresa López Triana de Pinzón (mother) US 
$200,000  
María Teresa Pinzón López (sister) US $34,000 
Sara Paola Pinzón López, (sister)  US $34,000 
Esther Pinzón López, (sister)  US $34,000 
Luz Mery Pinzón López (sister) US $34,000 
Jaime Riaño Colorado US $80,000  
Luz Mery Pinzón López (spouse) US $50,000  
Antonio María Barrera Calle US $80,000  
Viviana Barrera Cruz (daughter) US $50,000 
Omar Patiño Vaca US $80.000 
Eliécer Martínez Vaca US $80.000 
Manuel Arévalo  US $80.000 
Edwin Morales US $80.000 
Raúl Morales US $80.000 
Jaime Pinzón US $80.000 
Ana Beiba Ramírez US $80.000 
Uriel Garzón US $80.000 
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and Peace Unit13 of the Colombian legal system managed to get 16 paramilitaries 
to accept responsibility for the massacre of Mapiripán. The hearing in which this 
occurred has been the most controversial among the many procedures initiated by 
the Attorney General’s Office in order to reconstruct and judge the crimes 
committed by paramilitaries who were demobilized between 2002 and 2005.   
 
In this hearing, Mariela Contreras testified that she had lied and thus 
fraudulently benefited from the monetary compensation paid by the Colombian 
State as a result of the historical ruling in this case. Following the Inter-American 
Court’s decision, the State had given her US $150,000 for the death of three of her 
relatives in Mapiripán: her husband and her two sons. However, the Justice and 
Peace Unit found that her husband, Gustavo Caicedo, had in fact been killed by 
guerrillas eight months before the Mapiripán massacre. Her son, Hugo Martínez 
appeared in 2008 as a demobilized FARC soldier and her other son, Diego 
Martínez, was found obtaining his citizenship identification card in December 2001, 
four and a half years after the massacre (Semana.com, 2011). As a result, she is 
currently part of Colombia’s witness protection program.  
 
In the same hearing, Colombia's Prosecutor concluded that only ten people 
could be confirmed dead and affirmed that 9 out of the 20 victims identified by the 
Inter-American Court and who received more than 3 million U.S. dollars in 
reparations, were not in fact actual victims (Semana.com, 2011). 
 
Colombia´s Defense Minister visited the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (ICHR) in Costa Rica to ask for a reconsideration of its ruling concerning the 
events in Mapiripán. ICHR denied the Colombian State’s request to recover the 
                                                 
13
 The Justice and Peace Unit of the Office of the Attorney General was created by Law No. 975 of 
June 25, 2005 (Art. 33). According to Article 15 of that Law, “The Justice and Peace Unit will 
investigate, through the attorney delegated to the case, and with the support of the specialized 
group of the judicial police, the circumstances of time, mode and place in which the punishable acts 
took place; the social, familiar and individual life conditions of the latter and his previous behavior; 
the judicial and police background and the damages that he might have individually or collectively 
inflicted directly on the victims, such as physical or psychological, emotional suffering, financial loss 
or substantial detriment of fundamental rights”.  
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compensation paid to the false victims and confirmed its original ruling. The ICHR 
recalled that the sentence established the state’s duty to fully identify the victims. 
 
The Mapriripan case illustrates the risky sides of the Intrinsic Importance of 
Truth: first, the difficulties in knowing the ephemeral facts that happened in the past 
and second, how these difficulties both turn victims into subjects of doubt and 
justify the importance for victims´ testimonies to be subject to cross-examination 
and to the minimum rules of evidence. I call the first risk “past facts, ephemeral 
knowledge” and second one “unbelievable victims, sceptical audience”. In my 
opinion, both risks do not undermine the Intrinsic Importance of Truth: to admit that 
international or national judges can make mistakes by knowing facts happened in 
the past or that victims are capable of lying is tantamount to accepting that one’s 
thought can be objectively true or false (Lynch, 2005, p. 43).  The very distinction 
of “right” or “wrong”, “true” or “false” makes testimonies commensurable, leaving 
sufficient room for channels of communication between different narratives of the 
past. If those sort of distinctions make no sense, and all the victim`s testimonies 
should be equally accepted, these testimonies become incommensurable, locking 
up the victim into their own isolated testimony and preventing us from having 
reasoned discussions about the issues that matter the most (Lynch, 2005, p. 35).  
 
3.Conclusion: Telling and Knowing as Alternative Approach to Truth in the 
Aftermath of Violence 
 
I would like to conclude this chapter by introducing my alternative notion of 
truth to answer the central question I suggested at the beginning: What could be 
the meaning of truth and why does it matter in the aftermath of violence?  The 
answers to this question should take into account the risky aspects of both 
historical notions of truth and suggest a synthesis between knowing facts and 
telling testimonies.   
 
While knowing facts is a mandatory attempt to reduce the power of the 
unknown, describe and judge past acts as morally wrong, and confront the lies of 
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ideological thinking with reality, it contains inherent limitations.  Here, inherent 
limitations refer to the idea that “all efforts to remedy past violations are inherently 
limited by the inability to recuperate irretrievable losses of life, human dignity, and 
social relations” (Onur Bakiner, 2016), meaning that no possible response to mass 
atrocities can be adequate or proportional. The mere implication of adequacy is 
itself potentially insulting (Minow, 2000, p. 235). The poem “Unchopping a tree” —
written by Merwin— expresses man’s powerlessness when facing the effects of 
radical evil. The poem examines “step-by-step how one would reassemble a tree 
that has been destroyed so completely that its leaves, branches and twigs have 
come apart. After the painstaking steps to reassemble the tree part by part, it 
stands, but the breeze still can touch only dead leaves”. Attempts to redress what 
has been destroyed is an absurd or even obscene notion for those who have died 
(Minow, 2000, p. 2).   
 
As previously sated, despite being a seemingly unachievable goal, knowing 
facts is a mandatory attempt, because the  clandestine nature of the harm, through 
the disbelief of the community, may aggravate the pain of those experiences and 
even jeopardize the victim's own memory and sanity (Minow, 1999, p. 67). 
Knowing facts has the power to reduce the power of the unknown, a typical feature 
of tyrannical or dictatorial regimes, because criminal acts has a mind-independent 
character. The harm of these acts does not disappear because the criminal act is 
denied or ignored; on the contrary, the more unknown criminal acts are, the more 
harmful the power to damage becomes.  
 
The mandatory attempt to know facts not only seeks to describe criminal 
acts as they happened in the past, but also to attach to them a judgment that they 
are morally wrong. The importance of truth-as-knowing-facts in the aftermath of 
violence lies in confronting ideological thinking with reality. For instance, the slogan 
of “War Against Subversion” was a mask and a lie used to justify imprisonment and 
torture in Chile; thereby holding that armed forces had done nothing more than 
annihilate this subversion. On the contrary, the description of these criminal acts, 
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included in the Final Report of the ‘The Valech Commission’ asserts that they are 
an undesirable situations.  Statements such as “27,153 persons in Chile were 
victims of political imprisonment and torture” implicitly contain both characterizing 
and appraising evaluation. This statement not only describes criminal acts, it  also 
ensures that the majority of the population condemns the violations of the past and 
does not support what happened on the basis of past justifications. 
 
However, it is important to underline that dealing with the harm of criminal 
acts implies much more than purely factual knowledge.  
 
However, dealing with the damage of criminal acts implies much more than 
knowing some factual information. In that sense, telling testimonies seeks to deal 
with the myriad of injuries and harms that knowing facts cannot. On the other hand, 
the process of telling testimonies runs the risk of being an excuse to isolate even 
more victims. Thus, the process of telling testimonies makes sense if we are 
correct about some core criminal acts. These core acts allow the commensurability 
between narratives of the past and strengthen the channels of communication 
between them.  
 
In sum, my alternative approach to truth asserts that truth in the aftermath of 
violence means getting core facts straight about some criminal acts in order to deal 
with the antecedent damages (those which triggered a criminal act) and 
consequent damages (the ongoing damages suffered by the victims). 
 
Ephemeral acts of human action could or could not be established with a 
high degree of certitude, perfect truth lies beyond human reach, but the 
unattainability of the ideal is no excuse for shirking the effort in order to get core 
facts straight about some criminal acts (intrinsic importance of truth) (Frank, 1973, 
pp. 109-112).  Knowing the truth about criminal acts is an uncertain but necessary 
attempt, otherwise the clandestine nature of such acts will only serve to exacerbate 
the damage they have caused (Minow, 1999, p. 67).   Additionally, truth in the 
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aftermath of violence also matters by the process related to it (instrumental 
importance of truth). These processes do not seek to know the criminal acts as 
they happened in the past; their purpose is to deal with the antecedent and 
consequent damages. These processes open the door for broad participation 
during the lifespan of the truth commission and guarantee associated participation 
of different understandings will emerge and confront each other. Paine´s concept 
of contentious coexistence rests merely on open and democratic debate. Yet, from 
my own perspective the purpose of broad participation is not just a competition 
over ideas and a conflict over values and goals to present the past as irresolvable. 
On the contrary, truth commissions seek to create dialogical encounters to recover 
the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully (Simpson, 2007). During truth 
commissions, members of society (victims and non-victims) debate the past, 
exchange information and perspectives, externalize grief, loss, and anger and 
attempt to reach some form of consensus as to a way forward (Simpson, 2007, p. 
329).  
 
For my alternative apporach to truth in the aftermath of violence, the main 
character is the victim who suffered the damage. Perpetrators can confess their 
responsibility as a way to satisfy the victim’s right to know; or judges might punish 
those who caused the harm as a means of satisfying the victim’s right to justice.  
Saying that victims are the protagonists does not necessarily mean the truth 
commissions are provided for the exclusive benefit of the victims, as these 
commissions can likewise be a service that victims perform for society as a whole 
(Smyth, 2007, p. 16). The synthesis between telling facts and knowing facts sheds 
light on this point. 
 
Telling is neither a monologue nor an isolated experience. There is an 
audience listening to victims´ testimonies, listening to their singular and unique 
experience of suffering. In that sense, telling might imply knowing. Beyond the 
singularities and subjectivities of each single narrative, it is impossible to overlook 
an undeniable pattern that the testimonies read together reveal; human rights 
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violations were not isolated events, but part of a larger and systematic pattern, 
suggesting a policy rather than an exception (Laplante, 2007, p. 443) When 
individual narrative is situated within the larger political context, it could be a 
service provided for the victim´s benefit as well as a that of society.  (Smyth, 2007, 
p. 16): 
 
“One mother in Chile felt guilty about the death of her 
young son, who was shot by police after she had let him cross 
the street to watch television with neighbors. In therapy with 
professionals committed to acknowledging the context of 
political terror in Chile, the woman learned that her son was shot 
as part of mass political repression. The process helped her 
attain "an emotional understanding of the fact that the police, 
and not she, had killed her son.”(Minow, 2000, p. 243) 
 
 
In conclusion, the interwoven relation between knowing-telling is a step 
forward towards overcoming the “victims´ isolation” in an atomized society and 






Chapter 2. Truth Commissions: Definition and Justification 
 
As it was presented in chapter 1, truth in the aftermath of violence has been 
historically justified in two senses: (i) by the benefits it brings (instrumental 
justification) and (ii) by its own sake (intrinsic justification). Both historical 
approaches to truth have been established through different mechanisms. An 
enormous variety of unofficial truth projects have emerged14  (Bickford, 2007; 
Bilbija et al., 2005; Erica, Cynthia, & Monica Eileen, 2011); but the most common 
ones have been the official “initiatives” such as truth commissions and criminal 
trials. Today, discussions over which mechanism is better alternative to deal with 
the past have been overcome. The tendency of international trends is to make a 
complementary synthesis among judicial, extrajudicial and social truth-seeking 
mechanisms. This has been the case in Sierra Leone (2002) and Colombia (2016).   
 
Whereas the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission made 
historical findings and documented what happened in Sierra Leone during the 
conflict, the Special Court of Sierra Leone had a very narrow and focused mandate 
geared toward designating criminal responsibility to individuals involved in the 
commission of crimes during the conflict (Alpha Sesay 2014, 489). Similarly, an 
integral system of truth, reparations and non-repetition was approved in Colombia. 
This system is composed of different, interconnected judicial and extra-judicial 
mechanisms: (i) The Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition Commission; (ii) The 
Special Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing in the Context of and 
due to the Armed Conflict; and (iii) The Special Jurisdiction for Peace. Whereas the 
Truth Commission in Colombia will be an extra-judicial mechanism to contribute to 
                                                 
14 For example, the Brazilian NGO Nunca Mais Project; The non-governmental Truth and 
Community Reconciliation Project in Greensboro, North Caroloina (USA, 1979); The Recovery of 
Historical Memory Project (REMHI) led by the Catholic Church in Guatemala; The Peace and 
Justice Service (SERPAJ) (Uruguay, 1981), guided by team of lawyers, doctors, and human rights 
activists; The report “Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980–1989” (1997) organized by  the Legal Resources Foundation 
(LRF) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP); and The Ardoyne Community 
Project (ACP), coordinated by members of the small Northern Irish community of Ardoyne (Bickford, 




the realisation of the right to truth for victims, and for society as a whole, the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace will exercise judicial functions, and will fulfil the duty 
of the Colombian state to investigate, prosecute and sanction the main 
perpetrators of crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict. 
 
The international trend toward complementary support between different 
mechanisms to find truth is invaluable. However, in what follows I focus particularly 
on the official truth commissions (TCs). These commissions move between both 
poles: offering a complete picture of what happened (objective and general 
information) and dealing with the singular nature of human suffering (subjective 
and particular information). This tension is quite useful to  materialize my 
alternative approach to truth in the aftermath of violence.  
 
Scholarly disagreement on the definition of a TCs makes it difficult 
to establish accurately the number of countries that have created TCs since the 
seventies. For example, while the Transitional Justice Data Base Project estimates 
that about 60 TCs were established between 1970 and 2007, this figure fluctuates 
between 30 and 40 in most other studies. (Bakiner, 2014, p. 9). Despite the 
disagreement on data, it is undeniable that TCs have proliferated worldwide 
(Nauenberg, 2015) and have become a standard component of the transitional 
justice repertoire  (Heine & Turcotte, 2015). 
 
In the past, the first TCs were designed merely for knowing facts. They were 
investigative mechanisms with the primary aim of publishing an authoritative and 
factual report on human rights violations committed in a country (Hamber, 2003b, 
p. 1074). For instance, Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappeared 
(more commonly known by its Spanish acronym, CONADEP) was created 
specifically to clarify “the acts related to the disappearance of persons and, if 




Currently, the scope of TCs is much broader (societies and individuals 
advance in healing, promoting a process of reconciliation, assisting in reparation 
programs, etc.) and seems to have a greater focus on the possibility of telling 
testimonies: “For truth telling, public acknowledgment of what happened, and 
attention to survivors, a truth commission, actually may be better than 
prosecutions” (Minow, 2000, p. 57). This emphasis on telling testimonies is defined 
by its victim-centered character:  
 
“Most TCs  focus mainly on victims… much of their time and attention is 
focused on them... By listening to victims' stories, perhaps holding public 
hearings and publishing a report that describes a broad array of experiences 
of suffering, commissions effectively give victims a public voice and bring their 
suffering to the awareness of the broader public” (Hayner, 2011, p. 22). 
 
Despite the current emphasis on telling testimonies, the first and most 
straightforward objective of a TC is still knowing facts by conducting descriptive 
fact-finding and producing an impartial, historical report on human rights violations 
(González & Varney, 2013). Thus, what seems interesting about current TCs is the 
expectation of offering a complete picture of what happened in the past 
(establishing factual and objective information), while dealing with the singular 
nature of human suffering (attending experiential and individual experiences).   
 
In that sense, the TC’s  challenge is two-fold. On the one hand, a TC cannot 
reduce the systematic nature of violence to single and isolated cases of violence, 
those commissions are concerned not only with sorting out the facts of individual 
cases but also with “providing an account of the patterns of severe violence or 
repression” (Freeman, 2006a, p. 15, 2006b). On the other hand,  a TC is 
challenged by the fact that it must offer objective and general information without 
ignoring or reducing the individual suffering to numbers or cold facts (Wilkinson, 
2005, p. 40), which would not serve any purpose other than to depersonalize the 




This chapter seeks to offer a definition of a TC that moves beyond its 
typically victim-centered character and deals instead with the tension between 
identifying general patterns of violence and listening to particular narratives of 
suffering.  
 
The definition (chapter II) and activities to be conducted by TCs (chapter III) 
offer a broad picture with enormous possibilities for new TCs. The purpose of this 
is not to raise, even further, the expectations about TC capabilities, on the contrary, 
the aim is to offer a wide spectrum of alternatives to be chosen for each new TC, 
according to local priorities and political context. My definition focuses exclusively 
on state-based TCs because I concur with Freeman that,  “A truth commission has 
an inherent self-assessment or self-investigation character; it involves a state or 
society trying to repair or regenerate itself in some way” (M. Freeman 2006, 16). A 
TC focuses on violations committed in the sponsoring state, with this investigation 
acting as a proof of the state’s willingness to  regenerate itself. When TCs’ reports 
reveal the crimes committed by political institutions, or their past negligence, the 
former place the latter under public scrutiny and in a position where the latter feels 
to need to change their tarnished reputation and hereby regain political and social 
legitimacy (Ferrara, 2015). State-based TCs might therefore prompt fundamental 
changes in relations between state institutions and society. According to Ferrara, 
TCs play  a key role as a means by which ethical and institutional transformation 
can occur within countries where commissions are set up. Commissions can 
change the political discourse as well as popular and elite perceptions on the 
issues of the past, generate awareness across society regarding the extent and 
magnitude of the crimes committed, and attribute political and moral responsibility 
(Ferrara, 2015).  It is possible to conclude that the moral and social pressure 
generated by a state-based truth commission, can, in the long term, make political 
institutions more responsive to the demands of victims  - and of society in general 
– and gradually trigger a positive cycle,  which may produce deep social and 




1. What is a truth commission? 
 
In general terms, I define a TC as a (i) temporary and democratic (ii) 
forward-looking and backward-looking enterprise, the main purpose of which is to 
establish a (iii) diagnosis of the past (iv) and suggest feasible remedies.  This 
enterprise implies different speech situations for a dialogic exchange.  In what 
follows, I explain each of its components in turn and the speech situation that my 
definition of TC implies. 
 
1.1 Components of the definition  
 
1.1.1 TCs as temporary and democratic enterprises 
 
TCs are not permanent institutions. They are not part and parcel of the 
regular institutional arrangements of "normal" democracies (DuToit, 2000, p. 124). 
They begin with a mandate which specifies the details of their objectives, lifespan, 
procedures and compositions; and they end with the submission of a report 
containing findings (Freeman, 2006a, p. 10). In the past, the primary aim was 
publishing a final report and the social process during the TC lifespan was given 
little attention. Currently, however, the process (during the TC), regardless of the 
outcome, has become as important as the report (Hamber, 2003b, p. 2).  
 
 Guthrey defines a TC as a participatory process because it “embodies the 
victim´s greater opportunity to be a part of the post-conflict process” (Guthrey, 
2015, p. 20). Within TCs victims are the key source of information about the past, 
which sharply contrasts with the status quo of periods of mass violence where 
state or military leaders may be the dominant purveyors of information, thus further 
repressing populations (Guthrey, 2015, p. 21). For him, TCs have progressively 
opened the door to a strong presence of victims inspired by public hearings held in 




This definition of participation focuses exclusively on the possibility of giving 
a public voice to those who suffered, yet it excludes other important features of 
participation. For instance, Argentina Commission (CONADEP) did not hold public 
hearings, but rather was the result of a shared effort by the constitutional 
government, the majority of Argentine human rights organizations and other civil 
society organizations, which participated and contributed in many different ways. 
Additionally, this Commission strengthened its legitimacy making its results and 
findings known to the public (the report was an immediate best-seller) (Crenzel, 
2008; Hayner, 2011).  
 
Conversely, the establishment of South Africa’s TRC was uniquely preceded 
by an extended public debate concerning its general objectives, and its  specific 
mandate and procedures were fashioned through a process of parliamentary 
hearings and debates with the participation of all major political parties (DuToit, 
2000, p. 129). Additionally, it is worth mentioning the Commission's efforts to carry 
the TRC process through various special and institutional hearings  (DuToit, 2000, 
p. 131).  
 
In my opinion, participation in public hearings is one aspect of the TC 
implementation, but a TC’s lifespan is broader and the victim´s role cannot be 
reduced to giving testimony. Likewise, the process of giving testimony cannot be 
an isolated experience exclusively for victims. It is desirable to (1) involve victims in 
more TC scenarios (i.e. in the design and implementation of a TC) and (2) foster 
reflection among different ex-perpetrators, political parties, and sectors of civil 
society, many of whom were passively or actively complicit in past wrong-doings 
(Smyth, 2007, p. 17). 
 
From my own perspective, for a TC to be a democratic enterprise, it should 
define who should be involved in the conceptualisation and implementation of a 
TC, as well as how and why.   The literature about bottom-up truth mechanisms 
illustrates well who shall be part and in which way (how). The “Habermasian Model 
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of Truth Recovery” (Simpson, 2007) illustrates the purpose of this democratic 
character (why), which will be explained in section (1.4.) of this chapter.  
 
As TCs have become more of a global and international trend rather than a 
local claim, there is a risk in designing a TC as a top down intervention. However, 
TCs are not a discrete tool that can be applied with the same effect in any setting, 
considering victims and local people as mere receptors of policy makers´ 
knowledge (Sesay, 2007). A TC’s needs to shift away from the top-down “one-size-
fits-all” approach to allow “voices from below” to be heard and heeded (Lundy & 
MacGovern, 2017, pp. 266, 279).  They must pay greater attention to concerns and 
interests of local civil society organizations, which have the power to either bolster 
or undermine such a project (Bosire, 2014, p. 256).  
 
Some international experiences show the importance of this sort of design. 
Despite the considerable efforts of external actors to create a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) for Bosnia, the project floundered  for, among 
other reasons, its lack of legitimacy, notably among Bosnia’s victim associations. 
The alleged greatest beneficiaries rejected the TJRC, for its inadequate manner of 
including them in the process while “professionalized” NGOs with strong links to 
international actors had a prominent role in the design of the TJRC. In the end, the 
victims considered it an “elitist lucrative project pushed by large NGOs and wealthy 
individuals”(Dragovic-Soso, 2016, p. 14).  
 
When looking at the same case, Bosire and Lynchy assert that civil society 
plays a critical role along the entire process in any TC (Lynchy & Bosire, 2014). 
While prominent civil society organizations (CSOs) embraced and advocated for 
the idea of the TJRC in 2003, their demands were ultimately weakened by the 
failure of their own organizations to mobilize mass public support. In contrast, the 
TC that was ultimately established from 2008 to 2013 received very limited support 
from key CSOs and  faced heavy criticism. The  key CSOs’ inability to build a 
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strong constituency for the TJRC led to its non-implementation, undermining the 
TC’s potential political impact (Lynchy & Bosire, 2014).  
 
Conversely, during the conceptualization and planning phases of the Timor-
Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR - the 
Portuguese acronym by which it is commonly known), the importance of accessing 
and utilizing a range of traditional, local and community systems was 
acknowledged by external actors who were in charge of implementing the CAVR. 
This experience recognized that  
 
“accountability concerns and reconciliation needs at the community level 
could only be meaningfully addressed through a process of reception 
and reintegration, and that these were best achieved with the assistance 
of processes that were familiar, and above all, legitimate for most 
ordinary Timorese”(Pigou, 2004, p. 7)  
 
In conclusion, in my view, international experiences and global standards 
could make a positive contribution to the debate about “bottom-up” approaches. 
This “bottom-up approach” requires the broadest participation possible. Ideally, 
local communities, civil society, or any other form of organization could take part at 
every stage in the process, including conception, decision-making, management, 
implementation and evaluation.  
 
1.1.2 Forward and backward looking 
 
DuToit argues that it would be “misleading to conceive of truth commissions 
as backward-looking only… they are primarily aimed at establishing a new moral 
and political order”  (DuToit, 2000, p. 125). For him, TCs are historical founding 
projects that they primarily deal with the past not for its own sake but in order to 
establish a new and improved moral and political order, going forward.  They clear 




Similar to this line of thought, Heine and Turcotte defend the TC’s popularity 
arguing their ability to investigate the underlying causes of democratic failures, 
which is indispensable to lay the foundations for a lasting and sustainable peace 
(Heine & Turcotte, 2015, pp. 344, 347). Likewise, the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights assumes that knowing  past wrongdoings has important benefits 
for the entire society as it embodies a safeguard or antidote for society to prevent 
the repetition of such acts in the future (I/A Commission H.R. 1987). 
 
Regarding these TC potentialities, there is no evidence to support the claim 
that knowledge of one genocide has prevented, or indeed could prevent, others. 
For example, Daly states that the truth about the atrocities that occurred during the 
Third Reich ”did not save the victims of Pol Pot or, for that matter, the people dying 
today in Darfur. Nor is it generally possible to say that a truth commission report 
prevented future abuses in the same country” (Daly, 2008, p. 29).  Similarly, Saskia 
Nauenberg asserts that the increasing number of TCs around the world is not 
because of their success in dealing with past atrocities and strengthening emerging 
democracies, but because of the influence of “rationalized myths” about the 
benefits of truth telling (Nauenberg, 2015).  These “rationalized myths” might be 
defined as “socially constructed cultural logics legitimated by actors in the global 
environment to guide the practices, policies, and operations of state institutions, 
independent of their actual efficiency” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Nauenberg argues 
that TCs have increasingly relied on four rationalized myths about the value of truth 
telling, despite inconclusive evidence of their effectiveness: i. Truth telling leads to 
reconciliation; ii. Future violence can be prevented if it is known how human rights 
violations occurred; iii. Establishing the truth is a form of justice; and  iv. Truth 
commissions are tools able to give complete and objective accounts of the truth 
(Nauenberg, 2015, p. 651). 
 
From my own perspective, previous critics have been mistaken because 
they state that the inability of TCs to provide guaranteed antidotes against future 
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atrocities implies that we ought not to use TCs in order to prevent them from 
happening. This statement is incorrect as nobody would be audacious enough to 
claim that TCs can provide guaranteed antidotes. It is true that TCs cannot do such 
a thing and it is also the case that such an assertion is irrelevant when deciding 
whether to use TCs as a prevention mechanism (and for other reasons as well). 
The question is not whether TCs are by themselves a silver bullet, but rather 
whether they can (more modestly) help, in some contexts and in combination with 
other tools as well, to reduce the probability of some future atrocities and increase 
the probability of improved moral and political order. In other words, once we clarify 
the more modest nature of the forward-looking aims of TCs, then it is much more 
plausible that the backward-looking aspects of TCs can at least help to meet the 
forward-looking goals. TCs are just one among various components that work 
together to accomplish their aims, but they cannot guarantee success. 
 
My proposed attention to both forward and backward looking damages and 
remedies seeks to overcome the current TC tendency of spending disproportionate 
efforts and time on diagnosing damages and leaving the recommendations for the 
last pages of the report. A TC should look both ways with the same commitment. It 
should attend equally to the tasks of identifying damages and suggesting 
remedies. I will return to this topic in next chapter. 
 
1.1.3 To diagnosis damages 
 
The purpose of setting up a diagnosis through a democratic process is 
inspired by my alternative approach to truth in the aftermath of violence, which 
involves getting the facts straight about some core criminal acts in order to deal 
with the damages which triggered them and the ongoing harm suffered by the 
victims. Regarding the damages, and following my alternative approach to truth in 
the aftermath of violence,  TCs seek to identify both: (i) the antecedent damages  
and (ii) consequence of those damages. Because TCs appear in contexts where 
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criminal acts have an important social and collective dimension15, damages refer to 
the interwoven relations between individual transgressions and institutional 
shortcomings. Diagnosing the damage implies both identifying the breeding ground 
for singular criminal acts as well as the impact that these acts produce. Looking 
backwards, then, seeks to establish the historical antecedents and ongoing 
institutional shortcomings that made individual criminal acts possible, but also 
shows how a criminal act changed, harmed and impacted the victim´s way of life. 
The backward-looking function of a TC is to clarify both the causes and effects of 
damaging events. 
 
The aim of “getting the core facts straight about some criminal acts” points 
out three important aspects of the diagnosis. First, the diagnosis implies a 
mandatory selectivity; it is impossible to know the whole truth about all criminal 
acts; only some criminal acts will be known properly and in the worst case 
scenario, a TC can only set up a “global truth” about some criminal acts. Second, 
for victims, one of the benefits of taking part in a TC is not that their testimonies will 
become an official truth, rather, their benefit is the possibility of reconstructing the 
facts of some criminal acts that oppressive regimes sought to deny or hide.  Third, 
the diagnosis implies a redefinition of the TC’s victim-centered character, which 
has been defined by locating the victim´s testimonies of suffering as the 
centerpiece of how the TC proceeds.  
 
The aim of dealing with the antecedent damages (which triggered a criminal 
act) and consequent damages (the ongoing damages suffered by the victims) 
means that individual suffering is one part of the diagnosis, but not the 
cornerstone.  The victims could participate by telling testimonies not only of their 
                                                 
15
 Some authors who study the systemi c nature of mass atrocity crimes: Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report of the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963). Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's 
Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Knopf, I996). Peter A. French, 
«Unchosen Evil  and Moral Responsibil ity»in War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing, ed. Aleksandar Jokic 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 32-34. David Luban, «Intervention and Civil ization: Some Unhappy Lessons 
of the Kosovo War»in Global Justice and Transnational Politics, ed. Pablo de Greiff and Ciaran P. Cronin 
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2002). 
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suffering but also of their resistance or resilience, and also as citizens with plans 
and ideas for future discussion. Non-victims groups would play a key role as well, 
which would go beyond a passive empathetic audience who listens to the victim´s 
testimony of suffering. The process of setting up a diagnosis seeks to create 
dialogical encounters between victims and non-victims to suggest feasible 
remedies.  
 
1.1.3.1 Mandatory selectivity, global truths. 
 
“Getting core facts straight about some criminal acts” implies a mandatory 
selectivity. Although the extent of this information should be as broad as possible, 
the possibility to learn the whole truth about criminal acts is limited to the means 
and resources at the TC’s disposal. In the next chapter, I will introduce and 
evaluate some criteria used by previous TCs to select which criminal acts should 
and should not be documented.  
 
This mandatory selectivity implies not only excluding some criminal acts and 
prioritizing others, it also means deciding to what extent selected criminal acts 
should be investigated and documented. In the worst case scenario, a TC can just 
reveal “global truths”(Hayner, 2011, p. 84) about some criminal acts by 
demonstrating with some degree of certainty the broad patterns of the events that 
took place. “Global truth”, as consolation for the impossibility of “whole truth”, 
implies a long-term process to make it broader and more precise. This ongoing 
research process could make TC findings “temporary” as long as “it remains 
subject to amendment as new evidence is found to cast doubt on the accounts of a 
fact” (Evans, 1997: 79).  
 
However, although the truth-knowing process may be partial, it could 
establish a basis on which victims and society could rely. These records are both 
authoritative and provisional: the legitimacy and credibility of the truth-finding 
process as an authoritative account of the past rests profoundly on a demonstrable 
objectivity and impartiality. This process “establishes what for broad segments of 
55 
 
opinion can be accepted as a plausible narrative” (Maier, 2000: 275). 
Nevertheless, it is also provisional in as much as “it remains subject to amendment 
as new evidence is found to cast doubt on the accounts of a fact” (Evans, 1997: 
79).  
 
Omissions and mistakes during the Mapiripan case show why it is 
necessary to attempt to gather more truth, even if only partially and incrementally. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ judgment, while imperfect and 
incomplete, created a point of departure to establish with some degree of certainty 
the broader aspects of the Mapiripán massacre. This point of departure was 
continued by the Prosecutor’s research, which did not deny the broad patterns 
established by the first judgment, but instead helped to make the details and facts 
of this “global truth” more precise. Beyond the details that should be clarified in the 
future, this “global truth” has gained a growing public consensus against 
paramilitary violence and the complicity of governmental armed forces with these 
actions. 
 
Chile’s experience is also useful to understand how a TC can be used to 
gather more truth. The Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (‘Rettig 
Commission’) was created in 1990 by the first democratically elected government 
of Chile to investigate and report on the worst human rights violations committed 
during the Pinochet dictatorship (Ferrara, 2015). This first Chilean TC  documented 
3,197 cases of people who were killed or forcibly disappeared under Pinochet. 
Torture under the military regime was only discussed in general terms in the 
Report, but the commission was not mandated to draw a list of torture victims. The 
2003 National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture was set up in 
reaction to its shortcomings (Onur Bakiner, 2016). This second TC was created by 
former socialist president Ricardo Lagos in 2003 and certified, in 2004, the 
existence of 27,153 victims of political imprisonment and torture. It reopened in 
2010 and in its final report the number of victims of torture and political 
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imprisonment had dramatically increased (Ferrara, 2015). This third commission 
documented 32,000 new cases. 
  
This long and constant process revealed an increasing progress in truth 
knowledge. With each step, a more complete image of what happened became 
visible. The reports form different chapters of the same history and offer a gradual 
reconstruction of the truth (Ferrara, 2017).  However, these limited and strategic 
acts of acknowledgment fall short of initiating a more comprehensive process of 
addressing past wrongs (O. Bakiner, 2013). In Bakiner’s words, “coming to terms 
with the past is not a success story, but rather a solemn working and reworking of 
an irretrievably lost past” (Onur Bakiner, 2016). 
 
The examples of the cases of Mapirirpan and Chile confirm the mandatory 
selectivity that a TC implies, a TC cannot reveal the “whole truth”, it can only teach 
“global truths” and these “global truths” imply a long-term process.  
 
1.1.3.2 Benefit for victim: materiality of the past vs. turning their testimony into official truth 
 
One purpose of “getting core facts straight about some criminal acts” is to 
challenge the power imbalances between the personal stories of survivors and the 
institutionalized versions of “how things happened” from political leaders, armed 
groups, state officials, or the media (Riaño-Alcalá, 2010), as forgotten and denied 
crimes have always been clear demonstration of political power.  Thus, the 
diagnosis set up by a TC, seeks to enable victims to reconstruct the “materiality” of 
the criminal act in order to be acknowledged by a public that denied, ignored or 
disregarded the truth of what happened (Crenzel, 2008).  
 
Under this approach, a TC´s task can be both to supply relevant factual 
knowledge and to lift the lid of denial from crimes already known. The first aim 
(knowing) seeks to discover new truth to respond to unanswered questions 
(DuToit, 2000, p. 132) and the second attempts to break the silence about widely 
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known but unspoken truths (acknowledging)  (Hayner, 2011, p. 20). Priscilla 
Hayner is sceptical in regard to the first option:  
 
“Few victims who provide testimony to a truth commission are able to learn 
new information about their own case. Because of limited time and resources, 
truth commissions can only thoroughly investigate a small number of cases…. 
A truth commission does not so much tell them (victims) new truth as formally 
recognize and acknowledge what has before been denied” (Hayner, 2011, p. 
21).  
 
Under Hayner’s approach, victimized populations already have a good idea 
of what took place, and the role of a TC is only to confirm or acknowledge this 
information (Hayner, 2011, p. 21). I disagree with Hayner’s distinction. In my 
opinion, both the task of knowing and acknowledging imply expanding the 
information available, as both  might imply finding new truths.  For the victims´ sake 
their testimonies cannot be weighed separately and as such a TC´s task is not to 
turn victims´ testimonies into official truths. Rather victims´ testimonies and all the 
information already known by the victims, must been seen as part of the full body 
of evidence in each case, thus allowing their testimonies to expand knowledge and 
understanding of what happened (Crenzel, 2010, p. 201). Breaking the imbalances 
between survivors’ personal stories and the institutionalized versions of the past 
which justify violence, imply more than just illustrating the public account with 
personal narratives. For instance, CONADEP used victims’ testimonies to give 
materiality to the disappearances and expand the information available in order to 
identify the perpetrators (Crenzel, 2010, p. 183). The CONADEP TC received 
testimonies of the survivors who disappeared for days or weeks, others who had 
spent years in captivity in the same place, and still others who had been in several 
different clandestine detention centers. Because of its heterogeneity, this body of 
testimonies enriched the existing evidence, confirmed other testimonies and 




CONADEP decided to classify this vast material from the clandestine 
detention center. This decision translated into the presentation of evidence and the 
preparation of a legal case, which allowed the TC to “fully invert the nature of the 
strategic space of the disappearances. The non-place that the detention centers 
had been, became the focal center around which the materiality of the 
disappearances was reconstructed” (Crenzel, 2010, p. 183).  
 
In conclusion, from this perspective, the distinction between knowledge and 
acknowledgment does not make much sense:  to supply missing relevant facts and 
to lift the veil of denial about crimes already known imply the same forensic effort 
and both require reconstructing the materiality of the criminal act.  Thus, the 
diagnosis set up by a TC, rather than turning their testimony into official truth, 
seeks to enable victims to reconstruct the “materiality” of the criminal act in order to 
be acknowledged by a public that denied, ignored or disregarded the truth of what 
happened (Crenzel, 2008).  
 
 In the last part of this chapter I will discuss the difference between treating 
suffering testimonies as sincere narratives and as true evidence.  
 
1.1.3.3 Defining the victim-centered character of TC 
 
What defines the TC’s victim-centered character is the location of the 
victim´s testimonies of suffering as the centerpiece of how the TC proceeds. The 
diagnosis I suggest challenges this approach.   
 
Because diagnoses attempt to identify damages as antecedent and as 
impact, victims might participate as somebody who suffered the impact of a 
criminal act in the past, but also as citizens who already resumed their lives after 
criminal acts, citizens capable of suggesting remedies to deal with the antecedents 
and context which made the atrocities possible. Both the victims´ capability of 
telling their experience of suffering, resistance or resilience and their capability of 




A democratic diagnosis requires more than the over identification with 
victims’ suffering by non-victims’ groups (ex combatants, state and/or society). 
Thus, these groups should not participate in a TC merely as passive listeners of 
victims’ testimonies of suffering, but rather must have a comprehensive 
understanding of how such suffering is an inherent result of greater historical social 
and political processes stemming from an armed conflict.  Gonzalo Sanchez 
argues that it is crucial to extend the gaze beyond the solidarity for the victims. 
While he agrees that indignation towards someone else’s suffering is important, it 
is insufficient. What is really needed is that citizens understand the armed conflict 
as a result of social and political processes against which it is possible and it is 
essential to react (Sánchez G, 2013). 
 
Peter Novick, quoted by Hamber, asserts that non-victims are inclined to 
identify  with the victims’ experience, rather than that of the perpetrator and that 
such an inclination devalues the notion of historical responsibility and the 
complicity of community members. This approach, Novick argues, “precludes 
people from thinking of themselves as potential victimizers”(Hamber, 2009, p. 19) 
19. Novick writes that there is:  
 
“an article of faith in these encounters [that is, visiting museums,  being 
taught about the event] that one should identify with victims,  thus acquiring the 
warm glow of virtue that such a vicarious identification brings .. .. And it is 
accepted as a matter of faith, beyond discussion [that it] is going to be morally 
therapeutic, that multiplying such encounters will make one a better 
person”(Novick, 2001, p. 13).  
 
Non-victims groups participating in the elaboration of the diagnosis should 
express their will in order to regenerate themselves in some way (Freeman, 2006a)  
and explain their reason for taking part in the restoration of the human and civic 
dignity of victims and society (Du Toit, 2000, p. 135). A brief episode of Antjie 
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Krog's Country of My Skull illustrates well these ideas. She recounts that six young 
black men went to the Cape Town office of the TRC and applied for amnesty, 
stating that their crime was apathy, explaining that: “The act says that an omission 
can also be a human rights violation. And that's what we did; we neglected to take 
part in the liberation struggle. So, here we stand as a small group representative of 
millions of apathetic people who didn't do the right thing” (Krog, 1999, p. 159).  
 
In conclusion, from this perspective, a TC’s main feature is not its victim-
centered character, in the sense that the victim´s testimonies of suffering are 
located as the centerpiece of how the TC proceeds.  Both the victims´ capability of 
telling their experiences of suffering, resistance or resilience and their capability of 
proposing possible futures must be afforded equal attention. Victims might 
participate as somebody who suffered the impact of a criminal act in the past, but 
also as citizens who already resumed their lives after criminal acts and who are 
capable of suggesting feasible remedies.  
 
 
1.1.4 Suggesting feasible remedies 
 
While the aim of “getting core facts straight about some criminal acts” is 
focused on identifying the damages, the aim of “dealing with the antecedent 
damages (which triggered a criminal act) and consequent damages (the ongoing 
damages suffered by the victims)” is focused on the possibility of suggesting, 
recommending, and designing feasible remedies.  
 
Regarding the notion of remedies, my definition of a TC steers away from 
the psychological concept of healing. “Healing”, as psychological notion, refers to 
the process of becoming sound or healthy again, it implies the restitution of 
something lost or stolen from the victim (Dictionaries, 2017). “Remedy”, as legal 
notion, is much more modest, it emphasizes the universally recognized “right to an 
effective remedy”; whoever causes the damages must amend them partially or 
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totally, according to the circumstances (Shelton, 2006). There are two aspects to 
this notion of remedy: procedural, the procedures through which relief may be 
obtained, and substantive, the substance of relief (Shelton, 2006). The majority of 
the remedies suggested by TCs are only procedural; they suggest the measures 
through which relief may be obtained. Substantive measures are fewer and 
uncertain. So, in a context where violence has been systematic and massive, 
remedies could merely be compensations, rarely, remedies become complete 
restitutions. 
 
The notion of feasible refers to the necessity to establish probable and 
realistic remedies and to avoid high and ambiguous expectations such as those 
that seek to  “help to heal a nation”; “reconcile victims with their torturers”; “ensure 
the rule of law”; and/or “establish a culture of human rights”. These sort of 
remedies might generate cycles of high hopes and bitter disappointments (Minow 
1999).  
 
A TC looks at the past to identify the damages and looks to the future to 
suggest remedies, with the awareness that the effectiveness of these remedies is 
uncertain and limited. The remedies available from a TC are heavily limited by 
material and/or political conditions, which fall beyond the TC’s scope and control 
and the task of suggesting remedies does not imply the execution of these 
suggestions. Rather, the scope is very precise as a TC’s job is to recommend 
suggestions that others will make effective once the TC finishes its job. Despite 
those restrictions, it would be wrong to deal with the past only for its own sake, 
rather a TC should use the identified past damages to suggest and recommend 
steps towards a new moral and political order.  
 
1.1.4.1 Debating for reaching some form of consensus  
 
One feature of the TC’s democratic character, explained in section (1.1.), is 
the design of grass-roots initiatives and bottom-up truth mechanisms based on 
broad participation. However, it is necessary to define the purpose of gaining broad 
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participation not only during the conceptualization of the TC, but also during the 
implementation. Along a TC’s lifespan, different understandings will emerge and 
confront each other resulting in a struggle to interpret the facts and their implication 
on contemporary politics. (Payne, 2008, p. 4). Paine´s concept of contentious 
coexistence rests merely on an open and democratic debate. Yet, in my opinion 
the purpose of a democratic character is not just the competition over ideas and 
conflict between values and goals. On the contrary, a TC is a democratic 
enterprise in the sense that it seeks to create dialogic gatherings to recover the 
ability of resolving conflicts peacefully, to encourage overcoming division with 
dialogue (Simpson, 2007). Remedies suggested by a TC materialize both the 
ability of resolving conflicts peacefully and the way in which consensus is reached.  
 
Kirk Simpson suggests that the Habermasian model of truth recovery is 
quite useful to explain this point. For Simpson, “post-conflict societies’ victims of 
political violence should be enabled to engage in meaningful truth recovery through 
a Habermasian process of public democratic deliberation and communication that 
involves direct dialogue with perpetrators of political violence” (Simpson, 2007, p. 
325). This process, which he labels ‘communicative justice’, is framed within the 
context of Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which is oriented 
toward reaching an understanding (Habermas, 1990, p. 136). In Communicative 
Action we coordinate our plans with each other in a consensual way, by making or 
invoking claims that everyone concerned accepts as valid or binding: “I hope to 
harmonize my plans with yours on the basis of our having, or coming to have, a 
common understanding of the situation we are in” (Habermas, 1990, p. 146). In 
that sense, reaching an agreement is a mechanism for coordinating actions 
(Habermas, 1990, p. 134). Specifically, for Simpson, truth recovery is about 
creating a “new public space in which people (often those previously liminal in the 
context of political transition, such as victims) are allowed to debate the past, to 
exchange information and perspectives, to externalize grief, loss, and anger, and 






In the case of my own definition of a TC, remedies suggested for the future should 
be voluntarily accepted by all of the individuals who will be affected by them. 
Victims shall accept suggested remedies not because they fear reprisals from the 
perpetrators, nor because perpetrators expect to gain some advantage from those 
remedies, but because all parties involved recognize the validity of the agreement, 
and for all of them, remedies are the appropriate response for the damages 
identified (Moon 1995, p. 146). Not all people involved might agree on the 
remedies suggested, but what is expected is for them to be in agreement that they 
participated in a fair and inclusive dialogic exchange.  
 
1.2 Speech situations during Truth Commission implementation 
 
 
My own definition of a TC requires different sorts of speech situations: (i) for 
giving and knowing testimonies, (ii) for getting core facts straight about certain 
criminal acts and (ii) for suggesting remedies. These moments are not completely 
separate; there is an interwoven relation among them.  This classification is just an 
exercise to identify and respect the purpose of each dialogical encounter and the 
validity of each of the claims. For instance, during the phase of giving testimony, 
such testimonies must not be challenged by cross-examination as they are 
considered truthful narratives. Conversely, in the moments for getting facts right 
about criminal acts, victims’ testimonies should be weighed as part of the full body 
of evidence, as these testimonies seek to become part of the body of true 
evidence. To define these three speech situations, I follow Kirk Simpson´s stages 
of truth recovery process and define them in Habermasian terms. 
 
For Habermas, in a speech situation actors take turns playing the 
communicative roles of speaker, addressee, and bystander. A situation denotes a 
segment of a “life-world” that has been delimited in terms of a specific theme. A 
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theme arises in connection with the interests and objectives of actors (Habermas, 
1990, p. 134). A competent speaker has the choice between (i) a cognitive; (ii) an 
interactive; or (iii) an expressive mode of language use.  Three different types of 
speech acts correspond to each of these three language uses: (i) constative acts; 
(ii) regulative acts; and (iii) representative acts. Thus, the speaker has a choice 
among three basic attitudes, each entailing a different perspective on the world 
(Habermas, 1990, p. 136).  For instance, a constative (fact-stating) speech act 
attempts to (i) represent the external world; (ii) establish a communicative relation 
with a listening audience (and thus relates to a social world); and/or (iii) express an 
inner world (an intention to communicate a belief) (Philosophy, 2007) (Habermas, 
1990, p. 136). This triadic structure suggests that many speech acts involve a set 
of tacit validity claims, thus, a speech act, in order to be acceptable, must satisfy 
the demands connected with three basic validity claims: truth, rightness and/or 
sincerity.  
 
In sum, first, an objective (constative) speech act, using cognitive language 
can be considered “true” when it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately 
represents actual states of affairs. The speaker makes reference to something in 
the objective world, so it implies a formal concept of the world (as the sum total of 
existing states of affairs).  Secondly, a normative (regulative) speech act is 
considered to be correct (right) whenever it fits within a complex array of competing 
social values and norms. Speech acts serve not only to represent states and 
events in the objective world; they serve to produce interpersonal relationships as 
well. In this case, the speaker makes reference to something in the social world of 
legitimately ordered interactions. Thirdly, evaluative (representative) speech acts 
are considered to be truthful when sincere communicative actors make them. 
Speech acts serve to express lived experiences, that is, they serve the process of 
self-representation in which case the speaker makes reference to something in the 
subjective world to which he has privileged access. Thus, a speech act might fulfill 
one of three functions: to present the state of affairs, to maintain an interpersonal 




Kirk Simpson, analyzing the Northern Ireland case, examines what a model 
for Habermasian truth recovery might actually look like in practice, and how it could 
be implemented. An appropriate security apparatus for dialogues must be afforded 
in order that victims and perpetrators are provided with a “safe and secure space”. 
It must be protected from the potential intrusion of vigilantes; or from the potentially 
malign influence of those political groups who might seek to disrupt the process for 
selfish political reasons (Simpson, 2007). This envisaged Habermasian model of 
truth recovery would be mediated by Truth Recovery Panels. These Panels would 
be comprised of independent experts on conflict resolution and would be invited to 
visit localities where there was a clear demand from individuals and communities 
for truth and reconciliation (Simpson, 2007). 
 
The dialogic exchange itself would be ‘tripartite’ in composition. Stage One 
would involve uninterrupted storytelling by victims, thereby providing victims with a 
much-needed platform from which to narrate their experiences. At Stage Two, 
victims would discuss their story and their experience with the Truth Recovery 
Panel, who would be empowered to ask victims relevant questions. These stages 
would be integral to the process of providing communicative dialogical capacity 
building and creating an atmosphere of trust. Stage Three of the process would 
involve victims in direct dialogue with perpetrators, a dialogic exchange that would 
be mediated and controlled by the Truth Recovery Panel (Simpson, 2007).  
 
Table 1. Stage for Dialogic exchange: Kirl Simpson.  
 
 Purpose 
Stage I Uninterrupted storytelling by the victim  
Stage II Truth Recovery Panel would be empowered to ask victims 
relevant questions  
Stage III Direct dialogue with perpetrators, mediated and controlled by the 
Truth Recovery Panel 
 
For Simpson, the social world and the subjective world are particularly 
relevant to processes of truth recovery (Simpson, 2007). For my own definition of a 
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TC, all three different validity claims are equally relevant: factual truth (true or 
false); normative rightness (right or wrong); and sincerity (sincere or insincere). 
Together they help to deal with the tension between the TC’s objective of 
establishing factual information and the objective of giving priority to experiential 
and subjective voices, in other words, identifying general patterns of violence and 
listening to particular narratives of suffering. 
 
During speech instances for giving and knowing testimonies, victims are the 
speakers, a commissioner addresses the speech situation, and non-victims are 
bystanders. The purpose of this moment is to express a lived experience of 
suffering, resistance and/or resilience. This speech act does not necessarily aspire 
to be true, it is truthful because the speaker is sincere. These sorts of moments are 
appropriate to identify the damages as impact and to understand how criminal acts 
affect the victim´s life course.  
 
Speech situations for “getting core facts straight about certain criminal acts” 
change the communicative roles: victims, ex-perpetrators and witnesses are the 
speakers, and the commissioner is the addressee. Bystanders are people who 
have not been touched directly by those criminal acts but live in a society that is 
affected by them. The purpose of this stage is to gain information or confirm 
knowledge of particular events, to reconstruct the materiality of the criminal act, to 
give an accurate description of the criminal act as it happened in the past and 
therefore, to judge them as morally wrong. In this case, the validity claim is truth. 
 
During moments for suggesting remedies the communicative roles remain 
the same. The entire society, which aspires to establish a new beginning, is the 
speaker; the commissioner is the addressee; and there is no bystander (everyone 
interested should be able to participate).  The aim is to recover the ability to resolve 
conflicts peacefully, to resolve the past and dream of the future with dialogue 
(Simpson, 2007). In these instances the broader the participation, the better. 
Victims can participate as citizens with suggestions and recommendations; non-
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victims’ groups might materialize their will to restore the victim’s dignity, ex-
perpetrators might ask for forgiveness. The goal is for participants in 
communicative actions to reach an understanding in order to carry out their plans 
on a consensual basis with some jointly defined actions.  
 
























































act as such. 









NA Normative Interactive Regulative Rightfulness 
 
In sum, my speech situations clarify the purpose of each dialogical 
encounter and its validity claims: (i) “giving and knowing testimonies”, seek to allow 
the manifestation of a sincere lived experience (personal or narrative truth); (ii) 
“getting core facts straight about certain criminal acts” seeks to represent the state 
of affairs, and consequently it can be considered “true” when it accurately refers to 
existing objects (factual or forensic truth) and, (iii) “suggesting remedies” aim to 
carry out correct plans on a consensual basis, assuming that those remedies are 
right insofar they serve to reinforce interpersonal relationships  (social truth and 






 In general terms, I define truth commission as a (i) temporary and 
democratic (ii) forward-looking and backward-looking enterprise, the main purpose 
of which is to establish a (iii) diagnosis of the past (iv) and suggest feasible 
remedies.  This enterprise implies different speech situations for a dialogic 
exchange.   
 
A TC is a forward-looking and backward-looking initiative not because 
knowing past facts is an effective antidote for future violence or because TCs are a 
“safe bridge” to leave behind a past of human rights violations and start a new 
democratic future. A TC looks both ways at the same time, because it seeks to 
identify damages and suggest certain remedies, knowing that the effectiveness of 
these remedies is uncertain and limited.  
 
A TC is a temporary enterprise; it begins with a mandate and ends with the 
submission of a report containing findings (Freeman, 2006b). Currently, the social 
processes undergoing the TC lifespan, independent of its final accomplishments, 
have become as important as the final report itself (Hamber, 2003b, p. 2). In that 
sense a TC should be a democratic enterprise, setting up grass-roots initiatives. 
International experiences and global standards could make a positive contribution, 
but a TC should be a “bottom-up” intervention with the broadest participation 
possible. The purpose of gaining broad participation during the TC’s 
implementation is not just to open a democratic debate and to present the past as 
irresolvable. On the contrary, a TC is a democratic enterprise in the sense that it 
seeks to create dialogic encounters to recover the ability to resolve conflicts 
peacefully and reach common understandings (Habermas, 1990)  
 
A TC’s final attainment is a diagnosis based upon identified damages and 
suggested remedies. The process of establishing this diagnosis implies a 
mandatory selectivity: certain criminal acts will be priories, while others will be 
excluded and not all selected cases will be fully and completely investigated and 
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documented. In some cases, TCs are simply unable to reveal “global truths” 
(Hayner, 2011, p. 84). 
 
In three ways, my own definition of a TC is not a victim-centered one. First, 
the diagnosis determined by a TC does not seek to turn victims’ testimonies into 
official truths. Rather, it seeks to enable victims to reconstruct the “materiality” of 
the criminal act so that it can be accepted by a public that did not recognize the 
reality of what had happened (Crenzel, 2008).  Second, victims´ suffering is not the 
cornerstone of how a TC proceeds. Victims might participate in a TC as people 
who suffered the damage of the criminal acts (damage as impact), but also as 
citizens capable of suggesting remedies to deal with the context which allowed the 
atrocities (damage as antecedent). Third, non-victims groups (ex-perpetrators, the 
State, bystanders, beneficiaries of the violence, etc.) play a key role in the 
elaboration of the diagnosis by expressing their will to regenerate themselves in 
some way (Freeman, 2006a, p. 16) and suggesting  remedies for a better future. 
 
  Chapter 3 presents two international experiences of TRCs, which reflect the 
importance of my own definition of a TC. South Africa and Sierra Leone TRCs 
were a temporary enterprise, which spent great efforts on backward looking and 
not on  forward looking.  Those Commissions were quite democratic as they invited 
victims to diagnose the damages of the past through public hearings, but these 
TCs put the onus of providing suggestions of remedies exclusively on the 
Commissioners, who raised expectations and recommend implausible remedies. 
Thus, both TRCs spent disproportionate efforts and time on diagnosing damages 
and left recommendations for the last pages of the report, which might explain, 
partially, why the impact of these remedies was so insignificant.   
 
Regarding the speech situations suggested in this chapter 2, South Africa´s 
case shows why this classification is quite useful. The TRC's final report defined 




 “Factual or forensic truth was 'the familiar legal or scientific notion of 
bringing to light factual, corroborated evidence'. Personal or narrative truth 
referred to the individual truths of victims and perpetrators, attaching value 
to oral tradition and story-telling. Social truth was established, in the words 
of Judge Albie Sachs, through interaction, discussion, and debate. Healing 
and restorative truth sought to repair the damage done in the past and to 
prevent further recurrences in the future” (Wilson, 2001, p. 36).   
 
In this plural model of truth, it is unclear how the elements are meant to 
relate to one another: “The report gives no guidance about how the four categories 
of truth might be connected, integrated and synthesized” (Wilson, 2001, p. 36).   
 
From my perspective, the mistake was defining these four truths instead of 
distinguishing between sincerity, truth and rightness. In the next chapter both 









In this chapter I use the previous conceptualization of an alternative 
approach to truth in the aftermath of violence and my own definition of TC in order 
to design a methodological framework for a future truth commission to precisely 
define their aims. This framework will allow future truth commissions to establish 
clear and achievable goals, as it seeks to plainly define the nature and scope of the 
type of damage that a truth commission should identify and the remedies it should 
offer. To do this, I introduce the methodology used in the first part of the chapter in 
order to construct the matrix; the second part of the chapter introduces this matrix 
by looking at two international cases: the South African and Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions.  
 
The matrix is a means of assembling a list of objectives to be chosen and 
prioritized for any new truth commission. It is composed by two main variables: (1) 
the main actions TCs are to perform, and (2) the main issues they need to 
document. Each variable contains different dimensions that were developed in the 
two previous chapters. Following my own definition of a TC (Chapter 2), the 
principal actions a TC should perform are: (i) diagnosing the damages suffered 
(backward looking) and (ii) recommending the necessary remedies to deal with 
them (forward looking). Thus, the TCs´ main actions are to establish a diagnosis of 
the past and suggest feasible remedies.  
 
                                                 
16
This chapter was written with Eduardo Gutierez, Research Assitant of the Project “ Truth as a 
Remedy”  funded by International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (2014). 
17
 I received two sources of funding in order to develop this chapter. First, I received one year of 
funding from the IDRC Doctoral Award in 2014 for CAN $20,000. Then the University of Rosario in 
Bogotá, Colombia award me a grant in 2015 for CAN $25,000) to share my findings in two 
Colombian cities. The last part of the research was focused exclusively on my country, Colombia, 
see Chapter 4, as the country is in the process of implementing a new TC due to the ongoing peace 
negotiations between the Colombian Government and the guerrilla group, known as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army, (FARC-EP). Despite this emphasis on 
Colombia, my methodological framework is not spatially or temporally bound, and the conclusions 
drawn will be of transferable value for other transitional societies . 
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Following the alternative approach to truth in the aftermath of violence 
(Chapter 1),  the main issues that a TC should document are: (i) the background 
and context of the crimes (that which triggered a criminal act), (ii) the criminal acts 
as such and the implicated actors, and (iii) the impacts caused by such atrocities 
(the ongoing damages suffered by the victims).  Consequently, the truth 
established by TCs should (i) get core facts straight about critical criminal acts in 
order to deal with (ii) the harms as an antecedent and (iii) the damages as impacts. 
 
Table 1. Variables and their dimensions 
 
Variables Dimensions 
1. Actions to 
perform  
i. To diagnose the damages suffered during recent 
periods of abusive rulers or armed conflict. 
ii. To recommend remedies to deal with those damages. 
2. Issues to 
document 
i. To identify the background and the context of the 
crimes. 
ii. To identify the criminal acts and the implicated actors. 





I drew simultaneously on theoretical and empirical literature to build 
framework. Meanwhile, I reviewed academic discussions on evil, suffering, 
memory and archives, the research assistant analyzed two international 
experiences: the South Africa and Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (hereinafter SATRC and SLTRC, respectively). As the revision was 
advancing, the variables and dimensions were changing. To see the evolution of 
the framework, see the annexes of this chapter.  
 
Once the bibliographic revision was completed for theoretical issues and 
international experiences, the research focused on the Colombian case (Chapter 
4). The first step was to determine the then current situation of Colombia’s peace 
negotiations (end of 2014 and beginning of 2015). This involved looking at the 
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laws, which had already been passed regarding truth seeking initiatives, and then 
studying the advances of some of these initiatives (specifically the National Center 
of Historical Memory).  
 
During this stage, the research assistant and I asked ourselves whether a 
TC was truly required, taking into account the numerous and admirable efforts that 
already were taking place in the country with the purpose —among other things— 
of satisfying the right to know the truth (e.g. National Center of Historical Memory, 
The Justice and Peace Unit).  Once the agreement of creating the TC was 
published in June 2015, we studied it and participated in a special seminar (Center 
of Memory, Peace and Reconciliation) to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of 
the agreement with national and international experts. 
 
Once the Colombian context was reviewed, we prepared a draft of the 
matrix to review it with strategic actors. To do that, we made an alliance with 
different universities such as Universidad de Antioquia (Medellín), Universidad 
CES (Medellín), and Universidad del Valle (Cali), to share our findings. The result 
was a series of two events: one in Cali on Nov. 27, 2015 and another in Medellín 
on Dec. 11, 2015. Each event had two working sessions, one with scholars and 
another with victim organizations and local authorities. After presenting and 
explaining our matrix to them, we used a group methodology —previously 
discussed with a hired expert— to listen to their comments. The findings regarding 
the Colombian case will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 
1.1 Why South Africa and Sierra Leone TRCs? 
 
 
After almost 10 years of conflict and political turmoil, a peace agreement 
was signed in 1999 between the government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Lomé, Togo. Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace 
Agreement ordered a TRC to “be established within 90 days after the signing of the 
[… Agreement] and [should], no later than 12 months after the commencement of 
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its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate implementation of its 
recommendations” (1999, V, XXVI, 3)18.  
 
In response to the Lomé Peace Agreement’s requirements, the Sierra 
Leone’s Parliament ratified the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act in 2000, 
which officially created the TRC and specified, among other things, the importance 
of the report which the TRC was expected to submit:  
 
The report shall summarise the findings of the Commission and shall make 
recommendations concerning the reforms and other measures, whether 
legal, political, administrative or otherwise, needed to achieve the object of 
the Commission; namely the object of providing an impartial historical 
record, preventing the repetition of the violations or abuses suffered, 
addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims and promoting 
healing and reconciliation. (2000, V, 15, 2), 
 
The context of the SATRC is somewhat different as it was established after 
more much than twenty years of increasing ethnic exclusion and abuses under the 
official racial segregation policy of the Apartheid. Most of the active opposition by 
disenfranchised groups were answered with a governmental crackdown involving 
extreme levels of violence and human rights abuses. However, after a series of 
international sanctions and the end of the Cold War a mostly peaceful transition 
away from the Apartheid system began with a series of negotiations between the 
governing party and the African National Congress between 1990 and 1993. 
Democratic elections were held in 1994, and an interim constitution was passed. 
The TRC was set up by the newly elected parliament to address the evils of the 
                                                 
18
 It is important to clarify that the SLTRC Report mentions the Abidjan Peace Agreement as a 
relevant antecedent of the final SLTRC: “The Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November 1996, 
which initially offered the hope of an end to the conflict but which did not succeed, for reasons 
detailed elsewhere in this Report, made no provision for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission or 
for any similar process. Yet article 14 of the Abidjan Agreement granted an amnesty to members of 
the Revolutionary United Front, allegedly so as ‘[t]o consolidate the peace and promote the cause 
of national reconciliation’” (2004b, 1,1,2). According to Hirsch, the structure of the entire Lomé 
Agreement was simply a modification of the original Abidjan Agreement (Hirsch 2001, 83). 
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apartheid , which was endorsed by  president Nelson Mandela and other prominent 
South African figures (USIP, 2016).  
 
These two TRCs (SLTRC and SATRC )were selected because they both 
meet two important criterions. First,  a reasonable amount of time has passed 
since both TC finished their work —SA finished on 2003 and SL on 2004— , so 
there is an adequate number of assessments and studies to have been published 
for these two cases; this helped us to ensure that we would be able to study not 
only the official TRC documents, but also the posterior expert assessments.  
 
Second, and most importantly, the two selected commissions provide important 
features that could be compared in the framework of this research. These two 
TRCs, then, have complementary features that suggest their utility as 
representative cases of two poles of the wide spectrum of possible TRCs: 
 
Table 2. Comparative table between South African and Sierra Leone TRC 
 
 South Africa TRC Sierra Leone TRC 
Judicial Functions Yes, Amnesty Committee No, such functions were 
assigned to the SCSL 
Working time 
period   
3 years, plus 4 additional 
years 
2 years 
Years of conflict 
investigated 
34 years  9 years  
 
The SATRC had several important judicial functions, such as granting 
amnesty to perpetrators who confessed their crimes truthfully and completely. 
Because the time period covered by the SATRC was broad (it worked for three 
years and was later granted four additional years to investigate thirty-four years of 
conflict), the report documented a wide and varied list of acts. Despite the fact that 
the final report defined four notions of truth that had guided the TRC: factual or 
forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social truth, and healing and restorative 
truth (2004b, 1, 3, 21), this Commission was widely criticized for offering an over-
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legalistic view and not contributing to an improved understanding of the context, 
patterns and causes of past violations (Wilson, 2001, p. 33)  
 
Conversely, the SLTRC did not have any legal functions because it worked 
simultaneously with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a different organism in 
charge of assigning criminal responsibility. Because the SLTRC covered a 
narrower period of time than the SATRC (two years to investigate nine years of 
conflict), the report paid special attention to the experience of children and victims 
of sexual abuse. Additionally this report has been praised for providing a crucial 
framework for debates on violence and repression.  
 
In sum, these two TRCs (SLTRC and SATRC) were selected because they 
both meet important criterions. First, there is an adequate number of assessments 
and studies published on these two cases. Second, the two selected commissions 
provide important features that could be compared in the framework of this 
research. African models might raise some issues for Latin American TCs, 
however,  the experience of the South African TRC was the first TC attained 
worldwide prominence (Freeman, 2006:22) and this help us to ensure that we 
would be able to study not only the official TRC documents, but also the posterior 




2. Methodological Matrix 
 
The purpose of my methodological matrix is to set up a list of objectives to 
be chosen and priorized for any new TC. These “potencial objectives” are a set of 
criteria that commissioners can use to learn from previous TC experiences from all 
over the world, as well as to dialogue with local truth-seeking experiences. On the 
one hand, the comparisons of international experiences will enable the 
identification of the challenges that previous TCs have faced in their efforts to 
achieve their so-called objectives. On the other hand, the local approach helps to 
77 
 
shed light on understanding how and to what extent these ideal objectives have 
been met in the regions and localities in which future TCs will work.  Taking into 
account both international and local experiences, more feasible objectives might be 
established for future TCs so that the commissioners might undertake their task 
more effectively. 
 
While there are some practical tools to draft the mandates in general 
(González & Varney, 2013) (González, 2013), none specifically help in the 
important task of defining a TC’s objectives. Having clear and concise objectives 
ensure that all participants [of a TC] have realistic expectations about what impact 
their contributions could have (González, 2013, p. 5). Whether the TC is expected 
to help heal a nation, or reconcile victims with their torturers, or ensure the rule of 
law, or establish a culture of human rights, etc., a sense of disappointment 
frequently emerges in the aftermath of a TC process (Freeman, 2006a, p. 38). A 
proper definition of a TC’s objectives can help control such expectations and save 
TCs from generating cycles of high hopes and bitter disappointments (Minow, 
1999, p. 82). 
 
To define these objectives, the matrix is composed of two main variables: 
(1) the main actions TCs are to perform, and (2) the main issues they need to 
document. Each variable contains different dimensions. The actions a TC should 
perform refer to: (i) diagnosing the damages suffered and (ii) recommending the 
necessary remedies to deal with those damages. The main issues that a TC 
should document refer to: (i) the background and context of the crimes, (ii) the 
criminal acts as such and the implicated actors, and (iii) the impacts caused by 
such atrocities.   
 
Once both variables —actions to perform and issues to document— were 
integrated into a matrix, different possible objectives were established and 
organized into groups:  
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 Identify and 
document the 
structural causes 
of violence.  
 Identify the 
criminal acts that 
led to the 
atrocities.  
 Identify the social 
frameworks that 
led to violence.  






 Identify and document 
the most relevant 
criminal acts. 
 Identify the victims 
implicated in the 
criminal acts. 
 Identify the responsible 
actors involved in the 
criminal acts. 
 Identify the different 
degrees of 
responsibility for the 
criminal acts. 
 Identify and document 
different impacts on 
individual/collective 
and/or  indirect/direct 
victims.  
 Identify the impact of 

























 Recommend the 
necessary reforms 
to deal with the 
structural causes 
of violence. 




behaviors and acts 




 Suggest the 
necessary reforms 
to change the 
criminal 
architecture of the 
State. 
 Recommend the 
necessary reforms 






 Produce an impartial 
and official report which 
describes the relevant 
criminal acts. The report 
must include all the 
recommendations made 
by the TC. 
 Recommend alternative 
ways to deal with the 
different degrees of 
responsibility for the 
criminal acts. 
 Design processes to 
assess to the impacts 
on direct and indirect 
victims. 
 Design a mechanism 
to facilitate victims’ 
access to reparation 
programs.  
 Design mechanisms 
and establish 





These three sets of objectives offer a broad picture with enormous 
possibilities for new TCs. The purpose of this is not to further raise the society 
expectations about TC capabilities; the point is to offer a wide spectrum of 
alternatives to choose from for each new TC, according to local priorities and 
political context.  
 
The following explains each variable and each dimension of the matrix 
looking at the SLTRC and SATRC. The purpose is not to present an exhaustive 
comparative exercise betwent both TRCs, but rather to illustrate each objective 
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suggested for the matrix, analyzing how it was or was not accomplished for each 
Commsision. 
 
2.1 Variables. Actions to perform: diagnose damages and recommend 
remedies. 
 
As the notion of “damage and remedy” has been broadly discussed in 
previous chapters, this introduction provides only a brief summary. Criminal acts 
can be defined as core factual matters that happened in the past and gave rise to 
an ongoing damage that should be remedied. This sort of damage has a dialogic 
structure, which refers to two opposite but related components (implicated actors): 
the damage committed by someone finds its other half in the damage suffered by 
someone else (Ricoeur, 1995).  
 
Finding damages is a descriptive, analytic and explanatory —not 
propositional— task; therefore, all the objectives related to damage begin with 
verbs like “identify” and/or “document”. The notion of damage cannot be reduced to 
an individual transgression because, due to the nature of the context in which a TC 
emerges, criminal acts also imply institutional shortcomings: the notion of 
background refers to the historical  institutional antecedents which precede the 
atrocity, while context refers to ongoing institutional failures. Additionally, the 
damage goes beyond the effect that the criminal act had on victim, so the criminal 
act has an impact on the victim that continues through time. 
 
The notion of remedies is inspired by the universally recognized “right to an 
effective remedy”, which holds that damages must be remedied partially or 
integrally, according to circumstances. TC suggested remedies are based on 
identified damages, thus these remedies usually come in the form as 
compensation since  remedies can rarely fully restore victims with what they have 
lost. The majority of TC suggested remedies are of a procedural nature in that they 
81 
 
suggest the measures through which relief may be obtained. Substantive remedies 
for relief are fewer and uncertain. 
 
The task of “recommending remedies” suggests a propositional assignment. 
Thus, the goals related to remedies begin with verbs like suggest, recommend, and 
design. It is important to note that this propositional task does not imply the 
execution of the suggestions. The scope is very precise: a TC’s job is to 
recommend some suggestions that others will make effective once the TC finishes 
its job. 
 
2.2 Dimension. Issues to document: Context and background, Criminal acts, 
Implicated actors, and Impacts. 
 
2.2.1 Context and background: Damage as Antecedent 
 
Andre DuToit asserts that truth commissions typically give priority to gross 
human rights violations rather than to systemic injustices, and thus diagnose the 
primary moral needs of victims and perpetrators rather than of beneficiaries and 
bystanders or collaborators (DuToit, 2000, p. 127). Likewise, Priscila Hayner 
argues that it is not clear how a TC might address a full range of injustices. For 
Hayner, it seems that TCs tend to focus more on human right violations than 
economic and social injustices (Hayner, 2011, p. 77).  
 
Lisa Laplante, on the contrary, proposes that TCs should expand their 
mandates to include a legal framework that examines the socioeconomic root 
causes of violence in terms of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. In 
her opinion, if the underlying socioeconomic structures that lead to violence are not 
addressed, sustainable peace will remain beyond our reach. The overarching aim 
of prevention rests on the basic premise that postconflict recovery entails a holistic 
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approach that should include economic, political and social structural reform 
(Laplante, 2008)  
 
The matrix I suggest agrees with Laptante’s theory of confronting underlying 
social issues as a forerunner to sustainable conflict resolution. TCs appear in 
contexts where human rights violations cannot be reduced to individual 
transgressions; criminal acts cannot be explained by ignoring the context from 
which they emerged. In that sense, the notion of damage refers to the interwoven 
relation between individual transgressions and institutional shortcomings. Thus, to 
diagnose the damage implies establishing the historical antecedents, which 
precede the atrocity (background) and/or the ongoing institutional failures (context), 
which made it possible. Depending on the country, the background and context 
might be explained by the existence of the structural causes of the violence, the 
criminal state, the social frameworks, or the international context of relations, 
among other reasons. In any case, each TC must identify the most important social 
aspect that triggered criminal acts; each Commission should define the scope of 
the damage as antecedent according to TC resources, to the local requriments and 
to the political conditions. In what follows, I sugest some dimensions as for what 
could be identified.  
 
2.2.1.1  Structural causes of violence 
 
Iris Marion Young asserts that structural injustice occurs when social 
processes that put large groups of persons under systematic circumstances of 
vulnerability simultaneously enable others to derive significant benefits: “structural 
injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to 
pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part within the limits of 
accepted rules and norms.” (Young, 2011, p. 52). 
 
A good example for this can be found in Sierra Leone where the country’s 
administrative and judicial structures made it possible for the country’s capital 
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(Freetown) to accumulate all the political and financial power, leaving the 
remaining portions of the country in poverty and misery. The SLTRC pointed to the 
State as an inefficient and eroded structure (Shaw, 2010, p. 115)  that inherited a 
series of problems from British rule, especially because “the [inherited] duality of 
the country’s administrative and judicial structures made them vulnerable to 
manipulation” (2004b, 2, 1, 19). According to the SLTRC Report, the political 
system inherited from the days of British rule left space for a very immature and 
corrupt democracy (2004b, 2, 2, 40) and, in the end, “provided a context conducive 
for the interplay of poverty, marginalisation, greed and grievances that caused and 
sustained the conflict” (2004b, 2, 1, 16ff). The SLTRC reviewed the record of post-
independence governments and found a series of critical indicators, that is, a group 
of items that were seriously problematic within the political edifice of the country: 
“separation of powers; decentralisation; political participation; independence of the 
judiciary; the rule of law; and the existence and effective operation of oversight 
bodies and institutions of accountability” (2004b, 2, 1, 18). Further, the crisis 
regarding such indicators was found not only because of the investigations 
undertaken by the TRC, but because “the perceptions adduced by the Commission 
during its hearings indicate that Sierra Leoneans yearn for a principled system of 
governance” (2004b, 2, 1, 17). 
 
The Report mentions two important initiatives the SLTRC suggested as 
remedies for the structural causes of the violence in the country: National Vision for 
Sierra Leone and Vision 2025. The first was intended to sense the peoples’ 
expectations for the future (2004b, 2, 1, 89), while the latter was established to 
design a government development policy (2004b, 2, 1, 93). Sadly, these 
recommendations were inefficient in themselves, inasmuch as national resources 
are still centralized and economic inequalities persist: “in practice, almost 
everything is still centralized around the President and the ruling party; access to 
economic and political resources and other benefits is still dependent upon how 




2.2.1.2 Criminal State 
 
In other cases, individual criminal acts could be strongly related to the 
existence of a criminal state. Isaacs and Vernon assert that “regimes do not pull 
triggers, but they collectively create circumstances in which triggers get to be 
murderously pulled” (Isaacs & Vernon, 2011, p. 9) .  Atrocity requires the members 
of a regime to “act jointly, although none of them individually might commit 
atrocious acts” (Isaacs & Vernon, 2011, p. 9).   
 
The difference between the structural causes of violence (explained in 
section 2.2.1.1) and the criminal state is that the first one refers to an inefficient 
State while the second refers to “joint criminal enterprise”, according to 
international law. Inefficient States are unable to manage the wider socio-economic 
and political challenges, so they place a large number of their populatino in 
circumstances of vulnerability and pursue their particular goals (Young, 2011, p. 
52). A criminal state might also be inefficient, but also becomes a “joint crimina l 
enterprise” (see, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at 
Art. 7 (1) and Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, at Art. 6) with a 
“common criminal plan or purpose” pursued by a plurality of persons (Guliyeva, 
2007). If this is the case, a TC must document how the criminal state created an 
administrative architecture to obtain the degree of cooperation and coordination 
necessary to commit crimes in a systematic manner.  
 
The South African Apartheid is a case in which an administrative 
architecture of atrocity played a key role in the explanation of the country’s 
conflicts. The SATRC Report states the National Party considered Apartheid as “a 
white counter-revolution” which promoted at least seven official legislative 
strategies within the administrative architecture —the Population Registration Act 
of 1950, the Group Areas Act of 1950, the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 
the 1950 Immorality Amendment Act, the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, 
the 1953 Separate Amenities Act, the 1953 Bantu Education Act and the 1959 
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Extension of University Education Act (1998, 1, 2, 26–40)—, all of which were 
racism-driven (Cobban, 2007, pp. 83-88). As a whole, all of these Acts grew into “a 
social engineering project of awesome dimensions” thanks to which, “from about 
the mid-1950s and for the next thirty or so years, the inherited rural and urban 
social fabric of South Africa was torn asunder and recreated in the image of a 
series of racist utopias” (1998, 1, 2, 42). 
 
There were many transformations needed in order to remedy the 
administrative architecture of atrocity in South Africa. All the recommendations 
were issued and entrusted to a Secretariat that had the responsibility of overseeing 
them (1998, 6, 5, 7, 2). A very significant remedy was the demand for the President 
of South Africa to apologize. After decades of silence and denials, the SATRC 
urged “that, as head of state, the President of the Republic of South Africa 
[apologize] to all victims on behalf of those members of the security forces of the 
former state and those armed forces of the liberation movements who committed 
gross violations of human rights” (1998, 6, 5, 2, 16). 
 
By the time the TRC started its investigations, the core of the Apartheid 
architecture had already been dismantled. However, a considerable portion of such 
administrative architecture remained the same; the hegemony of the security 
forces, for example, remained intact “during the period of preconditions for 
negotiations and the negotiations process itself” (De Lange, 2000, p. 19) and, 
although some consider that the SATRC might have helped in the breaking of such 
a hegemony (Ibid., p. 19), others note that the courts kept their missions before, 
during and after the TRC period (Ibid., p. 28), and that, in general ( Ibid., p. 29), 
there was a high degree of continuity in the structure and organization of state 
institutions, especially with regard to personnel. This problem manifests itself in two 
ways. In the first place, “a lingering 'apartheid memory' continues to restrict the 
development of trust and allegiance in the new political dispensation and its 
institutions. […] In the second place, the whole legal order, especially the criminal 
justice system, suffers from a serious crisis of credibility, legitimacy and efficacy” 
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(De Lange, 2000, p. 28).  In a way, this might show that an important aspect of the 
South African antecedents demanded more satisfactory remedies than the ones 
the SATRC suggested.  
 
2.2.1.3 Social frameworks  
 
Ordinary criminals act outside the prevailing moral framework, violating 
social norms by committing crimes; in contrast, individuals who are swept up in 
mass violence do not step outside the prevailing moral framework – they succumb 
to intense social pressure (Aukerman, 2002, p. 59). These sorts of social 
frameworks “turn the world upside down and make a crime against a whole 
category of people an accepted behaviour” (Bernstein, 2002, p. 221); in such 
conditions, criminals effortlessly may come to believe that murdering is morally 
acceptable. The concept of social frameworks is closely related to Arendt´s 
concept of ideological thinking; both seek to reduce the monstrosity and the 
magnitude of the criminal acts, justifying them through lies and through 
emancipation from reality. 
 
The SATRC points out three important social frameworks that later 
facilitated Apartheid’s racial segregation as an accepted phenomenon in the 
country: the Cold War, the anti-colonial context and the Apartheid itself. The first 
refers to a “virulent form of anti-Communism and anti-Marxism that took root after 
the 1948” (1998, 5, 7, 67) that resulted in a demonization of the liberation 
movements. In the same passage, the TRC quotes a former Minister of Law to 
illustrate its point: 
 
The mother organisations of the liberation movements, the ANC-PAC, 
were seen with justification as fronts and tools of the Marxist-
Communist threat against the country … I believed and still believe 
that if the forces of Communism and Marxism since the 1950s were 
allowed to take over South Africa, our country would today be 
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destroyed, impoverished and a backward country with an atheist 
communist ideology as the government policy … I saw it as part of my 
duty to fight against such thoughts, programmes or initiatives and to 
ensure that these objectives were not successful (1998, 5, 7, 67). 
 
The second framework refers to the anti-colonial resistance movements in 
South Africa. Although “the liberation movement was dominated by the non-
racialism of the ANC and anti-racism of other movements such as Black 
Consciousness, some organisations interpreted it as a struggle against whites” 
(1998, 5, 7, 69), and some even explicitly stated that “the local struggle was part of 
the wider anti-colonial movement in Africa” (1998, 5, 7, 70). The Report mentions 
all of this as a social framework in which South African atrocities found important 
support in both black and white groups. 
 
The third and final framework refers to fundamentals racism elements of 
Apartheid. Knowing that the obvious problem underlying Apartheid politics is the 
intense racism it entails, the Report goes on to explain how such racism was 
ideologically understood at the core of Apartheid:  
 
Racism is a systematic ideological doctrine which creates the ‘other’ as 
essentially different. In South Africa this was the rhetorical basis for 
apartheid and ‘separate development’: blacks required development, but 
at their own, slower and different pace, since (as the argument went) 
they were essentially different from the more civilised, developed people 
of European origins (1998, 5, 7, 83). 
 
Unfortunately, it seems that not enough recommendations were made to 
remedy the strong racism by white South Africans, a factor that served as an 
important part of the framework of the atrocity. Evidence of such gaps left open can 
be seen in ongoing racial differences in political (Cobban, 2007, p. 131) and 
economic levels (Cobban 2007, 132; Chapman 2008b, 188); even after the end of 
88 
 
Apartheid, subsequent economic problems revived old interracial problems, where 
the Whites accused the Blacks for the crime rates and the Blacks accused the 
Whites for having most of the country´s wealth still in their hands (Cobban 2007, 
133). In some way, this suggests that the problem of changing into an equal-race 
mindset was not wholly confronted and that racism still lurks beneath the surface. 
Cobban quotes Mongezi Goma, a South African activist, who is of the same 
position: 
 
So, did [Goma] feel that the TRC had succeeded in bringing about a 
recognition by most Afrikaners of the equal humanity of their non-White 
compatriots? ‘No, they mostly don't recognize that yet,’ he said. ‘The 
average Afrikaner would still see the transformation of 1994 as a sellout’ 
(Cobban 2007, 122–123). 
 
2.2.1.4  International context 
 
In other cases, international institutions and/or foreign States could facilitate 
tools to execute genocides and provide the means to industrialize crimes (Drumbl, 
2011). In those cases, atrocities begin “with the devious kindling of conflict 
entrepreneurs, who seek to inflame and exacerbate communal tensions”; this is the 
case of Sierra Leone. 
 
The SLTRC did identify the major role played by Charles Taylor’s political 
administration in the neighboring country of Liberia. Having taken over, Taylor 
established a dictatorial regime that officially fueled the entire Sierra Leonean 
conflict throughout (Dugal, 2009, pp. 34-36). In fact, the SLTRC report mentions 
how, as leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia —the position from which 
he seized power in his country—, “Taylor warned in a BBC radio interview in 1990 
that Sierra Leone would ‘taste the bitterness of war’ because of the country’s 
membership and backing of the West African Intervention Force (ECOMOG) that 




However, the Liberian administrative architecture was not the only one to 
play a central role as an antecedent for the conflict; the SLTRC’s regional analysis 
also showed how Taylor could not have sparked the Sierra Leonean conflict if he 
had not become the protégé of Muammar Gaddafi (Economist, 2007). According to 
the SLTRC Report, Gadaffi’s government not only trained Sierra Leonean would-
be revolutionaries in the late 1980s, while the country was still in a pre-conflict 
stage (2004b, 2, 1, 24), but also encouraged and trained Taylor in Libya (2004b, 2, 
2, 375) and even helped him to meet Foday Sankoh —the future leader of the RUF 
guerillas—, with whom Taylor established an alliance that later proved decisive for 
the future Sierra Leonean conflict (2004b, 2, 1, 63). 
As part of its recommendations, the Report emitted two suggestions 
regarding several external actors that contributed to the Sierra Leonean conflict. 
Mentioning Taylor’s role in the conflict, and how he received enormous benefits out 
of the blood diamond trade, the SLTRC suggested the following: 
 
The Governments of Sierra Leone, Liberia and the International 
Community [should] spare no efforts to trace the material and financial 
assets of Charles Taylor and the NPFL and to take measures to recover 
such assets. Any recovered assets or parts of them should, subject to 
negotiations with the government of Liberia, become part of the War 
Victims Fund proposed under the Lomé Peace Agreement and used for 
financing the comprehensive reparations programme recommended by 
the Commission (2004b, 2, 3, 429–430). 
 
Along the same lines, the Report also insisted on the promotion of regional 
integration and unity, calling on involved regional governments to acknowledge the 
role they played during the conflict and publicly commit to ECOWAS’s principles of 
regional cooperation (2004b, 2, 3, 412). Specifically regarding the aforementioned 
case of Libya, “the Commission [called] upon the government of Libya, in 
recognition of the training and financial support it supplied to the insurgents, to 
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provide monetary support to the War Victims Fund and to support reconciliation 
initiatives within Sierra Leone” (2004b, 2, 3, 413). 
 
2.2.2 Criminal Acts and Implicated Actors 
The matrix aims at identifying the different actors involved while avoiding the 
assignment of fixed and homogenous roles to victims and perpetrators. In the sort 
of conflicts where TCs emerge, the victim of a given criminal act might be the 
perpetrator in another (i.e., child soldiers); or someone may be unable to recognise 
him/herself as a victim (i.e., victims of sexual violence); or someone may even 
deny the status of victim given to him/her by others (i.e., for fear of stigmatization) 
(Selim, 2017). 
 
With respect to the task of “suggesting remedies”, it may happen that those 
who were victims in the past now claim other identities such as survivors or 
resilient subjects, indicating that the status of victim has been overcome. It is 
equally possible that overcoming misfortune and passivity, conditions commonly 
associated with victimhood, indicates that those who have suffered in the past can 
now participate in TCs as citizens who have resumed their lives and who can 
suggest feasible remedies for the future.   
 
On the other hand, the potential indignation felt by the empathic public 
(“those who are not victims”) as a reaction to victims’ suffering needs to be taken 
into account(Sanchez G., 2013).. However, it is not sufficient to provide a forward 
looking Peter Novick,  contends that the public feels more easily inclined to identify 
with the victims than with the perpetrators, and that such inclination tends to 
undervalue the notion of historical responsibility and the involvement of community 
members in the commission of atrocities (Novick, 2001, p. 13). This approach 
elides the possibility of generating morally important discussions in which the 
different actors can express their willingness to transform and participate in 
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restoring the human and civic dignity of both victims and society (Du Toit, 2000, p. 
135). 
 
The suggestion of identifying the different actors involved questions the 
traditional focus of TCs on victims, along with questioning the identity and role of 
‘victims’ and ‘non-victims’. If TCs focus on victims, how does one decide who is a 
victim and who is a ‘non-victim’, what can be expected from ‘non-victims’, should 
bystanders, those who benefitted from the violence and aiders and abettors be 
lumped in the same category, should a TC expect the same things from them?  
 
Eric Bourine advocates for the concept of ‘complex political victim’. He 
argues that the concept of victim expresses a specific position within a specific 
context and relation. It is a concept that determines a partial identity, one among 
several. Hence, a ‘complex political victim’ is not fully subsumed in the victimized 
subject, he/she is not reduced to the status of victim, since other components 
make up his/her identity (Bouris, 2007). 
 
Following in Bourine’s footsteps, Baines suggests a ‘complex political 
perpetrator’ to describe extremely marginalized persons, in situation of chronic 
crisis, and who use violence as an expression of political agency (Baines, 2009). 
This concept is particularly used to concetualise the responsibility of child soldiers. 
This group of ‘perpetrators’ cannot be defined solely by the acts of violence they 
commit, regardless of how serious they are. Doing so would disregard the various 
levels of responsibility that led to the victimization of the child (Baines, 2009, p. 22). 
A contextual analysis allows the uderstanding of the various layers of responsibility 
of national and international actors, thereby revealing the true complexity of the 
conflicts that come before TCs (Nagy, 2017, p. 279). 
 
In sum, TCs are highly participatory temporal spaces, which seek to perform 
both retrospective and prospective examinations. This aim displaces victims as the 
main focus of TCs because their objectives require the participation of a wider 
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range of actors. This participation cannot be reduced to public statements in which 
(i) victims share their testimonies and (ii) those ‘who are not victims’ listen 
empathically, but passively. The different actors involved in the conflicto require 
different spaces representing both the complexity of the conflicto and dynamics of 
identities. For instance, victims may participate as human beings who suffered 
harm in the past, but also as citizens who have resumed their lives and are able to 
propose viable solutions for the future. Perpetrators may provide factual 
information to shed light on the past, while also expressing and materialising their 
remorse and desire to contribute to the construction of a peaceful society. Other 
citizens may be an empathic audience to testimonies of suffering, but also reflect 
on their responsibility as bystanders.  
 
 
2.2.2.1  Victims implicated in the criminal acts. 
 
Another objective suggested by the matrix is to identify the victims 
implicated in the criminal acts. In broad terms, the notion of victims might refer to 
the direct victims who have suffered the direct effects of violations, but also to 
indirect victims who are linked to direct victims in such a way that they too suffer by 
virtue of that link (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral, 2003, p. 54). 
Simultaneously, those who have suffered the direct or indirect effects of the 
damage might be identified as individual victims (individual persons) or as 
collective victims (groups, communities, entire nations, etc.). This collective notion 
of victimhood recognizes that atrocities damage us all- simply by virtue of our being 
part of a common humanity. Each new TC must define what the notion of victims 
means, what its scope will be and, specifically, if there would be specific groups of 
victims which require special attention. Additionally, it implies how the victims’ 
information will be presented: a general list of victims, emblematic cases, 




Chapter 5 in volume 7 of the South Africa TRC Report is a list of all the 
victims identified throughout the investigative process of the TRC. The SATRC 
used the list to focus on each of the victims, not the perpetrators (2002, 7, 1, p. 
3)19; because it was also meant as a tribute to the thousands of victims, the list is 
considered the SATRC’s richest legacy for the future (2002, 7, 1, p. 9) and was 
handed to South Africa’s National Archives for future access by the general public 
(2002, 7, 1, p. 2). The list “contains the stories of those who came forward to speak 
of their suffering” (2002, 7, 1, p .1) and those whom the TRC corroborated to have 
been victims of gross human rights violations (2002, 7, 1, pp. 3 and 5). 
Nevertheless, several victims were left out of the process —with no hope of 
reparation— because they came forward after the cut-off date of December 1997 
(2002, 7, 1, p. 2). Overall, the “Commission received statements from 21,290 
people, of whom more than 19,050 were found to be victims of gross violation of 
human rights. In addition, more than 2,975 victims emerged from the amnesty 
process” (2002, 7, 1, p. 1). The list of 926 pages indicates the names of the victims 
arranged in alphabetical order, the victims’ age, the time in which the violation 
occurred and a brief summary of the crime (2002, 7, 1, p. 4). 
 
Some consider the Report to be limited because of its focus against 
persons, thus leaving out abuses such as those committed against communities 
(Cobban, 2007, p. 97). Similarly, the Report itself recognizes the summaries of the 
crimes do not always do justice to the wider picture of the abuses to black people 
(2002, 7, 1, p. 6), especially to the “thousands of women in South Africa who were 
left behind to fend for themselves and who experienced the brutality of the 
Apartheid system” (2002, 7, 1, p. 9). This was mainly due to the fact that, although 
the TRC was “obliged by statute to deal even-handedly with all victims” (1998, 1, 3, 
60), the principal victims of the conflict were males: 
 
                                                 
19
 Up to this point, all of the quotes from the official SATRC documents have used the numerical 
reference system each of the documents offer; in this case, due to the lack of such numbering in 
the Foreword of the Codicil’s Volume 7, Part 1, sections of the text are quoted referencing the 
pages in which the selected passages appear.  
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Males dominate as victims within the narrow mandate of violations 
examined by the Commission – killings, torture, abduction, and severe 
ill treatment. The gender profile of those killed inside South Africa, 
those shot in street protests, the MK operatives arrested, imprisoned, 
tortured and killed is largely male (2002, 7, 1, p. 9). 
 
The Sierra Leone TRC Report gathered a list of war victims “as an 
acknowledgement of those who suffered in the war and as a poignant reminder of 
the vital need to ensure that the events described herein never happen again” 
(2004b, 2, 5, 5). A grand total of 13,003 victims were presented in two lists; 
answering to the requirement in its mandate to pay specific attention to subjects of 
sexual abuse and to children (Parliament of Sierra Leone 2000, III, 6, 2b), “the 
Commission […] devoted its first list [of 1,012 names] to victims of sexual violence 
and forced conscription […;] the second list [of 11,991 names20] excluded those in 
the first” (2004b, 2, 5, 1). The 230 pages of the list include the name of each victim, 
his or her age, the year and district in which the crime took place and a brief 
description of the violation. 
 
2.2.2.2  Responsible actors implicated in the criminal acts 
 
The matrix suggests that TCs should identify both the responsible actors 
involved in the criminal acts and the different degrees of responsibility for the 
criminal acts. Likewise, TCs should recommend alternative ways to deal with the 
different degrees of responsibility for the criminal acts. 
 
Regarding the responsible actors, the matrix suggests that TCs should focus 
on the complex lines of collective responsibility and complicity. Focusing “only on 
the most notorious killers and senior leaders may falsely bestow collective 
innocence among the majority, who never shot a gun, but who have been 
                                                 
20
 Of these 11,991 victims, only 10,404 are explicitly mentioned in the list; the remaining 1,587 were 
individuals named in confidential statements (2004b, 2, 5, 7). 
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passively or actively complicit with atrocity” (Isaacs & Vernon, 2011, p. 37) . Even 
though a TC assumes that criminal acts are, in a way, a product of vices in context, 
it is also true that responsible actors are to be held morally responsible.  Their 
actions are wrong, and must be judged, even if their character was shaped in a 
collapsed context (French, 2001, p. 41). The point is that, criminal trials —ad hoc 
or permanent— are better suited to deal with individual criminal responsibility; 
indeed, tribunals are set up to judge the innocence or guilt of the defendant. In that 
sense, this objective is excluded from the TC’s scope. 
 
Once a TC focuses on collective responsibility, it should be careful to realize 
that not all citizens bear the same relationship to the wrongdoing (Isaacs 2011). In 
that sense, the different degrees of responsibility must be identified in order to 
avoid that which Arendt warns about when she explains that, where all are guilty, 
nobody in the last analysis can be judged (Arendt, 2011b, p. 126). Arendt 
establishes a distinction between guilt, responsibility (moral and causal) and 
shame. Likewise, Jaspers suggests distinguishing between criminal, political, moral 
and methaphysical guilt (Jaspers, 2001). Each TC must establish the most 
adequate way to classify and deal with collective responsibility and design 
alternative forms of accountability and non-criminal sanctions. 
 
A significant element of the Sierra Leonean conflict is the fact that the 
civilian population suffered attacks from all sides (Dugal, 2009, p. 37). The Special 
Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) had jurisdiction over “those with the greatest 
responsibility for international crimes during the conflict” (USIP, 2016) and were 
tasked with the  responsibility of assigning criminal responsibility. It is an enormous 
achievement for the  SLTRC to have held all criminally responsible warring groups 
to the same standards (Cobban, 2007; Stovel, 2010, p. 218) and to have been able 
to uncover complexities about the war that were not known before; for example, 
that the havoc was not produced only by the RUF (Stovel, 2010, p. 203), or that the 
Civil Defense Forces, specifically the Kamajors, who were thought of as heroes, 
turned out to be criminals too (Dugal 2009, 38). Overall, the  SLTRC Report stated 
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the most significant criminals were the RUF —especially youths between 18 and 
35 years (2004b, 2, 1, 62)—, the AFRC and the CDF (2004b, 2, 1, 34). However, 
the Report also considers several external actors in the Sierra Leonean conflict 
who were involved and should have been held responsible, namely the 
international diamond industry for not being able to filter blood diamonds; the 
country’s neighbors, especially Liberia, for not sanctioning diamond piracy; the 
Taylor regime for trading blood diamonds with the RUF; the Sierra Leonean 
government for not controlling diamond mining and exporting; Libya, for training 
RUF members; Burkina Faso, for serving as a weapons conduit for the RUF; 
Liberia (especially, Charles Taylor and his NPFL) for sparking the first battle and 
fueling the conflict all along; the UN, for abandoning Sierra Leon in time of need; 
the UK, for delaying its intervention; the ECOMOG, for failing to protect Freetown 
in 1999 (although its positive battle contributions are undeniable); and the 
Executive Outcomes’ victory over the RUF as an important aspect to bear in mind 
in terms of its contribution to the Peace Accords (Dugal 2009, 362; 2004b, 2, 2, 
106ff). 
 
Despite these clear identifications, there are very few suggestions of how to deal 
with those responsibilities; a notable example is an imperative recommendation 
regarding the State as a principal perpetrator of the conflict. The Report suggested 
that:  
 
The President, as the ‘Father of the Nation’ and as the Head of State,  
should acknowledge the harm suffered by women and girls during the  
conflict in Sierra Leone and offer an unequivocal apology to them on  
behalf of the government and preceding governments in Sierra Leone  
(2004b, 2, 3, 317).  
 
The South African TRC relied, to a large extent, on a different form of 
submission – amnesty applications (1998, 5, 6, 31). It was the possibility of 
amnesty in the Amnesty Committee (AC), —but especially, according to the 
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SATRC Report, the disclosures of Mr. Eugene de Kock— that motivated 
perpetrators to reveal themselves (1998, 5, 6, 32). 
 
Although the AC’s output was vast, by September 1997 the AC had already 
received 7,127 submissions (1998, 1, 10, 3), the SATRC Report itself recognizes 
that the individual responsibility of “the leaders and voters of the nation, and the 
varying degrees of moral responsibility that should be adopted by all South 
Africans, have (both by design and default) not been given sufficient emphasis by 
the Commission” (1998, 1, 5, 106), mainly because “the greater part of the 
Commission’s focus has been on what could be regarded as the exceptional – on 
gross violations of human rights rather than the more mundane but nonetheless 
traumatising dimensions of apartheid life that affected every single black South 
African” (1998, 1, 5, 107). It is for this reason that the Matrix suggests leaving the 
determination of individual/criminal responsabilities to criminal courts. 
Extraordinary violence usually results in crimes that can be punished, as they are 
considered crimes. However, there are other forms of violence, everyday, 
mundane cases, that are not considered crimes, but are nonetheless traumatic and 
painful. This second type of violence, which cannot be properly defined as a crime, 
must be dealt with in particular by TCs. 
 
Overall, Chapter 6 of Volume 5 of the SATRC Report describes the role of 
the State, its allies, the liberation movements and civil society. Later on, as part of 
the Codicil, Section 5 of Volume 6 dedicates 117 of its 151 pages to view more 
closely what the 1998 Report had said regarding some of the most important 
actors of the conflict —in general, it confirms the most important statements of the 
original Report—: the State, the ANC, the Inkatha Party, the Pan African Congress 
and several right wing groups (2002, 6, 5). Thus, all warring groups were held to 
the same standards (Stovel, 2010, p. 218); this provided “a single, recognizable, 
and politically neutral benchmark for the TRC as it investigated acts committed by 




Of all the different actors, the SATRC Report clearly points to the State as 
the principal perpetrator during the South African conflicts: 
 
The predominant portion of gross violations of human rights was 
committed by the former state through its security and law-
enforcement agencies. Moreover, the South African state in the period 
from the late 1970s to early 1990s became involved in activities of a 
criminal nature when, amongst other things, it knowingly planned, 
undertook, condoned and covered up the commission of unlawful acts, 
including the extra-judicial killings of political opponents and others, 
inside and outside South Africa. In pursuit of these unlawful activities, 
the state acted in collusion with certain other political groupings, most 
notably the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (1998, 5, 6, 77). 
 
Sadly, like in Sierra Leonean case, the SATRC left a gap when it came to 
suggesting remedies for collective responsibilities. As part of the Institutional 
Hearings, there were side mentions of the sectors’ role in the future of South 
Africa, but they did not include very significant concrete suggestions, or limited 
themselves to share the different sides of debates regarding such roles – for 
example, on what businesses that benefited from Apartheid should do to help 
change the situation in the country (1998, 4, 2–7, esp. 4, 2, 149ff). There are two 
recommendations that are also noteworthy in this sense, one referring to the 
liberation movements and the other to the business sector. The SATRC suggested 
liberation movements should help with symbolic reparations, especially with 
apologies and the investigation of missing victims (1998, 5, 8, 109–111). Also, the 
SATRC suggested that the business sector should be involved in restitution 
initiatives that might help repair the victims of the conflict and empower the poor 
(1998, 5, 8, 39). Such recommended initiatives included the audit of underused 
lands, the creation of special funds for victims and the abolition of child labor in all 
sectors, among others (1998, 5, 8, 40ff). Nonetheless, when compared with other 




Regarding non-criminal responsability, some consider the TRC’s work, as a 
whole, to have caused a considerable change in the white South African 
Population: 
 
White South Africans can no longer say ‘I don´t know’. The truth can 
no longer be avoided. A remarkable feature of the Commission was 
the media coverage of its progress. Newspapers and electronic 
media routinely covered the work of the Commission, every day of the 
hearings. Hearings were broadcast live throughout South Africa for 
four hours a day (Boraine, Niacro, Victim Support Northern, & South 
Africa Truth and Reconciliation, 2000, pp. 10-11) 
 
Likewise, as it was said before, there was an episode were six young black 
men went to the Cape Town office of the TRC and applied for amnesty, stating that 
their crime was apathy, explaining that: “The act says that an omission can also be 
a human rights violation. And that's what we did; we neglected to take part in the 
liberation struggle. So, here we stand as a small group representative of millions of 
apathetic people who didn't do the right thing” (Smyth, 2007, p. 17) 
 
Despite these events, the challenge that the SA Report set is that “ordinary 
South Africans do not see themselves as represented by those the Commission 
defines as perpetrators”, and its suggestion that “only by recognising the potential 
for evil in each one of us [are we able to] take full responsibility for ensuring that 
such evil will never be repeated” (1998, 1, 5, 108). 
 
2.2.2.3  The most relevant criminal acts to be documented. 
 
The matrix suggests that TCs should select the most relevant criminal acts 
to be documented. As was said before, the extent of criminal acts documented 
should be as broad as possible, however, the possibility to learn the whole truth 
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about criminal acts is limited to the means and resources at the TC’s disposal 
(mandatory selectivity). Even though it was recognized both for judicial and 
extrajudicial mechanisms, it is naive to attempt to investigate, prosecute and, if 
appropriate, punish all criminal conduct that occurred during an armed conflict or 
during an authoritarian regime. This impossibility has led to the implementation of 
selection and prioritization criteria. Although there are no internationally accepted 
parameters to delimit and guide the determination and application of the selectivity 
criteria, practice has shown that this selection may occur in conjunction with 
prioritization or independently. There may be an express policy of prioritization or 
deduction from the given practice within the ordinary and permanent courts or 
temporary courts that apply the laws of transitional justice; they may be in 
accordance with the mandate of the judicial mechanism or not necessarily follow it; 
it can occur in a scenario within all the criminal conduct that occurred during the 
period of the transition of the State, or only within those that constitute crimes 
under International Law.21  
 
In the Sierra Leone case, the Executive Summary of the Report gives a first 
explanation on the TRC’s methodology to investigate and typify the relevant facts 
that occurred in Sierra Leone (2004b, 2, 1, 29):  
 
The Commission used quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques to 
shed further light on particular patterns and trends. Areas of analysis 
included the types and frequencies of the violations committed, the profiles 
of the perpetrators, the identities and demographics of their victims and any 
evidence of targeting. The Commission examined sixteen specific 
categories of violations, although within each of these the scope of analysis 
was broad. 
 
Later on, in the aforementioned chapter, the Report explains how the TRC 
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took “violations known to have occurred frequently” (2004b, 3A, 4, 12) and 
organized them into a framework:  
 
Some violations such as amputation, forced cannibalism and forced 
displacement stand alone, because of their specific character and the 
patterns in which they were committed. The remaining violations have been 
divided into three sections: violations perpetrated in the context of 
abduction; violations without prior abduction; and economic violations 
(2004b, 3A, 4, 12). 
 
Following these criteria, the resulting framework was developed to 
categorize the violations (2004b, 3A, 4, 19):  
 
1. Amputation 
2. Forced Cannibalism 
3. Abduction and subsequent long term Detention and Mistreatment 
3.1 Forced Recruitment and Sexual Slavery with particular reference to 
children (including the Drugging violation), Forced Labour 
3.2 Assault, Torture and Rape of both children and adults that accompany or 
follow from Abduction 
4. Mistreatment without Abduction 
4.1 Forced Labour, Assault, Torture and Rape 
4.2 Short term Detentions 
5. Economic Violations 
5.1 Looting and Property Destruction 
5.2 Extortion 
6. Forced Displacement 
7. Killing 
 
In the case of the SATRC, an important debate came up on whether the 
Commission’s investigative methodology was appropriate or not (Cherry, 2009, p. 
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255). This was mainly due to the fact that the TRC analyzed various individual 
cases with the purpose of establishing more general patterns of violence in order to 
prevent future repetitions (Cole 2010, 168) and, of all the material that was 
gathered for this purpose and later handed in to the National Archives for public 
access, only certain emblematic cases were included in the Report (1998, 1, 5, 
38). On the other hand, unlike the SLTRC Report, which included a thematical 
categorization of the crimes committed on a national scale, the South African 
crimes —listed in Volumes 2 and 3 of the Report— were presented using different 
criteria: thus, Volume 2 described the crimes committed inside and outside South 
Africa between 1960 and 1990 and during the 1990s as such (1998, 2, 1–5), while 
Volume 3 (1998, 3, 1–6) portrayed the gross human rights violations from the 
victims’ perspective, regionally structuring the narrations and thus reflecting the 
regional structure of the TRC itself (Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Developement of the Republic of South, 2009). In the end, the result was a report 
that only showed emblematic cases that more or less supported the general 
explaining narratives which, according to some, did not reflect the expectations of 
the victims and avoided the complexities of reality (Cherry 2009, 253). 
 
Both the Sierra Leon and South Africa cases —and common sense— show 
that no TRC can presume to cover all such situations; thus, the selection of cases 
is a necessary procedure that depends on various factors, including —among 
others— the resources a TRC has at hand22. In that sense, both the SLTRC and 
the SATRC worked in different ways. The SLTRC (with a budget of $4.7 million 
over 2 years) chose to prioritize and select cases based on university studies and 
without previously going to the regions to hear the victims; it reviewed several 
university studies and, using such documents, chose a series of categories and 
main themes that were later used as criteria to select the most representative 
institutional hearings – the chosen cases were the principal material for the Report 
(2004b, 1, 6). The SATRC (with a budget of $55 million over 6 years), on the other 
                                                 
22
 This is mentioned here because inadequate funding was one of three important problems the 
SLTRC had when it started its investigations (Stovel 2010, 190). 
103 
 
hand, organized its window cases based on the information gathered by its 
regional offices throughout the country (1998, 1, 6). Both should be methods a 
future TC should consider to follow, depending on the nature of its conflict and the 
resources it has at hand for its investigations. 
 
2.2.2.4  Report 
 
An additional TC objective suggested by the matrix is to produce an 
impartial and official report, which describes the relevant criminal acts and includes 
all the TC’s recommendations. Due to the variety of audiences—policymakers, 
legislators, educators, researchers, victims, and others—consideration must be 
given to the different media and venues that could be utilized to maximize the 
report’s impact (González & Varney, 2013, p. 67).  
 
Laura Stovel mentions four important achievements of the Sierra Leone 
Report: besides providing “by far the most compelling history of the conflict 
available” (Stovel, 2010, p. 216), the SLTRC Report helped to understand the root 
causes of the war, held all warring groups to the same standards, recommended 
on cultural and legal factors of violence and advocated reparations for the victims 
(Stovel 2010, 217–219). Likewise, in Witness to Truth: The TRC of Sierra Leone - 
An Overview, author Zoe Dugal does not directly assess the Report as such, but 
widely quotes it in her examination of the Commission, and even seems to —
positively— review each of the objectives the TRC Mandate dictates, thus, 
manifesting an encouraging view of the Report (Dugal 2009). 
 
The official version of the SLTRC Report was widely spread across the 
country; two additional popular versions of the printed report were published, the 
first version was published for children and another one for secondary schools 
(USIP 2015a). The child-friendly version was developed by the TRC itself and later 
published with the help of UNICEF (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 




However, considering that, “with just 4,000 copies for the whole country, 
only a small percentage of the population [would] have access to these books and 
fewer [would] have the time to read so many pages” (Trwg, Sheriff, & Bobson-
Kamara, 2005, p. 4), the second version was produced outside the TRC by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Working Group (TRWG) and funded by Germany’s 
Foreign Office and the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations for the purpose of 
making the Report’s contents available to Sierra Leon’s population of secondary 
students (Trwg et al., 2005, p. 4). 
 
The SATRC Report was presented to President Mandela in October 1998 
(USIP, 2016). According to Richard Goldstone, an important figure chairing the 
fact-finding commission in the last years of Apartheid, the Report represents a 
major achievement in as much as it is a single historical record of what happened 
in South Africa, which contributed to establishing a consistent democratic 
apparatus, even if it was submerged in apartheid ideology (Cobban, 2007, p. 134). 
 
There were some issues regarding the subject of languages and 
translations. Indeed, the testimonies the TRC received during its investigations 
were gathered in all eleven official South African languages; however, they were 
only registered in the Apartheid system´s languages —Afrikaans and English—; in 
that sense, some consider it an academic duty to finish the translation and 
analyses of all narrative testimonies in order for the contents of the Report to be 
available for the entire South African population (Cole 2010, 168–169). However, it 
must be noted that even before the Report was published, the TRC’s work was 
given wide publicity in the South African media, especially its Human Rights 
Violations Committee (HRVC): a Media and Communications Department was 
established to allow for full TV-coverage of the TRC hearings and a weekly wrap-






The matrix suggests that TCs should identify and document different 
impacts on individual/collective and/or indirect/direct victims (psychological, mental, 
physical, economic, etc.), attending with special care to the impact of the violence 
on human relations and documenting their manifestations. According to these 
damages, TCs should design processes to assess the impacts on direct and 
indirect victims and facilitate victims’ access to reparation programs, to design 
mechanisms and to establish processes to repair broken relations. 
 
The Sierra Leone TRC powerfully depicts how the damage greatly impacted 
upon the victims as well as human relations as a result of the conflict, especially in 
its attention to severely affected groups, identified by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Act even from before the TRC began its work. 
 
Although the SLTRC was “obliged by statute to deal even-handedly with all 
victims” (1998, 1, 3, 60), the structure of its report shows it obediently followed the 
Act’s mandate to give “special attention to the subject of sexual abuses and to the 
experiences of children within the armed conflict” (2004b, III, 6, 2, b) and to 
examine “the impact of the conflict on specific groups, particularly on women, 
children and youths” (2004b, 2, 1, 5). Thus, the Report includes several sections 
dedicated to illustrate —from diverse standpoints— the impact of the conflict on 
these three groups of victims.  
 
The Report begins with an Executive Summary that highlights, for example, 
how women’s “vulnerability was deliberately exploited in order to dehumanise 
them” (2004b, 2, 1, 50), or the fact that children were forcibly recruited to become 
perpetrators (2004b, 2, 1, 56 and 60). For this reason, both the Lomé Peace 
Agreement and the TRC Act “directed the Commission to give special attention to 
the experiences of children in the armed conflict” (2004b, 2, 1, 57; 1999, V, Art. 




Another text that addresses the issue at hand is a chapter in the Report on 
Findings. Here, the text explains how the Sierra Leonean war left youths with three 
major problems: they are now undereducated, due to the lack of chances they had 
to study during the 1990s (2004b, 2, 2, 460); many of them —even some of the 
graduates— have a difficult time finding a job in a country with so many economic 
and infrastructural problems (2004b, 2, 2, 461); and finally, many had marijuana 
issues during the war, a serious problem that was left unattended and has now 
caused countless cases of addiction to harder drugs (2004b, 2, 2, 462). This 
chapter also talks about children, describing how they were deliberately targeted 
(2004b, 2, 2, 464) and how “many children have been ‘conditioned’ into accepting 
violence as the norm”, so that “perpetrating violence became a means of survival” 
(2004b, 2, 2, 468) and many “have entered adulthood deeply scarred by their 
traumatic experiences and their feelings of guilt” (2004b, 2, 2, 469). It also 
mentions other serious impacts, such as girls’ post-rape health problems (2004b, 
2, 2, 489), the grave disadvantages of not having received acceptable education 
(2004b, 2, 2, 490) and the increase in the number of children who, not able to 
return home, live now on the streets (2004b, 2, 2, 493). Regarding women, this 
section mentions how, in general, women were wronged “with the deliberate 
intention of inflicting serious mental and physical suffering or injury on them” 
(2004b, 2, 2, 526), and how this had various psychological impacts on them, be it 
because they lost their families and became widows (2004b, 2, 2, 547), or because 
they developed strong drug addictions (2004b, 2, 2, 529), or because they suffered 
a double victimization in Sierra Leonean society: 
 
The Commission finds that many women have suffered ‘double 
victimisation’. First they were compelled against their will to join the fighting 
factions and today they are victimised by society for having played a 
combative role in the conflict (2004b, 2, 2, 535). 
 
Further, women also suffered grave physical consequences: many were 
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forcibly sterilized (2004b, 2, 2, 518), others were mutilated (2004b, 2 ,2, 519) and 
many of them contracted diseases due to the sexual abuses they underwent 
(2004b, 2, 2, 543). 
 
The SLTRC recognized that human social relations, as opposed to isolated 
individuals, also suffered considerable impacts of the country’s war. The 
breakdown of social and cultural values the Report mentions can be better 
understood in light of the impact the Sierra Leonean conflict had on families, 
communities and belief systems. Regarding families, the Report considered “the 
family felt the most impact of the war in Sierra Leone” (2004b, 3A, 4, 127); the 
targeting of families “was designed to remove all vestiges of respect and dignity in 
the people abused. Such conditioning makes people very maleable and easy to 
control. It however led to the break up of families, as the trauma was too great for 
many to bear” (2004b, 3A, 4, 139). All of these problems were particularly strong 
when the heads of the families were killed and the community was not able to 
replace its providing functions (Sesay, 2007, p. 50); they were also evident when 
the forced recruitment of children included a systematic deracination of family 
relations, a traumatic transition into new values and an alteration of the initial 
identity of the children (2004b, 3A, 4, 345ff). Overall, the TRC summarized such 
impact as follows: 
 
Household heads were targeted, brutalised and killed in the presence 
of their children. Young girls most of them not yet at puberty were 
raped and taken away to become “bush wives”. Boys, some of them as 
young as eight years old, were taken away to be trained to fight for the 
combat groups, some of them never to return. In most cases, their 
links with their families were deliberately severed through forcing them 
at the pain of death to commit incest and horrendous atrocities against 




Regarding communities in general, the SLTRC considered they were 
attacked mainly in order to replenish the warring groups’ resources, and that such 
attacks were the principal cause of the widespread displacements that Sierra 
Leonean communities suffered during and after the war (2004b, 3A, 4, 144). This 
had an important consequence regarding the forma mentis of these communities 
and their tendency to commit violent acts: 
 
Moreover, such acts contributed significantly to the siege mentality 
prevalent in many communities of the Southern and Eastern provinces. 
One of the most direct manifestations of the siege mentality was the 
subscription to the concept of civil defence and the consequent 
mobilisation of local militias (2004b, 3A, 4, 145). 
 
Finally, regarding the human relations established around belief systems, 
the SLTRC discovered that the attack on barries23 and on local traditional chiefs 
seriously altered ancestral social relations and had a deep impact on a 
communitarian level (2004b, 3A, 4, 345ff; 3A, 4, 164). Indeed, the active search for 
the traditional chiefs and the particular nature of the abuse they were subjected to 
(2004b, 3A, 4, 165) had obvious consequences on the chiefs and their properties 
at an individual level (2004b, 3A, 4, 168), but ‘”the impact tended to be more 
profoundly and enduringly felt by his community than when similar abuses were 
meted out to less-exalted citizens” (2004b, 3A, 4, 169). Apparently, this was meant 
by the perpetrators as a way to show their strength and gain popularity in the 
communities (2004b, 3A, 4, 178), but in the end, these criminal acts “gave the 
civilian populace the inescapable impression that their attackers had embarked on 
a calculated programme to destroy the tenets and symbols of their local culture” 
(2004b, 3A, 4, 177). 
 
                                                 
23
 In Sierra Leone, barries “were the community meeting places and served all kinds of purposes 
including as places for the settlement of disputes” (2004b, 3A, 4, 163).  
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The SLTRC suggested several recommendations that were meant to attend 
to the negative impacts of the conflict on the country’s victims. Regarding children, 
for example, an important finding of the TRC was the disordered co-existence of a 
plethora of organizations that dealt with children in a very ineffective manner; 
confronting this issue, the Report recommended there should be a government-
organized leadership of such initiatives in order for them to work competently 
(2004b, 2, 2, 495). Another very concrete example: in an effort to address the 
problems facing youth in Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Youth and Sports was 
established in 2002 (2004b, 2, 1, 65), as well as the National Commission for 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) Programme: 
 
NCDDR was established in July 1998 to disarm and demobilize 
combatants and to support their reintegration into society through the 
learning of trade skills. Unfortunately, the poor state of the country’s 
economy is hindering the translation of these skills into means of 
sustaining a livelihood. In addition, many ex-combatants have left their 
programmes inadequately trained (2004b, 2, 1, 66).  
 
Regarding the reparations programs, the Commission first considered those 
victims who have become vulnerable as a result of having suffered human rights 
violations, in order to determine the categories of beneficiaries for the reparations 
program (2004b, 2, 1, 84). Having determined such categories, the TRC suggested 
a national reparations program should be established; for such a program, the 
Report recommended a responsible organization and recommended the means it 
should have in order to administrate the reparations for Sierra Leonean citizens: 
 
The Commission proposes that the reparations programme be co-
ordinated by the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), 
which would also serve as the implementing body for the programme 
and be entrusted with administering the Special Fund for War Victims. 
NaCSA should work closely with different ministries in ensuring the 
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decentralisation of reparations programmes. A dedicated Advisory 
Committee should assist NaCSA in its task(2004b, 2, 1, 87).  
 
The reparations were supposed to cover various aspects of the victims’ 
lives: health, pensions, education, skills training and micro-credit, community 
reparations and symbolic reparations (2004b, 2, 1, 43 and 484) and NaCSA was 
meant to be the implementing body of such reparations (2004b, 2, 1, 483).  
 
While assessing the Sierra Leonean reparation policies, Stovel highlights 
the satisfactory way in which the TRC chose the victims that were suitable for 
reparations according to their vulnerability, thus avoiding a reduced scope that 
limited reparations for civilians, or nationals, for example (Stovel 2010, 219). 
Others consider the way the SLTRC organized its reparations policy without 
enough care for material reparations (Amadu Sesay 2007, 27–28) and in some 
ways prioritized the help given to ex-combatants over non-combatants (Sesay, 
2007; Shaw, 2010, p. 112) and how all of this produced considerable frustration in 
the population (Millar, 2010, p. 491) and other negative effects: 
 
The Commission was too ‘process-oriented’, focusing as it were, on 
public truth-telling that was expected to lead to forgiveness, while 
overlooking the need to prioritize the issues of reparations as an 
important step towards true reconciliation effects (Sesay 2007, 15). 
 
The TRC of Sierra Leone considered reconciliation to be the key to recover 
the broken relations that the conflict formed as a negative impact in the country. 
Reconciliation was understood as “a long-term process that must occur at the 
national, community and individual levels” (2004b, 2, 1, 513). Besides explaining 
what the fundamentals for such reconciliation should be24, the TRC also explicitly 
                                                 
24
 “The improvement of the socioeconomic living conditions of the people; good governance; strong 
and functional oversight institutions; the creation of a respected and professional security force; and 
the implementation of a reparations programme that takes into account the needs of the victims of 
the conflict” (2004b, 2, 3, 514). 
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mentioned that certain steps were necessary to facilitate reconciliation in Sierra 
Leone. “These steps include: truth telling; reconciliation between victims and 
perpetrators as well as the perpetrator with his or her community; the provision of 
adequate physical security; and the implementation of a reparations programme” 
(2004b, 2, 1, 515). Thus, most of the reconciliation activities the TRC suggested 
were aimed either at promoting reconciliation between the victims and their 
perpetrators, or between perpetrators and their communities. Some of the activities 
the TRC promoted were symbolic activities, such as a national peace day, joint 
projects for community development, traditional activities “to reintegrate victims 
and ex-combatants into communities and to restore the social fabric in the 
community. Such activities can include traditional dances, pouring of libation, 
cleansing ceremonies and cleansing of the bush” (2004b, 2, 3, 522). Other 
activities included religious activities, sports and competitions, artistic or social and 
recreational activities, to name but a few (2004b, 2, 3, 523). 
 
In the South Africa Report the description of the psychological and physical 
consequences on individuals was particularly robust, especially in comparison with 
the description on human relations that are found throughout the Report. The 
South African conflicts, whether racial or political in nature —for not all inter-group 
frictions were racially caused (Cobban 2007, 131)—, had important psychological 
and physical impacts on the nation’s individual victims. The SATRC considered 
most individual psychological impacts not as a by-product of the conflict, but as a 
deliberate effort to discourage future opposition to Apartheid (1998, 5, 4, 13). The 
different ways in which these psychological damages were inflicted were organized 
in four types (1998, 5, 4, 16) and had two major traumatic consequences: 
incomprehension and disrupted attachment. The first refers to the way in which a 
victim’s worldview changes, as a whole, because of the traumatic experiences; the 
latter refers to the difficulty in establishing new relationships, thus alternating 
“between withdrawing socially and attaching themselves impulsively to others” 
(1998, 5, 4, 31 a–b). Besides these post-traumatic impacts, however, there were 




Post-traumatic stress disorder is not, however, the only consequence 
of torture and human rights violations. Other problems include 
depression, anxiety disorders and psychotic conditions. The effects are 
multidimensional and interconnected, leaving no part of the victim’s life 
untouched. Exposure to trauma can lead to sleep disorders, sexual 
dysfunction, chronic irritability, physical illness and a disruption of 
interpersonal relations and occupational, family and social functioning 
(1998, 5, 4, 21). 
 
Regarding the physical individual consequences, the SATRC illustrated a 
survivor’s description of them as “a tattoo, a permanent physical reminder of what 
was done to us, a symbol that in many cases brings shame” (1998, 5, 4, 56). The 
countless ways in which the South African people were abused obviously produced 
all sorts of physical injuries: infectious diseases, malignancies, cerebrovascular 
accidents, heart diseases reported in survivors of torture or prolonged arbitrary 
detention (1998, 5, 4, 57), etc., all of them altering the victims’ lives in numerous 
ways (1998, 5, 4, 63) and exacerbating psychological problems with pain, loss of 
independence and dignity (1998, 5, 4, 65), stress-related illnesses like heart 
diseases and high blood pressure, etc.   
 
Having said so much about the impact on individuals, however, the TRC 
also acknowledged the South African conflict had serious impacts on a collective 
level, especially on families and in black, rural and white communities. Concerning 
the conflict’s impact on families, the Report informed of some important impacts:  
 
“Group areas legislation and forced removals have both been linked to 
disruptions in healthy family functioning, and the migrant labour system also 
deprived people of family life. Children were denied fatherly guidance and support 
during their formative years and the fact that women were obliged to take on 
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domestic work meant that children were denied the care of their mothers” (1998, 5, 
4, 74).  
 
The report goes on to describe how the diverse crimes committed against 
families had consequences for the inner structure of the families (1998, 5, 4, 92–
93) and evidently had economic consequences as well (1998, 5, 4, 122ff). 
 
Regarding black communities, the TRC recognized that the Group Areas Act 
of 1960 had a strong impact on the dislocation of South Africa’s black communities 
(1998, 5, 4, 138). This is considered a central phenomenon that resulted in the 
death of many of the youths who were in some way thought to be associated with 
the resistance (1998, 5, 4, 144), but largely, in communities living in townships and 
residential areas with underservice problems, inadequate roads, lack of schools 
and general socio-economic depravation (1998, 5, 4, 139).   
 
Finally, referring to white communities, the TRC recognized they were the 
group most interested in preserving the Apartheid system, as they were its 
principal beneficiaries; thus, many white youths were militarized at a very early age 
and many crimes were committed in order to preserve the system (1998, 5, 4, 
182–185). The way South Africa’s history developed produced a white population 
that felt its leaders had abandoned them, and consequently, many were afraid of 
the TRC (1998, 5, 4, 186). Thus, an important collective impact of the conflict was 
a guilty and fearsome white population (1998, 5, 4, 188), some of whom even fled 
the country, producing —in turn— more negative consequences: 
 
Fears of an imminent civil war resulted in many white South Africans leaving 
the country. Emigration, although a voluntary activity, had widespread 
consequences for families and communities. In some ways, these mirror the 
experience of exile in that they result in the scattering and dislocation of 
families. Emigration also had economic consequences for the country, as it 




The SATRC did not talk very much about the way in which the country’s 
conflict altered the human relations of its citizens; however, this was usually done 
in the same texts that were discussed in the previous section, i.e., texts that 
primarily addressed the collective impact the conflict had on certain groups and 
communities. There are scant references scattered throughout the text, but nothing 
as solid as the information given on individual impacts. Three of such references 
are about the increased distrust in communities, the increase in inter-family 
conflicts, and the increase in inter and intra-community violence.  
 
The first reference is to a strategy used by Apartheid to “undermine the unity 
of resistance through a system of informers (both real and alleged)” (1998, 5, 4, 
94); this immediately created a climate of suspicion and distrust amidst the families 
and communities of the country. The second reference is to the increase of inter-
generational conflicts (1998, 5, 4, 99) inside the families themselves, particularly 
when younger generations challenged the old (1998, 5, 4, 101) and disrupted the 
status quo within the families: 
 
Thus, in many families, even where activism did not generate outright 
conflict, a shroud of secrecy often affected intergenerational relationships. In 
some families, political activism was seen as operating in a sphere outside 
of family life. This was sometimes linked with parents’ feelings of 
helplessness about the public realm of politics. This lack of communication 
was aggravated by disruptions to family life, caused by the absence of 
parents who worked as migrant labourers, domestic workers, or because 
group areas legislation and other apartheid laws prevented them from living 
with their families (1998, 5, 4, 107). 
 
The third and final allusion refers to the vigilantism and inter-community 
violence that became a feature in many communities from the late 1980s (1998, 5, 
4, 149), inasmuch as rebels organized strategies to destabilize the Apartheid 
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government and some local authorities were suspiciously seen as collaborators of 
the State and the oppression (1998, 5, 4, 150–152). As a consequence of this 
tension, negative relational —particularly political—impacts were soon seen all 
over the country and, “once again, the abnormal became normal as violence, fear 
and insecurity engulfed communities in South Africa” (1998, 5, 4, 158). 
 
Regarding the remedies, the South African TRC considered truth-telling and 
official acknowledgement as the principal means to heal the victims of the conflict 
and to restore their dignity. Even though the TRC was aware that “not all 
storytelling heals”, it still bet on “the healing potential of storytelling, of revealing the 
truth before a respectful audience and to an official body” (1998, 5, 9, 6) as a way 
of healing (Boraine et al. 2000). In fact, the South African case was paradigmatic in 
the transition from truth seeking to truth-telling (Millar, 2010, pp. 480-481). The 
main advantage of truth-telling as a central nucleus of the TRC’s procedure was 
the fact that “witnesses revealed far more in oral testimony than they had in their 
written statements” (1998, 5, 9, 10); in other words, truth-telling as a strategy 
enabled the TRC to carry out its strong investigative mission in various aspects. 
The Report mentions, for example, how both the decriminalization and exoneration 
of unjustly-criminalized people (1998, 5, 9, 20–29) strongly benefited from the 
advantages of the oral truth-telling that took place in the hearings. Likewise, at 
least fifty of the requests for exhumation and reburial of missing victims were 
successful, highlighting the benefits of the intense investigations – and truth-telling 
as its core (1998, 5, 9, 30).  
 
It is important to note that, “although it was not part of the Commission’s 
mandate to effect reconciliation between victims, the community and perpetrators, 
there were a number of significant instances where the Commission directly 
facilitated the beginning of this complex process” (1998, 5, 9, 62). Having said that, 
the SATRC’s contributions to this purpose sought to promote reconciliation and 
recover the broken relations in the country, aiming towards a peaceful and non-
violent coexistence. The Report states that, while a weak or limited form of 
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reconciliation, without apologies by those responsible or forgiveness by victims, 
may often be the most realistic goal towards which to strive (1998, 5, 9, 94) —
some even highlight the benefits of not demanding remorse of perpetrators 
(Cobban 2007, 129), thus enabling wider declarations and more information to be 
gathered (Boraine et al. 2000, 27)—, it is also true that sincere and qualified 
apologies have an enormous impact (1998, 5, 9, 49 and 98) and there were 
countless cases in which victims showed a remarkable willingness to forgive (1998, 
5, 9, 38), even when it meant long processes to overcome feelings of anger and 
humiliation (1998, 5, 9, 48) or the feeling of being witch-hunted (Cobban 2007, 13). 
The Report illustrates this by mentioning several cases of well-received apologies 
coming from religious organizations, the health sector, legal institutions, the 
business sector, etc. (1998, 5, 9, 56ff.).  
 
Otherwise, there were additional means that the TRC suggested as ways of 
recovering broken relations. Thus, many of Archbishop Tutu’s statements referred 
to the importance of building a culture of democracy and respect for human life in 
order to strengthen national unity and achieve reconciliation (1998, 5, 9, 110–113). 
Similarly, the Report mentioned the far-reaching moral influence of faith 
communities and how important it was for them to contribute to the recovery of 
broken relations by organizing ceremonies that helped people to acknowledge and 
come to terms with their involvement in the conflict (1998, 5, 8, 33) and through the 
redistribution of their skills and resources (1998, 5, 9, 34), among others. Likewise, 
giving priority to the needs of children and youth was suggested as an important 
way of healing the injuries inflicted upon families and helping to reintegrate 
combatants into a peaceful society (1998, 5, 9, 114–118). Another example is the 
effort suggested in order to bring veterans together as a way to improve relations 
among South Africans - the Report quotes Commissioner Mary Burton talking 
about the issue during a hearing in Cape Town: 
 
There are many, many citizens of South Africa who did their military service 
and who still view themselves as having fought a good fight, as having 
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upheld the safety of the State, as having opposed communism in a broad 
sense and who are still part of our country and who have to be taken into 
account as we move into a process of reconciliation and unity. Their views 
also need to be part of the whole stream of coming together. And when we 
talk about where we go forward we have to be knowledgeable of that view 
as well (1998, 5, 9, 119). 
 
Regarding the reparation programs, according to the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act, the SATRC was to include a Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Committee (R&RC); such committee had the mandate to suggest —
especially to the President— concrete measures to ensure the victims’ access to 
reparation and rehabilitation programs. The President himself was mandated to 
establish the President’s Fund in order to finance all these initiatives (1998, 5, 5, 7–
10; 1995, 4f; 25(b) i; 42), and a Secretariat was suggested in the President’s Office 
as an organism responsible for overseeing the implementation of all R&RC 
recommendations (1998, 5, 8, 23). 
 
Quoting the Act, the SATRC defined reparation as “any form of 
compensation, ex gratia payment, restitution, rehabilitation or recognition” (1998, 5, 
5, 23; 1995, 1(1) xiv), and understood it as a way to promote reconciliation and to 
counterbalance the amnesties that denied the victims their right to demand 
reparations from perpetrators. Thus, the government accepted that responsibility 
(1998, 5, 5, 3) and proposed a program that included five focal components: urgent 
interim reparations, individual reparation grants, symbolic reparation/legal and 
administrative measures, community rehabilitation programs and institutional 
reforms (1998, 5, 5, 25–32).  
 
Guided by international standards and local studies, the policy developed by 
the R&RC considered that both victims and their relatives and dependents were 
entitled to reparations (1998, 5, 5, 33); however, there were several problems the 
Report identified regarding the recommended reparations. A first problem was the 
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lack of cooperation from certain sectors; although there were some signs of good 
faith, it was a challenge to involve large numbers of people in the reparation 
programs. This was especially true for some who were unjustly privileged in the 
past (1998, 5, 9, 100 and 102), but there was also “a lack of specific advice and 
concrete guidelines about how ordinary people could get involved in restitution and 
reconciliation” (1998, 5, 9, 105). A second important problem resulted regarding 
material reparations: many victims were left without the material reparations they 
were entitled to receive (1998, 7, 1), and in general terms, there was a very strong 
emphasis on political apologies that diverted attention from the commitment 
towards financial reparations (Moon, 2008, p. 21). Also, there was a lack of 
strength and authority when it came to demanding the cooperation of highly-
privileged companies and financial sectors (Cobban 2007, 124ff.).   
 
Overall, the matter of material reparations turned out to be quite 
controversial; some suggest the SATRC should not have been limited to 
government suggestions and should have been given the capacity to compensate 
victims as part of its processes (Boraine et al. 2000, 26); others pointed out how 
the TRC’s efforts to change the South African mindset did not necessarily mean 
the black population recevied an immediate economic benefit (Cobban 2007, 98). 
In general, there were those who considered financial reparations as an important 
complement to amnesty; others did not agree with such reparations because they 




The purpose of my methodological matrix is to set up a set of objectives to 
be chosen and priorized for any new truth commission. This matrix seeks to 
support the creation of new TCs around the world in two ways: (i) by systematizing 
previous international experiences with TCs (specifically South Africa and Sierra 
Leone, but it can be used for any TC) and (ii) by looking at local truth and memory 
iniciatives (I will explore this point in Chapter 4). These objectives offer a broad 
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picture with enormous possibilities for new TCs. The purpose is not to raise the 
already high expectations of TC capabilities, but to offer a wide spectrum of 
alternatives to be chosen for each new TC, according to local priorities and political 
contexts.  
 
In what follows I present the learned lesson in each issue to be documented. 
 
3.1 Context and background 
 
This dimension suggests that to diagnose the damages implies establishing 
the historical antecedents, which precede the criminal acts (backgroud) and/or the 
ongoing institutional failures (context) which made them possible. Depending on 
the country and the background, the context can be explained by the existence of 
the structural causes of the violence, the criminal State, the social frameworks, or 
the international context or relations, among other reasons. The Sierra Leone TRC 
was successful in achieving a better understanding of the structural causes of 
violence and the role of the international context. It identified and rendered clear 
explanations of how pre-existing problems and the inability of the State to handle 
them were at the core of the Sierra Leonean war. On the other hand, the SATRC 
achieved a deeper understanding of the criminal State and social frameworks as 
the principal elements of the conflict. Future TCs should investigate whether or not 
particular conflicts feature a significantly inefficient State (as in Sierra Leone) or a 
criminal State (as in South Africa). This will determine the level of attention that 
should be given by the Commission to the historical antecedents and/or the 
ongoing institutional failures. 
 
What international experience shows is that the ability to identify damages is 
not comparable with a TC´s capability to change structural causes of violence, or 
modify a criminal State or transform international relations or context. In general 
terms, TCs are incapable of changing the “context or background” of their 
countries’ violence; this goes beyond a TC´s capabilities. In the best case scenario, 
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TCs might modify social frameworks and reinforce a shared understanding that 
certain violent behaviors and acts are wrong and unacceptable (be it as it may, 
South Africa did not wholly take advantage of either of these).  
 
What the matrix seeks is for future TCs to be more realistic about their 
objectives in order to avoid generating unlikely goals. Yet, TCs should make every 
effort to honestly identify the damages and offer adequate solutions that it can 
afford to recommend. In that sense, remedies suggested by a TC should aspire to 
be procedural ones in two ways: first, by suggesting recommendations through 
which a solution may be obtained (others will make it effective once the TC finishes 
its job) and second, by ensuring that these recommendations are the result of 
instances of broad participation. What the SLTRC and SATRC showed is that the 
remedies they suggested were procedural in the first sense only. In those TCs, the 
participation of victims (and non-victims) is reduced to identifying damages 
(especially in public hearings), but to give recommendations is the exclusive task of 
commissioners at the end of TC’s work. My approach to TC’s suggests broadening 
the participation of victims (and non-victims) and making it more complex such that 
they become involved in the process of suggesting remedies. In Chapter 2, I 
suggested aiming for speech situations that could generate solutions to recover the 
ability to settle conflicts peacefully, to resolve the past and suggest feasible 
remedies with dialogue. In these instances, the broader the participation, the 
better. The goal is to reach an understanding in order to carry out the plans of 
some jointly defined actions on a consensual basis. In that sense, the remedy 
suggested to change context and background seeks not only the capability to 
impact or to effectively change the identified damages, but to establish a process 
to recover the ability to resolve differences peacefully and carry out the plans with 
a shared understanding. 
 
3.2 Criminal Act and Implicated Actors 
 
The list of individual victims is considered the TRC’s richest legacy for the 
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future in both the Sierra Leone and South Africa cases. However, these two 
experiences show that no TC can presume to cover all the criminal acts; thus, the 
selection of the cases to be heard is a necessary procedure that depends on 
various factors, including —among others— the resources a TRC has at hand. In 
that sense, the SLTRC and SATRC have worked in different ways.  
 
The SLTRC chose to prioritize and select cases based on university studies 
without visiting the actual conflict zones to hear the victims, it selected “violations 
known to have occurred frequently” (2004b, 3A, 4, 12) and organized them into a 
framework: some violations such as amputation, forced cannibalism and forced 
displacement stand alone, because of their specific character and the patterns in 
which they were committed. These categories and main themes (selected using 
university studies) were later used as criteria to choose the most representative 
cases to be heard (7,700 statements were received) – the selected cases were the 
main material for the Report (2004b, 1, 6).  
 
The SATRC received over 21,000 victims’ statements and organized 
regional hearings all over the country. Unlike the SLTRC, the South African crimes 
were presented using different criteria: Volume 2 described the crimes committed 
inside and outside South Africa from 1960 up through the 1990s (1998, 2, 1–5), 
while Volume 3 (1998, 3, 1–6) portrayed the gross human rights violations from the 
victims’ perspective, regionally structuring the narrations and hence, reflecting the 
regional structure of the TRC itself  (Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Developement of the Republic of South Africa 2009). In the end, the result was a 
report that only showed window cases that more or less supported the general 
explaining narratives which, according to some, where not up to the expectations 
of the victims and avoided the complexities of reality (Cherry 2009, 253), leaving 
out cases that were insufficiently analyzed in their own accord (Cole 2010, 165). 
 
Even though Sierra Leone had significantly fewer resources than South 
Africa, the thematical categorization of the crimes committed on a national scale 
122 
 
helped to get a better understanding of the broad patterns of violence. In order to 
get this sort of understanding, the SLTRC not only gave priority to groups of 
individual victims (children, women and youth) but also examined abuses 
committed against communities and human relations. Therefore, because this TRC 
not only focused on crimes against persons, it did justice to the wider picture of 
abuses commited in Sierra Leone. 
 
Regarding the perpetrators, it is an enormous achievement for both TRCs to 
have held all warring criminal groups to the same standards, however it was a 
failure on the part of these same two TRCs for not carefully exploring the different 
sorts of responsibility involved. The ideal scenario is to have the TC working 
together with the judicial mechanisms, which investigate individual/criminal 
responsability (i.e. Special Court of Sierra Leone). In that sense, TCs might 
concentrate on investigating the collective, institutional responsibilities of 
beneficiaries, accomplices and the indifferent. Likewise, they should explore 
creative ways to deal with those responsibilities, designing alternative forms of 
accountability and noncriminal sanctions, such as tort, restitution, public apologies, 
public acknowledgemnts, symbolic reparations, etc. In the same way, TCs should 
work harder on the efficiency of the enforcement of their recommendations, on how 
to make the non-criminal sanctions suggested by them legally binding. 
 
Together with the list of victims, a TC report usually is one of its most 
significant outcomes of the Commission. As such, the matrix suggests that future 
TC´s must consider creative venues that could be utilized to maximize a report’s 
impact. The example of the SLTRC with regards to the diffusion of the Report 
issued in that case is quite useful, in that it was a) disseminated throughout the 
country and b) translated into versions that the different sectors of each society 
might require (including a children’s version). The example of South Africa shows 
that, even though the diffusion of the report was limited, its impact was still very 






Overall, both TRCs show it is possible to assess the impact conflict has on a 
warring society. In South Africa’s case, it is also clear that the descriptions of the 
psychological and physical consequences on individuals were particularly robust, 
especially in comparison with the descriptions of human relations found throughout 
the Report. Conversely, the Sierra Leone TRC powerfully how the damage greatly 
impacted the victims as well as human relations as a result of the conflict, 
especially in its attention to severley affected groups. In that sense, it is important 
to note that the task of identifying impacts is deeply related to how the TC defines 
the notion of victim.  For example, because the SLTRC paid special attention to 
women, children and youth, the impact of violence on those groups was widely 
documented.  
 
Regarding the solutions to deal with the impact of violence, the notion of 
truth-telling held a key position within the remedies suggested by the SLTRC and 
SATRC. In the midst of this much discussed matter of apologies and forgiveness, it 
is clear that truth-telling has always been a central piece of any TC 
recommendations to achieve reconciliation. Several cases, for example, 
“emphasised the importance of truth in the reconciliation process between victims 
and perpetrators: in other words, knowing whom to forgive and why the violation(s) 
took place” (1998, 5, 9, 43) – and it seems this was a generalized rationale 
frequently used by the TC in which the psychological benefits of forgiving were 
highlighted (Chapman 2008a, 80–81). However, it seems that “the participation in 
TC processes didn’t always help people to forgive their perpetrators” (Chapman 
2008a, 76); further, some victim advocates consider “the act of forgiveness does 
not necessarily confer benefits, and in some circumstances, especially when 
imposed on victims, may even be harmful”, and thus, “rather than placing pressure 
on victims to forgive their perpetrators, […] the TC should have provided space for 
people to express feelings of anger, sorrow, sadness, and rage” (Chapman 2008a, 
81). This problem increases when one takes into account the fact that sincere 
apologies and sincere remorse are emotions with which the different groups coped 
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in different ways (Cobban 2007, 120–121). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the advantages of truth-telling in terms of 
personal therapy and community catharsis have been broadly criticized. 
Commissions might facilitate the beginning of this complex process (social 
reconciliation or individual healing) but TCs cannot offer them as remedies. Truth 
telling is one component of these processes but it in itself is insufficient to meet the 
myriad of psychological and social needs that healing and reconciliation require. In 
that sense, TCs have a challenge to offer more appropriate remedies to deal with 
the impacts of violence; as will be shown in Chapter 4, which addresses how local 
initiatives in Colombia offer a broad and rich repertoire to fill this gap. 
 
Regarding the reparation program, the matrix suggests that TCs should 
facilitate victims’ access to reparation programs. The South African TRC 
administered, on its own, an urgent internal reparations program providing between 
USD$300 and USD$1,000 to many victims who had given a statement to the TC 
(Hayner, 275). The Sierra Leone TRC suggested that a national reparations 
program should be established and for such a program the Report recommended a 
responsible organization and recommended the means it should have. In 2008, 
four years after the SATRC had concluded, the UN Peace building fund provided 
USD$3 million for a one-year reparations program: $100 provided to approximately 
22,000 victims (USIP, 2016). 
   
Despite the difference in amounts of money, the economic reparations in 
both cases were considered insufficient. In South Africa, many victims were left 
without the material reparations they were entitled to receive (1998, 7, 1), and in 
general terms, there was a very strong emphasis on political apologies that 
diverted attention from the commitment to financial reparations (Moon 2008, 21). 
Some consider that the SLTRC organized its reparations policy without enough 
care for material reparations (Amadu Sesay 2007, 27–28) and prioritized the help 
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given to ex-combatants over non-combatants (Shaw 2010, 112; Amadu Sesay 
2007, 48).  
 
It is impossible to pretend that a TRC would come up with enough 
suggestions to solve all economic disparities in a given country, especially when 
the country has a history of war and conflict. In that sense, both the SRTRC and 
SLTRC show the enormous challenges that arise when material reparations are 
discussed, whether because of the debate they open on the justice or injustice of 
the measures taken or because of the difficulty in getting the government to 
cooperate. A future TC should be aware of these challenges so that the solutions it 
recommends regarding material reparations meet the victims’ needs, and also, 
reflect the capacity the country has to meet them. Also, although governments’ 
acceptance of a TC’s suggestions is not the TC’s direct responsibility, the 
difficulties faced by the Sierra Leone and South Africa TRCs suggest that all 
recommendations and initiatives should be as realistic and achievable as possible, 
so that, in some way, they will help governments to implement them.   
 
 
This third chapter focused on how a matrix allows to sistematize and 
evaluate previous TCs,  the fourth chaper shows how a matrix might support the 
creation of new TCs around the world. Focusing on the Colombian case, the next 
chapter uses a matrix to learn from previous TC experiences, as well as to 
dialogue with local truth-seeking experiences. The comparisions of the SLTRC and 
SATRC will enable the identification of the challenges that those Commisions 
faced in their efforts to achieve the objectives suggested. The local approach helps 
to shed light on understanding how and to what extent these ideal objectives have 
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i. Individual injury/ 
individual 
responsibility 
How was the subjective 
experience of suffering 
addressed?  
What was the epistemologic 
standing of the personal or 
emotional testimonies in the 
process that provided 
knowledge about the past? 
Was there room to express 
anger, outrage, etc.? 
Did victims receive an official 
apology for their suffering?  
Who (professional team) was 
in charge of listening to and 
supporting victims before and 
after they testified?  
 
How was the existence of 
violent facts documented 
and proved? 
What procedures were 
used to turn the victims’ 
private experiences into 
public evidence?  
How did the commissions 
deal with criminal 
responsibility (amnesty, 
punishment)? 
Did the commissions 
name the perpetrators? 
 
ii. Collective injury/ 
collective 
responsibility 
How was the institutional 
context in which the violence 
was perpetrated described?  
Were the causes, patterns, 
and historical contexts of the 
violence identified? How were 
they documented? 
How did violence become an 
acceptable social practice? 
Was a condemnatory message 
against the social conditions, 
which allowed the crimes, 
sent? 
Was the responsibility of 
the political elite, private 
companies, media, 




How was the participation 
of bystanders and society 
in the violence described?  
Were the beneficiaries of 
the violence identified?  





legislation or turning a 
blind eye to violent acts 
identified?  
 
Table 5. Evaluation of previous truth commissions with regard to remedy 
 
Remedy Memory Archives 
For victims Have the cathartic or therapeutic 
effects of testifying been assessed? 
What is the balance? 
Have the victims’ perceptions of 
hearings been studied? 
Did victims relieve their suffering 
through the experience of testifying? 
Why? 
Could victims obtain more 
information on their cases?  
Were bodies that had 
disappeared found? 
Was the information 
documented by commissions 
useful for defining reparation 
programs or accomplishing a 
judicial–criminal process?  
 
For society Has the impact of truth commissions 
on social reconciliation, democratic 
development, and HHRR improving 
peace been assessed? What is the 
balance? 
Have truth commissions embodied a 
closure of the past and/or a bridge to 
a new democratic regime?  
Has the report become a widely 
accepted interpretation of the 
abuses of human rights? 
Have the public institutions, political 
elite, private companies, and 
international actors involved in the 
violence undertaken reforms taking 
into account the truth commissions’ 
reports? 
How was the memory of the 
violence produced by the truth 
commissions’ reports 
materialized?  
To what extent were the reports 
disseminated within the country 
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 DAMAGE REMEDY 
 Injury Wrongdoing 
(Responsibiliity) 














of suffering, material 





How was the subjective 
experience of suffering 
addressed?  
What was the 
epistemologic standing 
of the personal or 
emotional testimonies 
in the process that 
provided knowledge 
about the past? 
Was there room to 
express anger, outrage, 
etc.? 
Did victims receive an 
official apology for their 
suffering?  
Who (professional 
team) was in charge of 
listening to and 
supporting victims 





































Have the cathartic or 
therapeutic effects of 
testifying been 
assessed? What is the 
balance? 




Did victims relieve 
their suffering through 










evidence in order 





were used to turn 
the victims’ private 
experiences into 
public evidence?  
Could victims 
obtain more 
information on their 
cases?  







useful to define 
reparation 


















The existence of 
collapsed moral 





How was the 
institutional context in 
which the violence was 
perpetrated described?  
Were the causes, 
patterns, and historical 
contexts of the violence 
identified? How were 
they documented? 
How did violence 
become an acceptable 
social practice? 
Was a condemnatory 
message against the 
social conditions, which 






















How was the 
participation of 
bystanders and 











embodying a closure 
of the past and/or a 






embodied a closure of 
the past and/or a 
bridge to a new 
democratic regime?  
How was the memory 
of the violence 
produced by the truth 
commissions’ reports 
materialized?  
To what extent were 
the reports 
disseminated within 
the country and 
abroad? 
Has the report 
become a widely 
accepted 
interpretation of the 
abuses of human 
rights? 
Has the impact of truth 










The society and 
governments´ 
attempts to make 
institutional 
reforms,  to 





violence  (AI) 
 





involved in the 
violence 
undertaken reforms 





beneficiaries of the 
violence punished?  





turning a blind eye 
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 Damage Remedy 
 
Victim Accountable 
Symbolic and ritual 
remedies 


















which attacked and 
destroyed the 







practices to recover 
the moral person 
and umque identity  
-Telling testimonies 
(hearings) 
- Knowing facts (TC 
findings) 
 
Means to recoverthe 
juridical person of 
thevictim 
























Social  injury that  
corrupted all  
human solidarity  








practices to recover 
the humansolidarity, 
to mend the broken 
relationships and 
build trust. (activities 
for reconciliation 
and reinsertion of 
excombtientes) 
Recommendations 
to make institutional 
reforms in order to 
deal with the 
political 
responsibility of the 




























 How have the 
structural causes, 
and historical 
contexts of violence 
in Colombia been 
documented? 





Colombia? How did 
it happen? 




legislation or turning 
a blind eye to 
violent acts been 
identified? 
 
The criminal act  
(Individual wrongdoing) 
 
 Have the direct perpetrators 
of the violence in Colombia 
been identified? How has 
their responsibility been 
documented? 
 Have the beneficiaries of 
the violence in Colombia 
been identified?  
 Has the responsibility of 
political elite, private 
companies, media, and 
international actors who 
approved and/or supported 
the violence in Colombia 
been identified? 
 
Consequences of criminal 




 How has the subjective 
and individual 
experience of suffering 
been addressed and 
documented? 
 Has the subjective 
experience been granted 
any epistemological 
value in the process of 
creating knowledge 
about the past? 
 Who is in charge 
(professional team) of 
listening to and attending 
to victims before and 
after they testify?  
 How do commissioners 
organize and categorize 
victims’ testimonies 
(individual injuries on 




 How has the collective 
experience of suffering 
been addressed and 
documented (memory)? 
 How do commissioners 
organize and categorize 











































allowed the crimes? 










of the criminal act 
 
 How have the different 
degrees of responsibility 
been dealt with? 
 Has the Center created an 
official historical record of 
criminal acts (report)? 
Reparations (individual/ 




 Which processes have 
been established to 
recover individual 
injuries (victim´s 
possibility of telling their 
testimonies and knowing 
the facts that surrounded 
their suffering)? 
 Which processes have 
been established to 
recover the victim´s 
juridical person (cross 
examination and 
procedures to validate 
victims experience as 
legal evidence which 
allow them later to re-
establishing their 
violated rights, make the 
necessary economical 
reparations and even to 





 Which processes have 
been established to 
recover the human 
solidarity, to mend the 
broken relationships and 








Chapter 4. Colombia: A new truth commission 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the matrix presented in Chapter 3 to 
establish precise and achievable goals in support of Colombia’s new truth 
commission.  This new TC was approved in the Final Agreement signed by the 
Colombian Government and the FARC-EP guerrilla group in November 2016 and 
regulated by Decree 588 of 2017. This Final Agreement approved the creation of 
an Integral System for truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition. It will be a 
system made of different judicial and extra judicial mechanisms and measures that 
will be implemented in a coordinated and simultaneous way. This comprehensive 
system shall consist of three mechanisms: (i) The Commission for the Clarification 
of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition (CEV in its Spanish acronym); (ii) the 
Special Unit for the Search for Persons deemed as Missing in the Context of and 
Due to the armed conflict; and (iii) the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP in its 
Spanish acronym). 
 
In this endeavour, the CEV could be linked both to previous institutional 
efforts and to multiple and varied local initiatives in order to avoid duplicating its 
tasks or ignoring the valuable experience acquired in Colombia over the last 10 
years. Between 1958 and 2012, twelve national commissions for the study and 
extrajudicial investigation of violence were designed. Three of these twelve 
initiatives sought to present a global diagnosis of violence in the country: National 
Commission for the Investigation of Causes and Present Situations of Violence in 
the National Territory (1958), Commission on Violence Studies II (1987) Historical 
Memory Area of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation 
(founded in 2007 and today called the Historical Memory Center) (Jaramillo Marín, 
2014). By October 2015, the Historical Memory Center had consolidated a record 
of 323 Historical Memory Initiatives (HMI). The purpose of this chapter is to show 
how, based on the methodological matrix, some horizons of articulation between 
the previous truth seeking initiatives and the future CEV can be proposed. 
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According to the alternative approach to truth in the aftermath of violence 
presented here (Chapter 1),  new issues for future TCs to document include: (i) the 
background and context of the crimes (that which triggered a criminal act), (ii) the 
criminal acts as such and the actors implicated, and (iii) the impacts caused by 
such atrocities (the ongoing harms suffered by the victims).  Consequently, the 
truth established by TCs should (i) get core facts straight about critical criminal acts 
in order to deal with (ii) the harm as an antecedent and (iii) the harms as impacts.  
 
In sum, the sixteen «ideal objectives» suggested by the matrix are a set of 
criteria that commissioners can use to learn from the experience of previous TCs 
(i.e South Africa and Sierra Leone) , as well as to dialogue with local truth-seeking 
initiatives: on one hand, the international comparative study will be able to reveal 
the challenges that previous TCs have faced in their efforts to achieve said 
objectives; on the other hand, the local approach can shed light on how and to 
what extent these ideal objectives have been met in the regions and localities in 
which the future Colombian TC will work. Taking into account both the international 
and the local experiences, it should be possible for more feasible objectives to be 
established for the future TC and the commissioners might thereby be able to  
undertake their task more effectively.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I present a brief history of the conflict in 
Colombia. In the second part, I introduce four truth-finding initiatives that have 
taken place in the country. In the third part, considering the methodological matrix 
presented in the previous chapter, I weigh some of these truth-finding experiences. 
The conclusions summarize CEV’s pending goals, namely the potential pending 
damages to be diagnosed and the possible remedies that the CEV should explore.   
 
1. The Colombian Conflict: Summarizing Five Stages. 
 
Diverse violent repertories make Colombia the country with the longest 
unresolved conflict in the world (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y & Área de 
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Memoria, 2013b). The General Report, prepared for the Historical Memory Group 
“Basta Ya. Colombia:  Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad” (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación y, 2013), identifies four main periods in its evolution.  
 
The first period (1958-1982) marked a transition from bipartisan violence to 
subversive violence. The proliferation of guerrilla groups was related to inequalities 
arising from the National Front, especially the failed attempts to reform land tenure 
and the limited influence of the dissident agents who questioned the bipartisan 
agreement (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y & Área de Memoria, 2013a, p. 
118).  
 
The second period (1982-1996) was characterized mainly by the expansion 
of the guerrilla groups, the attempts at peace policies (President Belisario 
Betancur, 1982-1986), the emergence of the paramilitaries and the placement of 
drug-trafficking on the global agenda. The new Colombian Constitution of 1991 
was an attempt to respond to the crisis of the State in the midst of the armed 
conflict (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013a, p. 118).  
 
The third period (1996-2005) marked the highpoint in the years of 
Colombia’s humanitarian tragedy. The armed conflict’s intensification is explained 
by the simultaneous expansion of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The 
relationship between these two illegal armed actors and the civilian population 
shifted: instead of using persuasive tactics, these groups became intimidating and 
aggressive, committing murder and forcibly displacing millions of Colombians. 
During this period, violent acts began to be carried out en masse; massacres and 
forced displacement became the most palpable signs of the situation. This period 
also involved the expansion and reorganization of major drug-trafficking cartels.  In 
response, the political radicalization of public opinion leaned towards a military 
solution to the armed conflict. Such claims were encourage by international 
pressures related to the war on drug-trafficking and its interwoven relationship with 
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the war on terrorism (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 
2013a, p. 117).  
 
 The fourth period (2005-2012) was a time of readjustment for the armed 
conflict. The failure of the negotiations between the FARC and the government of 
Andrés Pastrana, and the subsequent adverse climate for a negotiated settlement 
to the conflict, led to the second electoral victory of Álvaro Uribe in 2006. During 
Uribe’s second term, the State´s military offensive reached its maximum degree of 
effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations, which weakened but did not defeat 
the guerrilla groups. Uribe’s proposal for a military recovery of Colombia´s guerrilla-
controlled territory involved a combination of an intensification of the war against 
the guerrilla forces and the demobilization of the paramilitaries via some 
controversial negotiations. (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y & Área de 
Memoria, 2013a, p. 120). 
 
 In July 2005, President Uribe signed Law 975, Ley de Justicia y Paz (the 
Justice and Peace Law), which regulated the procedures to be followed for those 
demobilized members of illegal armed paramilitary groups and established judicial 
benefits based on their contribution to justice and reparation.  Nevertheless, this 
process failed to achieve its aim of overcoming the paramilitary phenomenon. 
Rather, it only lead to their rearmament and served to provoked violent internal 
rearrangements (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y & Área de Memoria, 2013a, 
p. 117). 
 
The “Basta Ya” report does not include the last stage of the Colombian 
conflict: The peace talks between the Colombian government and Colombia’s 
FARC guerrilla group (2010 - 2016). During this process, the government pledged 
to set in motion a process of de-escalation of State military actions provided that 
the FARC suspend their offensives. The talks were held between November 19, 
2012 and August 24, 2016, and an agreement was officially signed on September 
26, 2016. However, the Colombian people rejected that peace agreement in a 
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plebiscite on October 2, 2016. Thus, the Colombian government and the FARC 
went back to the negotiating table to try and strike a new deal which would be 
acceptable to those who had voted against the peace agreement. The newly 
revised agreement was submitted to Colombia’s Congress for approval, instead of 
calling for a popular vote. This new agreement was approved on November 30, 
2016.  Currently, Colombia is struggling to implement this Agreement.  
 
2. Colombian Attempts to Find Truth 
 
Due to the prolonged time span of its armed conflict (1958-2015), Colombia 
represents an unprecedented case in the construction of institutional spaces to 
clarify the past. None of these initiatives "have been the cause or effect of a 
transition from conflict to post-conflict or a negotiated way out of war" (Jaramillo 
Marín, 2014, p. 27) and in a strict sense, have not represented an official truth 
commission either; they only have been halfway attempts between truth 
commissions and extrajudicial commissions (Jaramillo Marín, 2014, p. 27). 
 
In this section, I focus on presenting four recent and significant attempts to 
clarify the Colombian past. The first attempt (Historical Memory Group and 
National Historical Memory Center) embodies the longer institutional and official 
attempt undergone in Colombia. This attempt began during the fourth period 
(2005-2012), which corresponded to Uribe Velez`s Government. The second 
attempt (Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims) was a temporary 
project that emerged during the fifth period, which refers to the peace talks with 
Colombia’s FARC guerrilla group. This temporary Commission was created during 
negotiations, but once it accomplished its goals, it was disbanded.  
 
The third attempt refers to some Historical Memory Initiatives such as works, 
actions, processes, or practices which Colombian society has autonomously 
promoted by civil social since 2012 approximately.  The fourth and final truth-
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finding attempt presented, in this section, is the future CEV, which was created by 
the Final Agreement and regulated by Decree 588 of 2017.   
 
2.1 Historical Memory Group and National Historical Memory Center 
 
Since 2005, when Alvaro Uribe Vélez's government negotiated the 
demobilization of the country’s armed paramilitary groups, attempts to know the 
past and build the memory of the conflict have become institutionalized in 
Colombia. Within the framework of the Justice and Peace Law (2005), the National 
Commission for Reconciliation and Reinsertion was created, among other entities, 
by the Historical Memory Group, whose role was to contribute to the reconstruction 
of the memory of the conflict, in particular the events associated with illegal armed 
groups within the framework of the peace process. 
 
The effective implementation of the Justice and Peace Law faced a number 
of problems. Most victims did not fulfill the requirements of formally reporting the 
crimes committed against them, the legal processes proved excessively time-
consuming and complex, and the institutional mechanisms where weak, thus 
limiting the number of beneficiaries. By 2008, only 24 victims had received damage 
payments. Amidst mounting pressure, the Victims’ Law was approved and signed 
by President Juan Manuel Santos Calderón in 2011 with the purpose of providing 
sweeping rights and protections that departed sharply from legislative precedent 
(Summers, 2012, p. 223). In 2011, with the approval of the Victims' Law, the 
National Historical Memory Center took over the work carried out by the National 
Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation, with the task of centralizing and 
collecting memory preservation functions and leading the construction of a 
museum.   
 
The work of the Historical Memory Group was primarily centered around the 
production and release of reports on emblematic cases. The implementation of 
each case involved consultations and negotiations with the victims who served as 
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witnesses and investigators. It also involved the revision of secondary sources, 
such as local and national archives facilitated by communities and organizations, 
the research of legal files and media archives, and the collection of academic 
research, among others  (Bello, 2013, p. 19). The emblematic reports cover the 
historical antecedents, as well as the causes and motivations that led to violence, 
and the responsible actors (Program, 2012). Through these cases, the GMH sets 
out to analyze the variety of victimizations provoked by the different forms of 
violence, groups and social sectors in different regions of the country  (Bello, 2013, 
p. 19). 
 
The "Basta Ya!" report, published in 2013 for the Historical Memory Group 
was the result of the systematization of the 24 emblematic cases that the Historical 
Memory Group (GMH) had documented since its creation (2002). All the 
information collected from the 24 cases is presented in the five main themes 
defined in the "Basta Ya" chapters: the dimensions and modalities of war; the 
origins and transformations of armed groups; the relations between justice and 
war; the damages and impacts on the victims; and victims’ memories. This report 
embodies the most recent and systematic efforts to account for the last 50 years 
(1958-2013) of armed conflict in Colombia (Bello, 2013, p. 19).   
 
In general terms, the effort of both the Memory Group and the Memory 
Center has been significant in their different areas of work. Nevertheless, both 
institutions have faced different challenges since their creation. First, neither the 
Justice and Peace Law nor the Victims’ Law formalized the connections between 
memory and justice, or processes by which the two could be linked. Historical 
memory did not feature in the justice system which led to a separation between the 
historical truth and the judicial truth; neither institution had a mandate to provide 
assistance to judicial processes as such they were disconnected from the legal 
investigations. This also hindered the capacity of the Memory Group and Memory 
Center to implicate the most responsible actors for the human rights crimes over 




Second, the state-commissioned GMH was to carry out historical 
investigative work even when strong political interests blocked the scope and 
impact of their work, “they did not have the national government blessing to 
operate and investigate freely” (Program, 2012).  
  
Third, structural barriers blocking access to information have limited the 
Group’s and the Center’s achievements. Such barriers can be largely attributed to 
Colombia’s unique context, namely the execution of its work while the country is 
still in the midst of an internal conflict. Physical access is important to the job of 
both of these institutions, nevertheless, they both had limited access to certain 
regions due to the increasing activities of criminal gangs and continued paramilitary 
activities. (Program, 2012). 
 
2.2 The Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims 
 
The "Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims" (the Historical 
Commission) was created during negotiations between National Government 
representatives and FARC delegates. The Historical Commission was composed 
of twelve experts and two rapporteurs in order to produce a report on the origins 
and multiple causes of the conflict and the main factors and conditions that had 
facilitated or contributed to its persistence (Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus 
Víctimas, 2015). 
 
It is curious that the negotiating teams from the Colombian government and 
the FARC decided to create this Historical Commission in August 2014 when by 
that date the “Basta Ya!” Report had already been available for a year. In my 
opinion, one of the reasons why this Commission was created was because the 
FARC guerillas did not approve of the time line covered by the “Basta Ya!” Report 
(1958-2015). Sergio de Zubiria, one of the twelve academics who participated in 
the Historical Commission,  suggests that, it might have been more convenient to 
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define the time line of the CEV as beginning in the 1930s because, according to 
him, the government proposed agrarian reform during that time ignored the 
demands of the peasants and favoured the landowning oligarchy. These reforms 
defined the capitalist model of development, against which the FARC have always 
fought (De Zubiria, 2016). Thus, if this future CEV is to adopt the time frame used 
by the “Basta Ya” report, it will make it more difficult for the FARC to justify their 
political claims. 
 
The report produced by this Historical Commission has been sharply 
criticized for the fact that the commissioners focused solely on portraying their own 
point of view, rather than concentrating on collectively elucidating the questions put 
to them. In his opinion column, Colombian political analyst, León Valencia recalls 
that the meaning of the word "commission" refers to a "group of people in charge of 
resolving an issue…it’s not about each one summarizing in 50 pages what he had 
always said about the Colombian conflict." (Valencia, 2015). That was not the task. 
That was the issue to be resolved. That was the key issue on which the 
Commission was obliged to establish a minimum consensus that would allow the 
Habana negotiations and the country to advance in the reconciliation.  The 
weakness of the report is due to the absence of these collective definitions.  
 
2.3. Historical Memory Initiatives  
 
Simultaneous to this institutional and official framework, civilian involved in 
creating HMIs in Colombia have multiplied and diversified. By October 2015, the 
Historical Memory Center had consolidated a record of 323 HMIs. These initiatives 
refer to works, actions, processes, or practices which society has autonomously 
promoted in order to make their own voices heard, to share what they have had to 
endure and what they have witnessed in the framework of the internal armed 




Louis Bickford has called these sorts of experiences Unofficial Truth 
Projects (UTPs), however, UTPs are different from HMIs. UTPs tend to resemble 
official commissions in their task of clarifying the facts of the past and producing a 
final report, even though they are not led and promoted by the state25 (Bickford 
2007). Conversely, HMIs are collective actions that can cover different projects 
simultaneously: reconstructing factual information, remembering experiences of 
suffering, expressing such memories through art or cultural practices, etc. A 
fundamental difference between a UTP and an HMI is that the former have a timely 
character, a defined period of time, while on the other hand, HMIs can be punctual 
but also collective processes in time, which are transformed, suspended and 
recapture themselves (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo 
de Memoria Histórica, 2009). 
 
Because of the similar formats they use, UTPs can submit documents, 
books or reports to the TCs that systematize the results of their efforts, in such a 
way that it is clear how these texts could represent an input for the investigations 
carried out by the TCs. This is not the case for an HMI in Colombia. Only a few of 
the "products" of the HMI are textual, but most of them have materialized in dolls, 
radio and virtual stations, murals, audio-visual productions, theater productions, 
massive occupations, pedagogical initiatives, photographic exhibitions, museums, 
etc. Bickford analyzes nine UTP experiences in nine different countries; one UTP 
per country. In the case of Colombian, 323 HMIs have been registered 
(approximately).  
 
The development of these HMIs in Colombia has been imbalanced 
(Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo de Memoria 
Histórica, 2009, p. 231). It is possible to suggest a correlation between memory 
initiatives and areas where demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) 
                                                 
25
 In Colombia there are several examples of UTPs, some of these are considered in this chapter: 
Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission’ Night and Fog (CINEP); Human Rights and 




processes have occurred. The Historical Memory Group hypothetically suggests 
that the elaboration of memory is in a latent phase in regions where the armed 
conflict still exists or where there have been no DDR processes or where the 
results of such DDR processes have been unsatisfactory. On the other hand, 
victims who live where DDR processes have been more effective and successful 
have been able to elaborate and express their memories with greater impetus 
(Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo de Memoria 
Histórica, 2009, p. 231). 
 
2.4  The Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-
Repetition (CEV) 
 
Decree 588 of 2017, which regulates the creation of the CEV, proclaims that 
the Colombian TC will (i) be extra-judicial in nature (its findings cannot have any 
judicial effect) and (ii) be regional in scope(Colombia, 2017). Due to the differential 
impacts of the armed conflict, the CEV will seek to understand the local dynamics 
of the armed conflict. The local approach with which the CEV has been designed is 
due, in part, to the fact that the Colombian war has not been geographically 
homogeneous, rather "it has had a long and profound impact on the rural world, 
while cities have been touched in very specific moments, in a less generalized way 
and with less violent practices, more visible but less lethal” (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 36).  
 
The CEV will have six months to define its mandate and three years for its 
operation and functioning, it will be composed of 11 commissioners. The Decree 
establishes that a maximum of three commissioners may be foreigners (Colombia, 
2017).  
 
Colombia’s new CEV faces challenges that differ from other Truth 
Commissions. First, both the number of victims and the time line are much broader 
than what other TCs have included and documented so far (see Table 1). Although 
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the Decree does not determine from which date the violence should be 
documented, the investigation carried out by the Historical Memory Group goes 
back to 1958 and states that from January 1 of that year until December 31, 2012 
(54 years of conflict), the conflict killed approximately 220,000 people in Colombian 
territory.  
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 The year in which the TC was established and the year in which the final report was presented.  
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Second, Colombian Commission must face a future in which it advances its 
functions in the context of the armed conflict. While the FARC and the bilateral 
cessation had considerable reduced the number of armed encounters in the 
country, there continues to be a significant presence of important armed actors 
such as the ELN guerrilla and former demobilized paramilitary groups that have 
again taken up arms, which could retaliate against those who testify in the 
Commission. Thus, one of the CEV’s challenges is to guarantee the necessary 
conditions so that those who participate in its activities may find safe places to talk 
(Jaramillo Marín & Torres Pedraza, 2015, p. 50).  
 
3. Colombian Commission for the Clarification of Truth: Setting Precise and 
Achievable Goals 
 
Decree 588 of 2017, without further distinction and conceptual clarity, has 
provided for the future CEV three fundamental objectives, two functions and a 
mandate that includes thirteen aspects to clarify and recognize. This section of my 
thesis has two goals: (i) to systematically analyze these  provisions (i.e. CEV´s 
objectives, functions and mandate) in light of the methodological matrix proposed 
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in the previous chapter, and (ii) to explore the horizons of articulation between the 
future CEV and previous truth-finding attempts in Colombia (i.e. National Historical 
Memory Center, Historical Memory Initiatives, etc.)  The exercise shows how the 
alternative notion of truth suggested in the first chapter allows TC  to articulate 
memory initiatives (focus more on impacts and subjective experiences  suffered by 
victims) and  truth seeking endeavours (focus more on establishing factual and 
objective information). Annex 2 contains a summary of this exercise: CEV’s 
pending goals and significant contributions to examine. 
 
 
3.1 Context and Background 
 
According to the proposed matrix, a TC should identify and document the 
structural causes of violence, the social frameworks that degrade and exacerbate 
violence, the criminal architecture of the State and / or the international relations 
and context that led to the atrocity. It should also suggest and recommend the 
necessary reforms and recommendations to modify said causes, frameworks, and 
architecture. 
 
The Decree, which regulated the CEV, contemplates that the Commission 
should clarify "the historical context, the origins and multiple causes of the conflict” 
and the "factors and conditions that facilitated or contributed to the persistence of 
the conflict" (Colombia, 2017). However, the document does not contemplate the 
formulation of recommendations or suggestions aimed at overcoming those 
causes, factors and conditions that led to the conflict. 
 
Faced with the objectives proposed by the matrix, the contributions of  HMIs 
to clarify these contexts and antecedents are nonexistent. Given the fragmentary 
and local nature of violence in Colombia, HMIs have been more concerned with 
making particular facts of violence visible rather than constructing national 
accounts that establish the causes of victims’ individual sufferings or identifying the 
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contexts that made these singular events possible (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2009, p. 227). 
 
On the contrary, the institutional, judicial, and extrajudicial contributions are 
very significant. For many years, in Colombia “justice was incapable of addressing 
- and understanding - violence beyond individual cases, which prevented it from 
understanding criminal organizations" (VerdadAbierta.com, 2016). The Context 
Unit of the State Prosecutors office, within the framework of the Justice and Peace 
Law, has been correcting this trend, so that nowadays the country has judicial 
decisions that allow a better understanding of the causes and contexts of the 
paramilitary phenomenon (VerdadAbierta.com, 2016). 
 
The extrajudicial efforts materialized in the “Basta Ya!” Report have been 
added to judicial mechanisms. This report in particular points out the possible 
structural causes behind the violence in Colombia’s conflict: the agrarian problem, 
the fragmentation of the State and drug trafficking because of the State’s inability 
to counteract the drug trafficking phenomenon, which contributed to the 
consolidation of a criminal State and perverse social frameworks. This incapacity 
allowed drug trafficking to become an ally, financier and promoter of illegal armed 
groups (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 52). 
 
 “Basta Ya!” Report also identifies social frameworks that have exacerbated 
Colombian violence. The arbitrary and permanent indications of communities as 
"collaborators with the other side", whether by their appearance, their ideas, their 
origin, or any suspicious traits, justified the atrocities committed against the civilian 
population: 
 
The detention, disappearance, and assassinations of leaders link these facts 
to the way villagers were stigmatized through rumors of supposed alliances 
with armed groups. This stigma extended to social and community 
organizations, to their collective actions and their companions. It is the stigma 
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that extends to the roles that mark social and political participation in public 
life. (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 79) 
 
Regarding the international relations and context that contributed to 
violence, the Report points to the United States as the country that has most 
influenced the Colombian conflict: "first with its anti-communist and counter-
insurgency doctrine in the context of the Cold War, the war on drugs, and finally 
with its crusade against terrorism" (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de 
Memoria, 2013b, p. 54). Also mentioned is the Cuban Revolution, the triumph of 
the Sandinistas, the fall of socialism, the agenda of Human Rights activists and the 
entry into force of the Rome Statute, among others. 
 
One particular feature of the "Basta Ya!" report worth highlighting is that it 
not only mentions negative traits that explain the conflict, but also highlights 
positive practices that have been constructive throughout these years of violence. 
This is the case of good practices of the law and the international context. Thus, it 
not only mentions the impunity favored by justice, but also highlights the obstacles 
that have been put before illegality "through key actions such as investigations into 
parapolitics, constitutional control of states of exception ... or the constitutional 
revision of legislative decrees that allowed ... the trial of civilians by military 
tribunals in 1987 to cease" (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de 
Memoria, 2013b, p. 57). 
 
It also highlights the good practices of the international context that have 
somewhat reduced the harmful effects of the conflict. Since the 1990s, the human 
rights agenda of the OAS and the UN, the US Department of State and the 
European Union, as well as international human rights organizations, have been 
crucial in supporting the victims and making visible the tragedy that war has meant 
for civilians.  “Similarly, the Rome Statute, in force since 2002, and the 
internationalization of justice have contributed significantly to changes for both the 
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State and for guerrillas and paramilitary groups” (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 55). 
 
In general terms, some have criticized the lack of novelty of the Report in 
explaining what many others have already explained: "the social and political 
reasons that have given rise to more than 50 years of internal armed conflict in the 
country" (Compaz, 2014, p. 9). It has also been criticized that given the structure of 
the National Center of Historical Memory and the guidelines of the Historical 
Memory Group, it lacks investigative autonomy from the State. In particular, the 
report's silence regarding the State's role in the genocide of members of the Unión 
Patriótica28 political party and its assassination of left wing leaders in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, who were not simply victims of the conflict but also victims of 
State crimes (Compaz, 2014, p. 9). 
 
In my opinion, the push to be novel in the antecedents and contexts of the 
Colombian conflict is an unnecessary challenge. The enormous amount of judicial 
and extrajudicial, institutional, and academic information that exists shows that it is 
an over-documented dimension at the national level. As I see it, a horizon that the 
CEV could explore, being true to its territorial approach, is the determination of the 
regional characteristics that these antecedents and national contexts have had. In 
this sense, the Sierra Leone experience can be useful. In that country, the 
Commission, relying on academic studies, identified the key issues to be 
documented and from these themes determined which public hearings to hold with 
civil society. Likewise, the CEV will be able to use all existing documentation at the 
national level to prepare regional hearings that allow prioritizing the background 
and contexts from a local dimension. 
 
                                                 
28
 The Patriotic Union was a leftist political party, founded by the FARC  in 1985, as part of the 
peace negotiations that the guerrillas held with the Belisario Betancur administration. During the 
end of the 1980’s, party-members was sought out and exterminated by State-sponsored 
paramilitaries and security force agents. 
151 
 
Regarding the criticism of the investigative autonomy of the Report, it is 
important to bear in mind that the Memory Group, the Memory Center and the 
future CEV are and will be the result of a legal commitment promoted by the State. 
In light of this argument, the CEV will not have investigative autonomy either. 
However, it should not be forgotten that most TCs in the world are officially 
sanctioned (state-sponsored investigations) and do not necessarily lack 
investigative autonomy. There are different mechanisms to safeguard this 
independence; in the case of Colombia, the selection processes of the 
commissioners and the President will be fundamental. 
 
Regarding suggested remedies to address the background and contexts of 
violence, the “Basta Ya!” Report urges the design of public policies aimed at 
overcoming inequality, discrimination, marginalization and exclusion, and ensuring 
the effective realization of economic, social and cultural rights (Comisión Nacional 
de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, pp. 90-95). It also suggests the design 
of mechanisms for the "cleansing of public entities” by removing employees from 
such places who have associated with illegal armed actors or who could be 
convicted of serious human rights violations (Comisión Nacional de Reparación & 
Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 91). It is important to remember that international 
experiences have shown that TCs generally fail to have a significant impact in 
modifying the structural causes of violence or State criminal structures or dealing 
with the international contexts that led to the violence. A TC’s scope is very limited 
for the extent of what these modifications entail. 
 
However, it is possible that in the Colombian case the CEV might transform 
social frameworks that have justified violence. The Commission can create spaces 
for participation and pedagogy that deny prejudices against social organizations 
and have been used by armed actors to justify their atrocities (this 




Likewise, these spaces of participation could have a more purposeful than 
descriptive character. Since the damage in this dimension is over documented, it 
would be of great value to call on victims and non-victims alike to participate in 
designing the solutions required to deal with the structural causes of violence. 
Although the impact of such suggestions may be limited, the very exercise of 
building consensus through dialogue can be very positive in a society as polarized 
as Colombia’s. In the end, ensuring that the given suggestions are not the 
exclusive product of the work of the commission can give a more inclusive 
character that allows seeing the CEV as a common project. 
 
3.2 Criminal Acts and Implicated Actors 
 
3.2.1 Victims Implicated in the Criminal Acts. 
 
According to the proposed matrix, a TC should identify and document the 
different types of victims who suffered the damage of violence. Likewise, the 
Decree 588 contemplates within the objectives of the future CEV, to promote and 
contribute to the recognition of the victims as citizens who had their rights violated 
and as political subjects of importance for the transformation of the country 
(Colombia, 2017). 
 
Faced with these objectives, the “Basta Ya!” report has made significant 
progress both in the identification of individual victims and in the definition of 
categories of victims of high vulnerability at national, regional and local levels. The 
“Basta Ya!” Report presented an extensive and detailed quantitative study of the 
various types of victimization in Colombia. Likewise, the country has a Single 
Victims Registry (RUV, in its Spanish acronym) for persons that suffered the 
actions of illegal armed groups and agents of the State between 1985 and 2011. 
The RUV was created by the Victims' Law and was open to victims for four years in 
order for them to register. On June 10, 2015, it was closed with a total of 8,268,758 
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registered victims. The figures are public, but the names of the victims are 
anonymous. 
 
These figures allow an understanding of the general patterns of violence in 
Colombia, and also illustrate victimization trends suffered in a territorial manner. 
However, the explanatory value of figures and percentages does not replace the 
symbolic value of the lists of victims constructed and submitted by the Sierra 
Leonean and South African Commissions. In these two African countries, the list 
was made public when the conflict was over and the victims saw no danger in that 
recognition. In the Colombian case, the possibility that the CEV may release a 
public list with names, biographical data and victimizing facts will be subject to the 
security conditions and the expressed will of the victims to be recognized publicly. 
 
With regard to the identification of victims' groups, both the “Basta Ya!” 
report and the HMIs have been able to make specific groups visible.  "Basta ya!" 
identified and prioritized women29, men, boys, girls, adolescents and the LGBTI 
population.  The "Basta Ya!" Report states that women "have suffered and have 
faced the damage caused by violence, mainly as survivors" (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 66). Widows, in addition to dealing with 
the impacts caused by the violence, must assume all the economic and emotional 
responsibility involved with now being the sole head of their household. In other 
cases, some women who at one point held a certain level of social or political 
leadership have suffered from sexual violence, have been murdered, threatened, 
persecuted and / or banished in order to truncate their social and community 
initiatives (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 66).  
                                                 
29
 The Memory Center has a series of books illustrating the types of victimization suffered by women 
in different regions of the country: El Placer - Mujeres, coca y guerra en el Bajo Putumayo (2012), 
Mujeres y Guerra. Víctimas y Resistentes en el Caribe Colombiano (2011) Mujeres que hacen 
Historia. Tierra, Cuerpo y Política en el Caribe Colombiano (2011) La masacre de Bahía Portete. 
Mujeres Wayuu en la mira (2010) . There are other different efforts to document the violence that 
women have suffered, one of these is the work carried out by the Colombian Non-Governmental 
Organization, Ruta Pacífica Mujeres, which in 2013 led the formation and implementation of a 
"Commission on the Truth and Memory of Women". The Final Report of this Commission reflects 





With respect to ethnic groups, the "Basta Ya!" Report has an essay that 
points to Afro-Colombians and Indigenous people30 as those who have suffered the 
greatest levels of human rights violations (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & 
Área de Memoria, 2013a, p. 278). In fact, the harms suffered endanger the very 
existence of these communities. Their productive systems, their uses of land and 
ancestral practices that guarantee their daily subsistence and their transmission of 
knowledge have been seriously threatened.  
 
In addition to the institutional effort, it is worth highlighting some local 
initiatives that have been advanced from an ethnic perspective in the department of 
Nariño. The first was an initiative in 2012 entitled “Memoria histórica desde las 
voces de las víctimas del conflicto armado en Nariño: cuatro casos emblemáticos 
reconstruidos con comunidades afrocolombianas de la costa Pacífica y 
comunidades campesinas e indígenas de la frontera sur andina de Nariño31”. This 
work documented the acts of violence and made visible the actions of resistance of 
the Black, Indigenous and peasant communities affected by the conflict (Centro de 
Memoria Histórica, 2016e). The second initiative was an itinerant exhibition 
“¡Ñambi y Telembí viven! Tejiendo memoria y resistencia Inkal Awá”32, which 
recounted and recalled the victims of a massacre in February 2009, where 17 Awá 
refugees, including two pregnant women, died (Centro de Memoria Historica, 
2016). In 2013 the exhibition won the stimulus for museum projects with an 
emphasis on historical memory, organized by the Ministry of Culture. 
 
                                                 
30
 Books published by the Center of Memory that have identified the mechanisms and motivations of 
this extermination: La masacre de Bahía Portete. Mujeres Wayuu en la mira (2010) "Nuestra vida 
ha sido nuestra lucha" Memoria y resistencia en el Cauca indígena (2012) Desafíos para la 
reintegración. Enfoques de género, edad y etnia (2013) Putumayo: la vorágine de las caucherías 
(2014) Bojayá: la guerra sin límites (2014) "Nuestra vida ha sido nuestra lucha" Memoria y 
resistencia en el Cauca indígena (2014) 
31
 "Historical memory from the voices of the victims of the armed conflict in: Four emblematic cases 
reconstructed with Afro-Colombian communities of the Pacific coast and peasant and indigenous 
communities of the southern Andean border of Nariño"  
32
 "¡Ñambi y Telembí are alive! Weaving memory and resistance Inkal Awá” 
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 The final initiative is  “La Casa del Saber” in Boyera (Nariño), which is a 
place of memory built to strengthen the socio-cultural and economic processes of 
the indigenous community and to reconstruct the historical memory of the 
affections suffered in the context of the internal armed conflict (Centro de Memoria 
Histórica, 2016b). 
 
In my opinion, both women and minority ethnic groups have been able to 
see their afflictions through the HMI. They also have a privileged place in the 
“Basta Ya!” report and in the work advanced by the Center and Group of Historical 
Memory. However there are other groups of “victims” which require more attention, 
for instance the "merchants"33 . According to merchants who attended the forums 
organized by the ICTJ and UNDP34 they wish to participate in the CEV to clarify 
their links to the conflict. They claim to be recognized as "victims of extortion" and 
not as entities responsible for collaborating or sponsoring armed groups, which is 
how merchants have usually been recognized by public opinion. For that, 
merchants require the Commission to offer not only security in terms of physical 
integrity, but also in terms of moral integrity, they fear that their names and 
reputation will be affected by accommodated interpretations. The Commission´s 
challenge is one of distinguishing merchants between the condition of victims and 
that of responsible actors or accomplices applies to a large productive sector in 
Colombia. Demobilized Paramilitaries have said that banana companies had to pay 
3 cents for every box of banana exported, similar stories occur with some sugar 
mills in the Valle del Cauca region and specific accusations have been brought 
against some oil officials (VerdadAbierta.com, 2015). In these cases, exhaustive 
investigations are required to look into the conditions in which certain extortions 
occurred, for example whether payments were made to paramilitaries in order to 
counter guerrilla extortion. This represents an unexplored horizon that may well be 
addressed by the CEV. 
                                                 
33
 The term “merchant” refers to a number of businesspersons and multinational corporations, such as 
banana companies in the Colombia state of Urubá. 
34
 “Dialogues on transitional justice and Mechanisms for clarifying the truth in Colombia",  led by the 





3.2.2 Responsible Actors Implicated in the Criminal Acts 
 
The matrix recommends identifying those responsible for criminal acts, but 
also distinguishing between the different degrees of responsibility that may exist. 
Likewise, it is suggested that the TC should recommend alternative ways to deal 
with the different degrees of responsibility for the criminal acts. With respect to 
these points, again, the Decree 588 designates descriptive objectives and 
excludes proposals. The Decree established for the CEV ascertains that it should 
only clarify and promote the recognition of the collective responsibilities of the 
State, including the government and other public powers, the FARC-EP, the 
paramilitaries, as well as any other group, organization or institution, national or 
international, that has had any participation in the conflict, for the practices and 
facts referred to in the previous paragraph (Colombia, 2017). 
 
Regarding the recognition of responsibilities, none of the HMIs analyzed 
seek to determine the identity of the perpetrators or the degrees of collective or 
institutional responsibility. This missing analysis can be explained for several 
reasons. First HMIs have focused more on pointing out particular facts of violence 
than on building national accounts, (Bickford, 2007) so identifying institutional or 
collective responsibilities becomes impossible. Second, this can be explained by 
the degree of powerlessness in which the HMIs are found: it is safer to narrate acts 
of violence than to identify those responsible for these facts. 
For its part, the "Basta Ya!” Report warns that the responsibility for violence 
in Colombia falls differently on guerrillas, paramilitaries and state agents who acted 
outside their legal mandate. The attack on the civilian population differs in its 
systematicity, its dimensions and in the forms of violence employed by each of the 
actors: 
 
Violence against physical integrity is the hallmark of paramilitary 
violence, while violence against freedom and property characterizes 
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the actions of guerrillas. In other words, the paramilitaries murder more 
than the guerrillas, while the guerrillas kidnap more and cause much 
more destruction than the paramilitaries (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación y & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 12)  
 
The role of members of the Armed Forces in victimizing civilians is equally 
condemned by “Basta Ya!” Report. The Report presumes their participation in 158 
massacres and 2,300 selective murders from 1958 to 2013 (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 12). 
 
Finally, in a section entitled "Memories of Complicity", the “Basta ya” Report 
points to other types of responsibility that evoke a “gray and differentiated universe 
of collaborations and responsibilities in war"(Comisión Nacional de Reparación & 
Área de Memoria, 2013a, p. 342), which include state agents, regional powers, 
entrepreneurs, cattle ranchers and members of the affected communities 
themselves, among others.  
 
In my opinion, the CEV should be a space used to identify and investigate 
those "memories of complicity" in greater detail and with more of a regional focus 
than the “Basta Ya!” Report suggests. On the subject of collective and institutional 
complicities and responsibilities is a deficiency of truth that must be addressed as a 
priority by CEV. It is necessary to identify civilians who indirectly promoted and 
maintained violence as well as multinational and/or productive private sectors that 
could well have been accomplices of armed groups, beneficiaries of violence or the 
media’s complicity with certain crimes and the promotion of speech that allowed 
the stigmatization of peasant leaders, social organizations, and human rights 
defenders. 
 
Likewise, the CEV should encourage the responsible actors to define and 
assume their own responsibilities in the conflict. Merchants’ claims to be heard by 
the Commission can be extended to other groups and private organizations that 
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feel that they too are victims of the conflict, but whom society in general qualify as 
accomplices or even perpetrators. The challenge of the CEV will be to mediate 
these parties so that all voices are heard and preventing these spaces of 
participation from being manipulated or used to justify the horrors of the past. 
 
Another horizon to be explored by the future CEV is the remedies and 
alternative ways to deal with the different levels of responsibility that may be 
assumed and/or identified within the framework of the Commission. The Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace has a repertoire of measures to deal with the criminal 
responsibilities, likewise, the CEV must propose suitable measures to deal with 
perpetrators and accomplices who are indifferent or have benefited from the 
violence. The "sanctions" that these different types of responsibility imply should be 
made effective in some way, so that those who express their repentance can 
channel their desire for amendment. 
 
3.3.3 Criminal Acts 
 
According to the proposed matrix, a CEV should identify and document the 
facts that constituted criminal acts. In this sense, the Decree establishes within the 
CEV’s mandate to clarify and recognize those practices and facts that constitute 
serious human rights violations and serious violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, in particular those that reflect patterns or have been carried out en masse. 
The "Basta Ya!" Report has extensively documented (quantitatively and 
qualitatively) the most systematic criminal acts that civilians in Colombia have 
suffered. Most of the deaths occurred on a daily, selective, and silent basis, in 
parts far removed from urban centers, and therefore have been overlooked by 
most of society. In most cases, these deaths were accompanied by cruelty and 
terror (Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 25). In 





- Selective assassinations 
- Massacres 
- Forced disappearances 
- Abductions and hostage-taking 
- Forced displacement 
- Sexual violence 
- Illegal Recruitment 
- Acts of War  
- Antipersonnel mines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive 
devices 
- Attacks on civilian property and sabotage 
- Terrorist attacks 
 
Regarding forced disappearance, "Basta Ya!" Report made a special where 
it explains why, despite the extent of forced disappearance in Colombia, this 
phenomenon has become invisible. The figures presented and the historical 
evolution explain how forced disappearance was a nationally orchestrated strategy. 
Additional Memory Center has published the different books and research pieces 
in recent years35.  
 
Some local Initiatives should be added to this institutional effort. For 
example,  the Memory Gallery organized by the Asociación de Víctimas de 
Desaparición de Nariño36 (AVIDES in its Spanish acronym) in Pasto, a city located 
in southern Colombia. The exhibition is made up of approximately 20 photographs 
                                                 
35 Regarding forced disappearance, the Historical Memory Center has published different books: 
Hasta encontrarlos. El drama de la desaparición forzada en Colombia (2016) Textos Corporales de 
la Crueldad (2105) Documental “Cuerpo 36” (2105) Four reports to understand the dimension of 
forced disappearance in Colombia, prepared by the National Center for Historical Memory (2014): I. 
Normas y Dimensiones de la Desaparición Forzada en Colombia II. Huellas y Rostros de la 
Desaparición Forzada (1970 - 2010) III. Entre la Incertidumbre y el Dolor: Impactos Psicosociales 
De La Desaparición Forzada. IV. Balance de la Acción del Estado Colombiano Frente a la 
Desaparición Forzada de Personas. This Centre also prepared a special multimedia report about 
forced disappearance:  
http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/ausenciasQueInterpelan/index.html ;  
36
 Association of Victims of Disappearance of Nariño 
160 
 
of the disappeared and pictures of paintings made by relatives. The purpose of this 
gallery is to make visible the organization’s demands to the government and the 
community for clarification on the circumstances surrounding the disappeared. It 
also seeks to raise awareness about forced disappearance as a subject of public 
reflection (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2016d). Another local initiative is the 
“Monumento a las víctimas del Cacarica”37 (department of Antioquia), built in 2000, 
contains the names of the victims of forced disappearance and homicide which 
occurred as the result of a military confrontation advanced by the Armed Forces in 
cahoots with the United Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU) 
against the FARC (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2016f). Finally, “Operación 
Sirirí”38 is a private archive created by Fabiola Lalinde, regarding  her son Luis 
Fernando, assassinated and disappeared by members of the Army. Its archival 
reconstruction was awarded in 2015 by UNESCO to be included within the 
Documentary Heritage of Latin America and the Caribbean (Centro de Memoria 
Histórica, 2016g). 
 
It is important to distinguish between this last initiative (Operation Siriri) and 
the two monuments mentioned above: the private archive of Mrs. Lalinde is an 
initiative focused on the achievement of evidence and factual information. 
Monuments, on the other hand, can be defined as "memories without evidence," 
since they reconstruct past events and identify victims, without having sufficient 
factual evidence to prove them. These monuments allow us to recall the suffering 
caused by forced disappearance, but not to prove the criminal act as such; they do 
not have the necessary resources (they do not even have the pretense) to turn 
their memories into judicial evidence for official authorities. 
 
In relation to the crimes of sexual violence, both the testimonial memory 
(chapter 3) and the figures (chapter 1) recorded by the "Basta Ya!" report, show 
the ferocity and brutality with which these crimes were and still are committed 
                                                 
37
 Monument to the victims of Cacarica 
38
 Operation Sirirí 
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(Comisión Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 77). Likely, 
should be added the book “Crímenes que no prescriben. Violencia sexual del 
Bloque Vencedores de Arauca39” (2015) and the report documenting in particular 
the violence suffered by the LGBTI population: “Aniquilar la diferencia. Lesbianas, 
gays, bisexuales y transgeneristas en el marco del conflicto armado colombiano40” 
(2015).  
 
Should the CEV decide to deepen the documentation of sexual violence as 
a relevant criminal act in the Colombian conflict, it would be of great value for  
commissioners to articulate their work on the methodologies that have been used  
locally to approach these crimes satisfactorily. For example, they could look to the 
case of "Cocer la memoria"41, a regional experience that has collective sessions for 
women victims of sexual violence to tell their stories. There is also the valuable 
methodological experience accumulated by Ruta Pacifica NGO and the Gender 
Section of the Historic Memory Center. 
 
Contrary to sexual violence or forced disappearance, the "Basta Ya!" Report 
recognizes that while the recruitment of minors is one of the most widely registered 
crimes by official entities, it is one of the least publicly recognized (Comisión 
Nacional de Reparación  & Área de Memoria, 2013b, p. 84). Although there are 
general approximations to the phenomenon, the CEV must delve more deeply into 
this poorly documented problem in Colombia. For this, the international experience 
of Sierra Leone would be of great value, especially because the case of ex-
combatant children represents a gray area between victim and perpetrator, a very 




                                                 
39
 Crimes that carry no statute of limitation: Sexual Violence by the Bloque de Vencedores de 
Arauca.  
40
 To annihilate the difference. Lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenderists in the framework of 
the Colombian armed conflict 
41
 This title roughly translates as allowing one’s memory to ferment or to stew.  
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The matrix suggests that the TC should produce an independent and official 
report, which describes the relevant criminal acts and includes all the TC’s 
recommendations. In this sense, among the functions entrusted to the CEV, 
("Functions"), should be the elaboration of “a final report that takes into account the 
different contexts, reflects the research on all components of the mandate and 
contains the conclusions and recommendations of its work” (Colombia, 2017). 
 
For their part, both the HMIs and the Memory Center can make a very 
significant contribution so that the dissemination of the CEV report is more friendly 
and accessible for both the victims and the general public, which in the end could 
maximize the impact of the Commission. 
 
Traditionally TCs have privileged textual formats with highly academic 
content, which are foreign to the common public. In contrast, the HMIs have found 
creative ways to publicly publicize their findings: photographic samples, digital files, 
dolls, patchwork quilts, monuments, murals, etc. Likewise, the Memory Center has 
been involved in the production of various artistic, audiovisual, graphic, interactive 
formats, etc. It is worth noting the audio-visual resources that were created for the 
public dissemination of the findings of the "Basta Ya!" report: the one-hour 
documentary “No hubo tiempo para la tristeza”42  and the radio series "La vida 
cuenta"43 which consisted of 14 micro programs that presented some of the main 
theses of the Report, and also the “Cátedra de Pensamiento Colombiano”44 to 
contribute to an exercise of reflection. 
 
There are still no systematic studies that evaluate the impact that the 
Memory Center has achieved with the creation of these means of dissemination. 
These studies are necessary to consolidate effective means that bring the 
production of truth and memory to the indifferent and apathetic Colombian public. 
                                                 
42
 There was no time for sadness. 
43
 Life Counts. 
44







The proposed matrix suggests that a TC should identify the different types of 
impacts that violence had on the victims. Based on this diagnosis, it should design 
processes to address and repair the impacts of violence on direct and indirect 
victims, mechanisms for victims to access economic and symbolic reparations, and 
design and / or establish processes and / or mechanisms to recover broken social 
ties. 
 
The Decree 588 establishes that the CEV must clarify and promote the 
recognition of: 
- The human and social impact of conflict in society, including the 
impact on economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, and 
the different ways in which the conflict affected different populations. 
- The impact of the conflict on the exercise of politics and the 
functioning of democracy as a whole, including the impact on political 
and social parties and movements, in particular those of opposition 
groups. 
- The impact of the conflict on those who participated directly in it as 
combatants and on their families and their environments (Colombia, 
2017). 
 
Within the functions assigned to the CEV, is the task of "guiding the victims 
and victimized communities that participate in the Commission in the institutional 
offer to satisfy their rights and mechanisms to demand them." (Colombia, 2017). In 
general terms, it can be affirmed that the mandate defined by the  Decree 
establishes that the CEV will have to concentrate again on the descriptive 
objectives (to identify damages), delegating the satisfaction of more proactive 




The “Basta Ya!” Report has categorized the damage caused by violence 
from the conflict in a very complete and meaningful way. It not only analyzes the 
psychological and emotional harm that the prioritized group of victims (women, 
men, children, adolescents and the LGBTI population) have suffered. It also 
presents moral damages suffered by communities whose religious and cultural 
practices, phenotypic or ethnic characteristics, and political convictions have been 
devalued and denigrated by the conflict. It also refers to the socio-cultural damages 
that spread mistrust, isolation and the devastation of public spaces. Harm done by 
the political sphere has have silenced and exterminated civic organizations, 
political movements, unions, peasant associations, and in the end have altered 
political plurality in Colombia.  
 
Likewise,  the Memory Center has documented impacts which are 
differentiated in the case of women (outlined in the previous section) and in the 
case of the peasants45, among others.  
 
Among the HMIs to be highlighted is "La Casa Campesina de Sincelejo"46 
(Sucre), an archival work that has systematized the testimony of serious human 
rights violations and documented and categorized the individual and collective 
damages that have impacted the peasant community of the region. Likewise, 
peasants from communities such as La Pola and La Palizua (Magdalena) have 
collected documents and oral testimonies from former community leaders by going 
door-to-door and speaking with each and every one of them. With this information 
"they created a file that is composed of minutes of agreements, rights of petition, 
legal decisions, maps, plans and press archives, dating from the beginning of the 
                                                 
45
 El orden desarmado La resistencia de la Asociación de los Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare 
(ATCC) (2014). Dignidad campesina y problema agrario en el Caribe colombiano (2016) La maldi ta 
tierra. Guerrilla, paramilitares, mineras y conflicto armado en el departamento de Cesar (2016) 
Feature film:  Voces de agua y de tierra: desde las memorias de los campesinos de la región 
Caribe” (2016) Memorias, territorio y luchas campesinas. Aportes metodológicos para la 
caracterización del sujeto y el daño  colectivo con población campesina en la región caribe desde 
la perspectiva de memoria histórica (2015). 
46
 The Peasant House of Sincelejo. 
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1980s which that have been key elements to advance their land restitution 
processes before the State" (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2016a). 
 
It is worth highlighting that a really novel contribution for the future CEV is 
the experience accumulated by the HMIs, in descriptive as well as propositional 
terms. As seen in the previous chapter, TCs at the international level have reduced 
their recommendations to the last pages of the final report, without reporting any 
novelty or effectiveness in terms of remedies. On the contrary, some of the HMIs 
analyzed, offer a very broad repertoire rich in methodologies and processes that 
have achieved what no other TC in the world has been able to do: allow the 
mechanisms used to visualize the impacts of the damage (descriptive objectives) 
to be in themselves remedies to deal with the damages suffered by the victim, to 
allow them to restart their lives, and to recover the bonds of trust within their 
community (purposeful goals). 
 
In the research carried out by the Historical Memory Group (2009), the 
definition of HMI is broken down into two fundamental aspects. The notion of 
initiative highlights the "foundational" character of these experiences, highlighting 
"the way in which, without ignoring the catastrophe, they carry a future, they affirm 
in the present an open future that at the same time restores and renews forms of 
community life" (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo de 
Memoria Histórica, 2009, p. 26). Their success lies in the fact that they relate this 
space, which had previously been destroyed with a space in which the community 
is once again able to conduct their daily lives, thereby building from the ashes a 
place where they are, once again able to attain a certain "way of life". This is the 
case of the Itinerant Cineclub of Montes de Maria, a region of Colombia heavily 
impacted by the conflict. Through the screening of films in places devastated by 
war, it has allowed people to meet friends again and to converse in places where it 
formerly had been impossible to be (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y 




The idea of memory, rather than forgetting an experience, represents the 
elaboration of that experience. For the Historical Memory Group, all the memory 
initiatives are indebted to the idea expressed by Jean Paul Sartre, who states 
"What is important is not what they have done for us, what is important is what we 
do with what has been made of us" (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y 
Reconciliación & Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2009, p. 18). This phrase by Sartre 
and the HMIs is a tribute to the human capacity to transform adverse conditions. 
For example, the “Abrazadas”47 of eastern Antioquia, has over time enhanced 
community processes to deal with pain, so that those who participate in their 
initiative manage to experience their grieving satisfactorily (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2009, p. 18). This 
group has given fruit to another group known as "Tejedoras por la Memoria de 
Sonsón”48 (Antioquia), who elaborate their sorrow through dolls, trees of life, 
embroidered quilts and paintings (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2016c). Their 
works tell their stories so they do not forget the facts of the past and also able to 
materialize their dreams and hopes for the future: 
 
Each stitch is a tear; it is an unfathomable memory in the immense void of the 
loss left by the armed conflict. But every piece of cloth sewn is one pain less, 
one more forgiveness. This is how the weavers of the country go about 
rebuilding their lives. Today many can already produce stitches of joy, hope 
and dreams to fulfill (Elmundo.com, 2016).  
 
In my view, it would be redundant for CEV to focus on documenting what 
many have already documented: the damage suffered. These damages must be 
recognized and made visible by the future Commission, but the true, creative and 
significant contribution of the CEV would be to show and recognize the local 
processes that have allowed the construction of highly significant and efficient 
solutions. The HMIs should contemplate the potential that the spaces for 
                                                 
47
 A community group whose name translates to “Embraces”. 
48
 Weavers of the Memory of Sonsón 
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discussion can have for dreaming of a possible better future. This accumulated 
local experience must have a leading role in the future CEV. These initiatives 
should be made known, strengthened, encouraged and replicated in other areas of 




The ICTJ, which has supported the work of truth commissions and several 
unofficial truth projects in twelve countries, asserts that drafting the mandate of a 
truth commission is a critically important step in the truth-seeking process 
(González, 2013, p. 1):  
“Well-crafted mandates enable a commission to undertake its task with 
effectiveness: they set the stage for productive cooperation among 
institutions and allow civil society to fully understand the nature and 
potential of the truth-seeking exercise. A mandate that is incomplete, 
obscure, or contradictory to fundamental human rights standards can 
cripple a truth commission in many ways, forcing it to waste valuable 
time and resources in defining the parameters of its task, causing 
critical contradictions within the commission, and diminishing the 
capacity of key stakeholders to cooperate effectively with the 
commission” (González, 2013, p. 1). 
 
This chapter has aimed to contribute to the first challenge facing the future 
CEV: to consolidate a well-crafted mandate. For this purpose,  CEV´s objectives 
and functions were systematized in light of the methodological matrix and 
articulated with national and local input as well as regional expectations. This 
systematization may be useful for the newly formed CEV to: (i) identify the truth 
deficits that must be addressed as a priority; (ii) avoid working on objectives 
already satisfied in other instances; and (iii) recognize and take advantage of local 
expertise in attaining major objectives. In effect, the systematization allows for a 
synthesis between judicial efforts to know the truth about criminal acts and the 
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local experience of offering victims adequate space to present their testimonies. 
The challenge is to decide how and under which criteria to best incorporate CEV´S 
work on previous truth seeking initiatives (judicial, extrajudicial, official and 
unofficial). In light of these criteria, several descriptive objectives contemplated by 
the Decree can be satisfied through secondary sources. This would enable the 
Commission to prioritize the identified truth deficits and articulate its efforts with 
local expertise. This articulation would be highly beneficial in the creation of 
participatory and purposeful spaces, where those who are responsible for illegal 
acts may manifest their contrition, and victims may not only tell their testimonies of 
suffering, but be recognized as political actors with concrete proposals for 
"effective" future initiatives to deal with the past. 
 
The exercise performed is illustrative, seeking only to show how the matrix 
could be used in a more rigorous and extensive research. However, in general 
terms, it is possible to conclude that the Decree foresees a Mandate focused on 
descriptive objectives, and ignoring the important issues which have the serious 
risk of investing its effort and time in documenting what is already documented 
(structural causes of violence and the impact of violence on women, among 
others), and to postpone Colombia's most sensitive truth deficits (identify collective 
and institutional responsibilities, identify accomplices, and beneficiaries of violence, 
and to clarify the phenomenon of forced recruitment, among others). 
 
 Facing this landscape, it is suggested that the CEV should decide how and 
under which criteria to best incorporate its work on previous truth seeking initiatives 
(judicial, extrajudicial, official and unofficial). In light of these criteria, several 
descriptive objectives contemplated by the Decree can be satisfied through 
secondary sources. This would enable the Commission to prioritize the identified 
deficits of truth and articulate its efforts with local expertise. This articulation would 
be highly beneficial in the creation of participatory and purposeful spaces, where 
those who are responsible for illegal acts may materialize their desire for 
amendment, and victims may not only tell their testimonies of suffering, but be 
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recognized as political actors with concrete proposals for "effective" future 
initiatives to deal with the past. 
 
Likewise, it is suggested that the CEV should determine the time frame and / 
or relevant historical antecedents that is plans to cover as one of its first 
discussions. If the timeframe is too long, the work of the CEV could become 
unfeasible; in fact, 58 years represents a comparatively longer time than any other 
TC has ever documented (See Table 1). However, if that time span is reduced for 
practical reasons, episodes that are fundamental to understanding the conflict 
could be excluded. The Decree does not specify the time frame to be documented 
by the future Commission. The Decree states: 
 
In order to address the different elements of its mandate, the 
Commission will have the temporal enclosure of the conflict period. As 
this is an extensive timeframe, it will be necessary for the Commission 
to establish priorities for its research. However, in order to fulfill the 
purpose of fully clarifying the origins and multiple causes of the conflict, 
the Commission may explore historical events prior to the conflict, taking 
into account as a basic input among others, the reports of the Historical 
Commission of the Conflict and its Victims  (Colombia, 2017) 
 
What follows are the most important conclusions for each dimension to be 
documented. Annex 2 contains a summary of this exercise: CEV’s pending goals 
and significant contributions to examine. 
 
4.1 Context and Background 
 
 On this issue, the Decree foresees a Commission focused on identifying 
damages but discards the suggestion of solutions. In addition, the Decree cites the 
report presented by the "Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims", as 
an essential document to be referred to the CEV regardless of the fact that this text 
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is exclusively academic in nature and has been highly criticized for the absence of 
collective definitions. In fact it never even mentions the "Basta Ya!" Report, which 
has been the result of a long work between academics from the Historical Memory 
Group and victims from different regions of the country. 
 
The HMIs lacks significant experience in order to adequately contribute to 
the documentation of context and background of the Colombia violence. HMIs 
appear to be more focused on elucidating particular criminal acts than on the 
contexts that made such acts possible. 
 
In my opinion, the most novel thing that the CEV could provide is to offer a 
regional and local approach on the information already existing at the national 
level; to identify on a regional basis, the weight of the variables that have been 
documented at the national level. The task of the CEV will be to discuss which 
circumstances can be documented through secondary sources (i.e., university 
studies reviewed by the Sierra Leone TRC) and which require consulting primary 
sources and / or public hearings. 
 
In terms of solutions, international experience shows the limited capacity of 
a TC to modify or transform the structural causes of violence, the criminal 
architecture of the State and / or the international relations and context that led to 
the atrocity. However, it is possible that in the Colombian case the CEV can offer 
two solutions: 1) the creation of pedagogical spaces which seek to modify the 
social frameworks that justified the violence against the civilian population; and 2) 
the creation of participatory spaces that allow for the construction of institutional 
recommendations from a regional and inclusive perspective, thereby preventing 
the final recommendations from being the result of the exclusive work of the 
commissioners in the final sessions of the Commission. 
 




Regarding the identification of victims, both the matrix and the Decree 
coincide with the proposed objectives. What remains to be resolved is the way in 
which individual and collective victims are identified. For individual identification, 
the consolidated figures in Colombia allow for an understanding of the general 
patterns of violence and also illustrate victimization trends suffered in a territorial 
manner. However, the explanatory value of the figures and percentages does not 
replace the symbolic value represented by the lists of victims in the international 
cases studied. The CEV should consult the opinions of the victims regarding the 
symbolic value of the construction of public lists with biographical data, and also 
evaluate the security conditions that such recognition requires. 
 
In the identification of collective victims, both the HMI and the Memory 
Center have consolidated significant advances (especially with regard to women 
and ethnic groups). However, there other sort of collective victims which creates a 
challenging horizon for the future Commission. Both merchants and some 
productive sectors of the country claim to be recognized as victims of extortion and 
expect to participate in the CEV as such (UN, 2015),  however, society in general 
has identified them as responsible for sponsoring and financing the armed actors. 
The CEV will face some of its most difficult challenges when defining its notion of 
collective victims and determining the criteria for which certain groups may enter 
that category. 
 
With regard to the identification of responsible actors, both the matrix and 
the Decree coincide in the objectives that must be fulfilled by the CEV. However, 
the Decree does not specify the need to design non-criminal sanctions (economic, 
symbolic, community work, etc.) that may be assumed by accomplices, indifferent 
bystanders or beneficiaries of violence. Besides, the Decree does not address the 
need to distinguish between those different levels of responsibility. 
 
The HMIs does not contribute with any experience that helps in the 
identification of responsible actors. These initiatives are more focused on the 
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clarification of particular criminal facts than on pointing out those responsible for 
these events.   
 
In my opinion, a broader notion of responsibility must be established, which, 
without ignoring the relevance of criminal and individual, can transcend to explore 
collective and institutional responsibilities. The biggest improvement in this area 
would be not only the identification of those responsible or their accomplices, but 
also their participation in the CEV. The CEV should be a space for many agents 
who have been indifferent bystanders, accomplices or beneficiaries of violence to 
express their commitment to the dignity of the victims and their desire to amend. 
 
In the identification of criminal acts, both the matrix and the Decree propose 
similar objectives. The diagnosis made shows that the least recognized and 
documented is forced recruitment. In this regard, the CEV will have to concentrate 
their efforts to understand and clarify the dimension of this phenomenon. 
 
Regarding the making of the final report, there are also similar objectives 
between the matrix and the Decree. Both the HMIs and the Historical Memory 
Center have significant accumulated experience so that the dissemination of the 
CEV report could be friendly and accessible to both the victims and the general 




When comparing the objectives of the matrix and the Decree, it can be said 
that the mandate establishes that the CEV will focus again on the descriptive 
objectives (identify the impacts suffered), delegating the satisfaction of more 
purposeful objectives (suggesting solutions) to other entities. 
 
For the matrix, both the goals that describe the harms and those that 
propose remedies are equally significant. A Commission that ignores what 
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happened in the past and only focuses on the future would be proposing remedies 
from a point of ignorance. TCs must recognize the past to project the future. This 
synthesis between past, present and future has been materialized in a very 
innovative way by the HMIs: the mechanisms that visualize damages 
simultaneously allow for confronting and overcoming such damages in order to 
undertake the future in a more positive way. The community processes that some 
of these initiatives have designed to make current impacts of past harms more 
visible have in themselves been remedies so that victims can restart their lives and 
regain the bonds of trust within their community. This is an invaluable experience 












Annex 2.  Colombian Commission for the Clarification of Truth: setting 
precise and achievable goals (Executive Summary) 
This charts summarizes how the matrix may support the definition of  the 
objectives of the CEV mandate. Below, using the balance between local and 
national  truth-seeking experiences, I set the most important CEV pending goals 
and suggest some significant contributions that CEV should examine in order to 
accomplish the goals I propose. 
 
 Context and 
background 




















 Clarify factors leading 





to examine:  
 
 For this task, the 
Sierra Leone TC 
should be used for 
guidance: the CEV 
will be able to use all 
existing 
documentation at the 
national level to 
prepare regional 
audiences that allow 
prioritizing the 
background and 
contexts from a local 
dimension 
 The Context Unit of 
the State Prosecutors 
office: Judicial 
decisions allow a 
better understanding 
of the causes and 
contexts of the 
paramilitary 
phenomenon. 
 Historical Memory 
Group and National 
Historical Memory 
Center  and scholarly 
research indicate 
possible structural 
causes of violence, 
 Extensively investigate the 
recruitment of minors, a 
phenomena that has been 
poorly documented in 
Colombia  
 Build a public list with 
names, biographical data 
and facts surrounding the 
victimization (it will be 
subject to the security 
conditions and the 
expressed will of the victims 
to be recognized as such in 
a public way.) 
 Defining CEV’s notion of 
collective victims and 
determining under what 
criteria certain groups may 
enter that category. It is 
especially important here to 
distinguish this category 
from the collective and 
institutional complicities and 
responsibilities.  
 Distinguish between those 
who indirectly promoted 
and maintained violence, 
funded armed groups, 
beneficiaries of violence, or 
are responsible for the 
imposition of violence. 
 Identify and investigate 
“memories of complicity" 
regionally and in greater 
detail. 
 
Significant contributions to 
examine:  
There is no pending goal 
related with diagnosing 
Impacts. It would be 
redundant for CEV to focus 
on documenting what many 
have already been 
documented.  
 
The “Basta Ya!” Report has 
categorized the damage 
caused by violence in a very 
complete and meaningful 
way. 
 
The HMI has a significant 
amount of accumulated 
experience. Some HMIs 
have achieved what no 
other TC in the world has 
been able to do:  their 
mechanisms to visualize the 
impacts of the damage 
(descriptive objectives) are 
in themselves remedies to 
deal with the damages 
suffered by the victim, to 
allow them to restart their 
lives, and to recover the 





show how an 
inefficient state 
becomes a criminal 





Colombian violence  
 
 
 “Single Victims Registry 
(RUV, in its Spanish 
acronym) for persons that 
suffered by the actions of 
illegal armed groups and 
agents of the State between 
1985 and 2011. 
 The "Basta Ya!" Report has 
extensively documented 
(quantitatively and 
qualitatively) the most 
systematic criminal acts that 
civilians in Colombia 
(individuals and groups) 
have suffered. 
 The HMI has significant 
methodological experience, 
evidence and archives to 
prove the occurrence of  






















 Create pedagogical 
spaces to modify the 
social frameworks 
that justified the 
violence against the 
civilian population 
 
 Create participatory 




from a regional and 
inclusive perspective 
and, in this way, 
prevent the final 
recommendations 
from being the result 
of the exclusive work 
of the commissioners 






 Recognize, visualize, and 
enhance local and creative 
ways to publicly publicize 
truth findings.  
 Encourage the different 
responsible and accomplice 
actors (medias, productive 
sector, bystanders, etc..) to 
assume their responsibilities 
and express their 
commitment to the dignity of 
the victims and their desire 
to amend. 
 Propose alternative 
"sanction" corresponding to 
different types of 
responsibility to made 
effective and channel desires 
for amendment and 
repentance.  
 
Significant contribution to 
consult: 
 
 HMI have created 
creative ways to 
publicly publicize their 
findings: photographic 
samples, digital files, 
dolls, patchwork quilts, 
monuments, murals, etc 
 Historical Memory 
Group and National 
Historical Memory 
Center  have been 
involved in the 




 Recognize, visualize, and 
enhance the invaluable 
experience of the HMI. 
These initiatives should be 
made known, strengthened, 
encouraged and replicated 
in other areas of the country 
where memory exercises 







A summary and significant conclusions of this dissertation can be found at 
the end of each chapter. The purpose of this final section is to underline the novelty 
and the most relevant contributions of this thesis in two senses: (i) the theoretical 
contribution to define the notion of truth and the concept of truth commissions in 
the aftermath of violence and (ii) the methodological contribution to operatize my 
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theoretical inputs, to compare two previous TCs  (South Africa and Sierra Leone) 
and to suggest some recommendations for future TCs (Colombia). 
 
Theoretical  contribution  
 
 Although truth-seeking mechanisms have been broadly discussed, the 
nature of the truth that is sought and its justification has been addressed less 
broadly. The current dissertation, instead of discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of establishing a truth commission and its merits over others, 
suggests a discussion around the very concept of truth that TCs find. This 
alternative approach overcomes the perceived tension between TCs’ tasks of 
identifying patterns of violence and hearing out the narratives of victims. 
 
The first and most straightforward objective of a truth commission is to 
conduct a descriptive fact-finding mission and produce an impartial, historical 
report on human rights violations (González & Varney, 2013). Nevertheless, in 
general terms, scholars who have justified the importance of truth commission 
seem to defend the thesis that testimonies recounted by victims, and to which 
empathic audiences listen, should be accepted in some sense, not because they 
exactly correspond to the way events happened in the past, but because the 
process of recounting what is said to be a fact serves many present and ongoing 
interests, e.g., promoting healing for individual victims, promoting reconciliation 
across divisions created by the collective violence, and restoring dignity to victims. 
My own alternative approach to truth and truth commission in the aftermath of 
violence distance themselves from these approach in three ways: i) it underlines 
the risk of overestimating the importance of telling testimonies; ii) it highlights the 
risk of underestimating the value of knowing some factual/objective information; 
and iii) it suggests a concept which makes a synthesis between knowing facts and 




 This distance implies a challenge to the traditional definition of truth-
commission, which locates the victim´s testimonies of suffering as the centerpiece 
of how the TC proceeds. From my approach victims shall participate in TCs as 
people who have suffered the impact of a criminal act in the past, but also as 
citizens who have already resumed their lives after criminal acts or as citizens 
capable of suggesting remedies to deal with the antecedents and context that 
made the atrocities possible. Both the victims´ capability of telling their experience 
of suffering, resistance or resilience and their capability of proposing possible 
futures must be equally attended to. Likewise, non-victims’ groups shall not 
participate in a TC merely as passive listeners of victims’ suffering testimonies. Ex-
combatants, state and/or society participating in the elaboration of the past´s 
diagnosis, shall express their will  to  regenerate themselves in some way 
(Freeman, 2006a)  and explain their purpose for taking part in the restoration of the 
human and civic dignity of victims and society (Du Toit, 2000, p. 135). 
 
Likewise, my definition of TC underlines the legal notion of “remedy” rather 
than the psychological concept of “healing”. “Healing” refers to the process of 
becoming sound or healthy again, it implies the complete restitution of something 
lost or stolen from the victim. “Remedy” is a much more modest notion, it 
emphasizes the universally recognized “right to an effective remedy”; whoever 
causes the damages must amend them partially or totally, according to 
circumstances. For my notion of TC, the idea of remedy implies something which is 
forward and backward looking; a TC should use the past identified damages to 
suggest and recommend steps towards a new moral and political order, it would be 
wrong to deal with the past only for its own sake. My proposed attention to both 
damages and remedies, seeks to overcome the current TC tendency of spending 
disproportionate efforts and time on diagnosing damages and leaving the 
recommendations for the final pages of the report. A TC should look both ways in 






The previous theoretical contribution allows me to design a methodological 
framework, which sets up a list of objectives to be chosen and prioritized for any 
new truth commission. It is intended to be flexible, so that it can help in different 
times and places that vary between each other. These “potential objectives” are a 
set of criteria that commissioners can use to learn from previous experiences of 
TCs from all over the world, as well as to dialogue with local truth-seeking 
experiences. On the one hand, the comparisons with the international experiences 
will enable the identification of the challenges that previous TCs have faced in their 
efforts to achieve their so called objectives. On the other hand, the local approach 
helps to shed light on understanding how and to what extent these ideal objectives 
have been met in the regions and localities in which the future TC will work.  
Taking into account both international and local experiences, more feasible 
objectives might be established for future TCs so that the commissioners might 
undertake their task more effectively. 
 
The important task of defining clear and concise TC objectives ensures that 
“all participants [of a TC] have realistic expectations about what impact their 
contributions could have” (González 2013). Whether the TC is expected to help to 
heal a nation, or reconcile victims with their torturers, or to ensure the rule of law, 
or to establish a culture of human rights, etc., a sense of disappointment frequently 
emerges in the aftermath of a truth commission process (Freeman 2006); a proper 
definition of a TC’s objectives can help control such expectations and save truth 
commissions from generating cycles of high hopes and bitter disappointments 
(Minow 1999).  
 
The challenges that new TCs face are enormous, so the methodological  
framework  attempts only to support their work in two senses: (1) by suggesting 
two main actions to perform:  (i) diagnosing the damages suffered (backward 
looking) and recommending the necessary remedies to deal with them (forward 
looking), and (2) recommending three important issues to document: (i) the 
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background and context of the crimes (what triggered a criminal act), (ii) the 
criminal acts as such and the implicated actors, and (iii) the impacts caused by 
such atrocities (the ongoing damages suffered by the victims). 
 
This methodological matrix was built looking at two international cases: the 
South African (SA) and Sierra Leone (SL) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
(TRC) and once it was finished it was applied to Colombia’s future TC. My 
methodological contribution allows for the comparison and systematization of the 
enormous variety of issues documented and the rich experience of both (i) the final 
reports of the SA and SL TRCs and (ii) the local  truth-finding experience in 
Colombia. 
 
The Sierra Leone TRC Report (1,828 pages) is organized in four main 
volumes, each divided in chapters; five appendices add 3,122 pages, for a total of 
4,950 pages. Grosso modo, the content of each of the volumes can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Section: Contents: 
Vol. 1  TRC Methodology 
Vol. 2  Executive Summary 
 Damages 
 Remedies 
 List of Victims 
Vol. 3A, 3B  Causes and antecedents of the Conflict 
 Nature of the Conflict 
 Influential factors 
 The TRC itself 
 Principle victims 
 TRC’s suggestion for reconciliation and the future 
SL 
Appendices  Esp. official documents received or emitted by 
TRC procedures 
 
On the other hand, and although it does present certain similarities, the 
general structure of the SA TRC Report is fairly different. The first five volumes are 
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2,757 pages long, while the two Codicil volumes contribute with 1,764 pages; thus, 
the whole report is 4,521 pages long. The content can be roughly summarized as 
follows: 
 
Vol. 1  TRC Methodology 
Vol. 2  Gross violation of human 
rights 
Vol. 3  Gross violation of human 
rights (from victims’ perspective) 
Vol. 4  Nature of the SA society 
Vol. 5  Conclusions 
Vol. 6  Codicils to the 3 committee 
reports 
 Findings and 
Recommendations 
 Administration report 
Vol. 7  Victims: names and findings 
  
 
The methodological matrix offers valuable criteria to make an easier 
comparative exercise between these TCs, regardless of how different their reports 
are in length, complexity, structure and the issues they address.  In light of the 
“potential objectives”, the dialogue between these previous TCs allow for the 
systematization of the challenges and lessons they have faced in their efforts to 
achieve and accomplish (or not) the said objectives. 
 
The exercise was applied to the Colombian case where the universe of victims and 
the duration of the conflict are much wider than what other TCs have addressed 
and documented so far. Specifically, the task of suggesting clear and concise 
objectives for the future TC in Colombia, faced two important challenges:  
 
i. The "Final Agreement for the Ending of the Conflict and the 
Building of a Stable and Durable Peace", the document which created the 
future Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-
Repetition (CVCR)  has set up three main goals, eleven functions and a 
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additional mandate that includes thirteen aspects to be clarified and 
recognized.  Thus, this document cripples the TC’s future in many ways by i) 
forcing the commission to waste valuable time and resources in defining the 
parameters of its task; ii) causing critical contradictions within the 
commission; and iii) diminishing the capacity of key stakeholders to 
cooperate effectively with the commission. 
 
ii. Colombia possess multiple previous institutional efforts and 
varied local initiatives, for example between 1958 and 2012, twelve national 
commissions for study and extrajudicial investigation of violence were 
designed and, by October 2015, the Historical Memory Center had 
consolidated a record of 323 Historical Memory Initiatives. Ignoring theses 
previous official and local inputs could lead to the duplication of tasks or the 
general ignorance of the valuable experience acquired in the last 10 years in 
the country. 
 
So how does one articulate this Colombian valuable experience with a TC 
that begins with an obscure mandate? The objectives of the Colombian decrees 
were incapable of accomplishing what the matrix objectives sought to do, which 
was to systematise previous institutional efforts and varied local initiatives, while 
highlighting the country’s truth deficits and prioritizing the pending goals of the 
CEV.  In sum, the contribution of the matrix in this thesis is to guide the current 
CEV in preventing them from duplicating objectives that have already been 
satisfied in other instances and to allow the CEV to take advantage of local 
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